

How sustainable is India's household debt?

Presenting estimates of debt service ratio (DSR)

- According to the [recent data](#) published by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), household liabilities surged in FY23, as annual borrowings stood at 5.8% of GDP (INR15.8t) last year, the second highest since the 1970s. Accordingly, India's household debt surged to 48.1% of their income in FY23, from 43.3% in FY20 and ~35% of GDP a decade ago. A look at the key drivers of bank loans to households confirms that non-housing personal loans have increased at the fastest pace since 2022, followed by housing loans, business loans and agricultural loans. As highlighted in our recent [report](#), non-mortgage household debt in India in FY23 was similar to that in the US, Canada, Japan, China and Australia.
- Irrespective of the key drivers of the surge in household debt, it is obvious that such a massive level of borrowings in just one year do not pose any threat to India's financial or macroeconomic stability. But what if it continues for the next few years? How long can it sustain? What is the sustainable level of household debt in India? In this note, we answer these questions and more.
- We adopt two different approaches. *First*, we analyze whether higher household debt in recent years is led by credit widening (i.e., more borrowers) or credit deepening (i.e., higher credit per borrower). The higher the share of the former is, the better it is. *Second*, we present our calculations of the debt service ratio (DSR) for Indian households. DSR measures the share of income used to service their loans (i.e., the ratio of interest payments plus amortizations to income). The lower it is, the better it is.
- Our analyses confirm that a majority of the growth in household debt in the past decade was driven by 'credit widening' and not 'credit deepening'. It is clear that as much as 90% of the growth in household debt in the past decade was attributed to credit widening. This methodology, however, has serious limitations.
- On the contrary, we find that DSR of Indian households is ~12%, similar to that in Nordic countries (where household debt-to-income ratio is 3-4x to that of India), and more than that in China (8.5%), France (6.4%), the UK (8.6%) and the US (7.7%), all of which have household leverage of more than 100%. A combination of a higher interest rate and lower tenure of loans makes DSR much higher for Indian households, even with a debt-to-income ratio of less than 50%.
- Historically, only a few nations (Australia, Denmark, Netherlands and Norway out of a sample of 19 economies) have seen household DSR of more than 15%. Doing the reverse calculation and assuming 15% DSR as the threshold, different combinations of an effective interest rate and maturity would yield a different threshold of household debt in India. However, our estimates suggest that Indian households will reach DSR of 15% with a debt-to-income ratio of ~60% (or ~47% of GDP), which was 48.1% (37.6% of GDP) in FY23. Given the recent trends in household debt and income, India can touch this threshold by the end of this decade, i.e. over the next 5-7 years.
- One of the most effective ways, in our view, to reduce the obligation burden for Indian households, and thus raise the leverage threshold, is to increase the residual maturity profile of borrowers. An increase in the maturity by six months (or 0.5 year) can push the threshold of household leverage by more than 4pp of income. At the same time, a reduction in the effective interest rate by 1pp raises debt by just 1.6pp of income. As highlighted [earlier](#), a falling savings ratio in India makes it difficult to aim for a lower interest rate over a long term.

Recent trends in India's household debt

According to the recently [released](#) data by the RBI, household net financial savings (HHNFS) [collapsed](#) to a 47-year low of 5.1% of GDP in FY23, compared to 7.2% in FY22 and 11.5% of GDP in FY21. The primary cause of the fall in HHNFS in FY23 vs. FY22 was the rise in their financial liabilities, as gross financial savings in FY23 were broadly the same as in FY22 at ~11% of GDP. HH liabilities increased by 5.8% of GDP (or INR8.2t) in FY23, marking the second highest rise in the past 50 years (*Exhibit 1*), barring FY07, when it increased by 6.7% of GDP. Accordingly, household debt stood at 48.1% of personal disposable income (PDI) in FY23, compared to 43.3% of PDI in FY20 and ~35% of PDI a decade ago (*Exhibit 2*).

Nikhil Gupta – Research analyst (Nikhil.Gupta@MotilalOswal.com)

Tanisha Ladha – Research analyst (Tanisha.Ladha@MotilalOswal.com)

Investors are advised to refer through important disclosures made at the last page of the Research Report. Motilal Oswal research is available on www.motilaloswal.com/Institutional-Equities, Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters, Factset and S&P Capital.

Exhibit 1: Household liabilities increased to the second-highest level on record in the past 50 years...





Exhibit 2: ... which led to a surge in household debt to 48.1% of PDI in FY23, up from 43% in FY20



Assuming 15% growth in nominal PDI in FY23
Source: Various national sources, CEIC, MOFSL

Key drivers of India’s household debt

Non-mortgage household debt at ~26% of GDP in India is comparable to that in the US, Japan, China and Australia

The level of Indian household debt has raised a lot of eyebrows. Some commentators have argued that the rise in liabilities is a reflection of the buoyancy in the residential real estate sector, which means that household physical savings have increased rapidly. On the other hand, some observers have raised concerns regarding the pace of the increase in household borrowings. We have already highlighted in one of our recent research reports that although household debt in India is low compared to other major nations, non-mortgage household debt at ~26% of GDP in India is comparable to that in the US, Canada, Japan and China (*Exhibit 3*). In fact, a look at the different major components of household debt by scheduled commercial banks (SCBs) that account for ~80% of total household debt confirms that non-housing personal loans have increased at the fastest pace since 2022, followed by housing loans, business loans and agricultural loans (*Exhibit 4*).

Exhibit 3: Non-mortgage household debt in India is similar to that in the US, Japan and China





Exhibit 4: Non-housing personal loans have increased at the fastest pace since 2022



Non-housing personal loans have increased at the fastest pace, followed by housing loans, business loans and agricultural loans

Overall, there is no doubt that housing debt has gone up; however, non-housing personal loans have grown at a faster pace, which means consumption-related loans have also gone up substantially in the past 18 months. And it is a well-established fact that leverage and savings are inversely correlated with each other. Higher borrowings will lead to lower savings since a large portion of household income will be used to service the existing debt.

It is obvious that massive borrowings in just 12-18 months do not pose any threat to India’s financial or macroeconomic stability. However, what if they continue for the next few years? How long can this financially irresponsible behavior continue before Indian households are pushed against the wall? What is the sustainable level of household debt in India? Let’s answer these questions.

Is the current rise in household debt threatening – credit deepening vs. credit widening?

As much as 90% of the growth in household debt during the past decade was attributed to credit widening.


The recent rise in household leverage, which clearly shows a notable shift in the post-Covid period, definitely seems exceptional. Nevertheless, it is widely known that India household debt at 48.1% of PDI (or 37.6% of GDP) is very low compared to most advanced economies and many large emerging nations as well. So, is the current rise threatening? If not, how long can it continue?

We adopt two different approaches to answer these questions. *First*, we analyze whether high household debt in recent years is led by credit widening or credit deepening. The RBI provides data on outstanding debt and the number of loan accounts on a yearly basis. ‘Credit widening’ implies the increase in household debt driven by an increase in the number of borrowers, while ‘credit deepening’ implies that higher household debt is led by a higher number of loans per borrower. It is obvious that the higher the share of the former is, the better it is and vice-versa. If higher debt is led by more borrowers, rather than more credit per borrowers, it implies less concentration and more broadening of credit.

The recent rise in household debt, thus, is not a concern, based on the analysis of credit deepening vs. credit widening.

Our analyses using RBI data confirm that a majority of the growth in household debt in the past decade (FY14-FY23) was driven by ‘credit widening’, and not ‘credit deepening’. During the economic slowdown at the turn of century (FY99-FY03) and immediately post the great financial crisis (FY09-FY13), credit widening accounted for only about a fifth of the increase in household debt. In contrast, it contributed as much as 50% during the high growth phase of FY04-FY08. It is also clear that as much as 90% of the growth in household debt during the past decade (even if divided between FY14-FY19 and FY20-FY23 period) was attributed to credit widening. The recent rise in household debt, thus, is not a concern, based on the analysis of credit deepening vs. credit widening.

Exhibit 5: Majority of the growth in banks’ household debt was owing to credit widening in the past decade



* Credit deepening means higher loan per account, and credit widening means more loan accounts

Source: RBI, CEIC, MOFSL

This methodology, however, has a serious limitation. The RBI publishes data on the number of loan accounts, rather than number of borrowers. It is then possible that a borrower could have borrowed from various financial institutions, leading to a higher number of loan accounts. Using the publicly available data, there is no way to address this limitation. Therefore, we present another method to estimate the sustainable level of household debt in India.

Higher leverage leads to lower savings over a period of time because of the rising share of income to be used to service debt

Presenting our estimates of Indian household debt service ratio (DSR)

The primary reason why higher leverage leads to lower savings over a period of time is the rising share of income to be used to service debt. One of the ways to find out the share of income utilized to service household debt is to calculate the debt service ratio (DSR) for Indian households. DSR measures the share of income used to service their loans (i.e., the ratio of interest payments plus amortizations to income). The lower it is, the better it is and the more sustainable household debt is.

The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) defines DSR as the ratio of interest payments plus amortizations to income. However, since the data on amortization is generally not available, BIS follows an approach used by the US Federal Reserve Board to construct DSR for the household sector.



Unfortunately, BIS does not produce estimates for India’s household DSR. Using official data from the RBI and National Housing Bank (NHB), we estimate DSR for Indian households with some assumptions (Please see [Appendix](#) at the end for details. Also, the interested readers could also read detailed analysis on the financial position of households and other economic participants in the recently released Book “*The Eight Per Cent Solution*”, authored by Nikhil Gupta and published by Bloomsbury).

DSR of Indian households was ~12% in the past three years vs. 11.4-11.5% in FY19 and FY20 and ~10% a decade ago

Our estimates suggest that DSR of Indian households was ~12% in the past three years vs. 11.4-11.5% in FY19 and FY20 and ~10% a decade ago (*Exhibit 6*). Interestingly, Indian household DSR is similar to that in the heavily indebted Nordic countries (where household debt-to-income ratio is 3-4x to that of India’s), and more than that in China (8.5%), France (6.4%), the UK (8.6%) and the US (7.7%), all of which have household leverage of more than 100% (*Exhibit 7*).

Exhibit 6: Household DSR is estimated to have risen to ~12% in India in FY23, the highest in two decades...





Exhibit 7: ...which is much higher than world’s many other major economies




* CY22 data, #FY23 data, quarterly data for all others
Source: BIS, CEIC, RBI, MOFSL

A combination of higher interest rate (~10% per annum) and lower tenure of debt (5.3 years) makes DSR much higher for Indian households


Despite having a much lower household debt-to-income ratio, a very high DSR is definitely a concern for India (*Exhibit 8*). Using the formulae mentioned above, it is easy to identify the causes of such high household DSR in India. A combination of higher interest rates (~10% per annum) and lower tenure of debt (5.3 years) makes DSR much higher for Indian households, even with a debt-to-income ratio of less than 50% (*Exhibit 9*). A silver lining here is the fact that the terms of household borrowings have improved in India during the past decade, with extending maturity (from 4.6-4.7 years a decade ago) and falling interest rates (12% in FY13 and FY14).

Exhibit 8: Household DSR is much lower in many other heavily indebted economies...



Based on Mar'23 data (Dec'22 for China/CN)

Exhibit 9: ...because of high interest rates and low maturity in India, which has improved in the past decade



FY23 data on tenure is our assumption
Source: BIS, RBI, CEIC, MOFSL

What is the sustainable level of India's household debt?


Overall, our analysis suggests that Indian households already utilize about 12% of their income to service their debt, which is among the highest compared to other major nations in the world. This is despite the fact that India's household debt-to-income ratio is less than 50%, which is much lower compared to many other major economies. If so, how long can the sharp increase in household liabilities witnessed during the past 18 months continue?

Historically, only a few nations (Australia, Denmark, Netherlands and Norway out of a sample of 19 economies we have) have seen household DSR of more than 15% (*Exhibit 10*). Household DSR in the US had touched 11.5% in 2007, before the great financial crisis of 2008.

Doing the reverse calculation and assuming 15% DSR as the threshold, different combinations of an effective interest rate and maturity would yield a different threshold of household debt in India. Our calculations suggest that assuming an unchanged interest rate and maturity, Indian households will reach DSR of 15% with a debt-to-income ratio of around 60% (or 47% of GDP), which was 48.1% (37.6% of GDP) in FY23. Going by recent trends (last few years, pre-Covid and/or post-Covid) in household borrowings and PDI, India can touch this ratio by the end of this decade, i.e. over the next 5-7 years.


Assuming unchanged interest rates and maturity, Indian households will reach DSR of 15% with a debt-to-income ratio of around 60% (or 47% of GDP), which was 48.1% (37.6% of GDP) in FY23

Exhibit 10: Only a few nations have witnessed a peak of 15% household DSR...



This is based on quarterly data available for 17 advanced economies

Exhibit 11: ...and it suggests a threshold of India's household debt-to-PDI of ~60% vs. 48.1% now



E = Assuming 15% growth in nominal PDI in FY23
 Threshold @15% DSR Source: BIS, RBI, CEIC, MOFSL

Household leverage in India is not as low as most public forums, market commentators and many leading multi-international organizations believe and argue it to be

How can we make it sustainable for a prolonged period?

While more analysis with detailed data is required to be done by the regulators, the key lessons are that: 1) since the cost of servicing debt is much higher and the average maturity is very low in India, the headline household debt-to-income ratio is not comparable to other nations; and 2) with unchanged maturity (5.3 years) and effective interest rate (10% pa), if DSR of 15% is considered as the threshold level for India, the sustainable level of India's household debt is ~60% of income, which was 48.1% in FY23; and 3) our analysis confirms that household leverage in India is not as low as most public forums, market commentators and many leading multi-international organizations believe and argue it to be. However, it is not even at alarming levels at this stage, which provides a window to the policymakers to attempt required maneuver to make it more sustainable.

An increase in the maturity by six months can push the threshold of household leverage by more than 4pp of income

One of the most effective ways, in our view, to reduce the debt servicing burden for Indian households, and thus, raise the threshold debt level, is to increase the residual maturity profile of borrowers. An increase in the maturity by six months (or 0.5 year) can push the threshold of household leverage by more than 4pp of income. At the same time, a reduction in the effective interest rate by 1pp raises the sustainable level of household debt by just 1.6pp of income. As highlighted [earlier](#), a falling savings ratio in India makes it difficult to aim for a lower interest rate over a long term. Therefore, the best way to make higher household debt more sustainable in India for a longer period is to increase the average maturity period.

Appendix: Estimation of debt service ratio (DSR) of Indian households

BIS [states](#) “At the individual level, it is straightforward to determine the DSR. Households and firms know the amount of interest they pay on all their outstanding debts, how much debt they have to amortize per period and how much income they earn. But even so, difficulties can arise. Many contracts can be rolled over so that the effective period for repaying a particular loan can be much longer than the contractual maturity of the specific contract. Equally, some contracts allow for early repayments so that households or firms can amortize ahead of schedule. Given this, deriving aggregate DSRs from individual-level data does not necessarily lead to good estimates. And such data are rarely comprehensive, if available at all. For this reason, we derive aggregate DSRs from aggregate data directly.”

The formulae used by BIS to estimate DSR for the sector j (households in our case) at time t is:

$$DSR_{j,t} = \frac{i_{j,t}}{(1 - (1 + i_{j,t})^{-s_{j,t}})} * \frac{D_{j,t}}{Y_{j,t}} \quad (1)$$

where $D_{j,t}$ denotes the total stock of debt, $Y_{j,t}$ denotes aggregate income available for debt service payments, $i_{j,t}$ denotes the average interest rate on the existing stock of debt, and $s_{j,t}$ denotes the average remaining maturity across the stock of debt.

To address the lack of data on average maturity of loans, we use an RBI publication known as *Statistical Tables related to Banks in India*. It contains the maturity profile of banks’ total loan book (not household loans) under eight different baskets: 1–14 days, 15–28 days, 29 days to 3 months, 3–6 months, 6–12 months, 1–3 years, 3–5 years and over 5 years. Taking the mid-point of each period and eight years for loans with maturity of over five years, we find that the average maturity of bank loans increased to 3.2 years in FY22 (the latest data available) from 2.5 years in early 2000s. Considering that household loans comprise housing loans, which are generally of longer maturity, we further assume that the average maturity of bank loans to the household sector was one and a half years more than the average maturity of loans. It means that the average maturity of bank loans to the household sector ranged between 4.0 and 4.7 years during the past two decades.

Additionally, since 97% of outstanding housing loans to individuals with HFCs were of over seven years’ maturity as at end-FY22 (and the ratio has been similar in the previous years), we have assumed their average maturity at 10 years for HFCs. Lastly, since no such information is available for NBFC loans to the household sector, we have assumed it to be same as that of bank loans (though with negligible portion of housing loans, it should ideally be lower).

After combining this information on the maturity profile of banks/NBFCs (4.0-4.7 years) and HFCs (10 years), an estimate of the average maturity of household debt in the country can be prepared using the share of each of these lenders into household debt.

Our methodology suggests that the average maturity of household debt in India ranged between 4.5 and 5.2 years during FY02 and FY22. We assume it to have risen to 5.3 years in FY23. To put it in perspective, the average maturity of household debt in 17 advanced nations, for which DSR is calculated by BIS, is estimated at close to 13 years.

Besides tenure, we use the RBI data on banks' exposure to the household sector to estimate the interest rate on household loans every year. This data is also available for the past two decades. Since there are no details on the effective interest rates charged by HFCs and NBFCs, we assume the banks' interest rate as the final rate on Indian household debt (effective interest rate for non-bank lenders; however, is likely to be higher than the rate for banks). Importantly, since the average maturity of household debt has been about five years during the past two decades, we use the debt-weighted average interest rate of the last five years on a rotating basis as a proxy to the effective interest rate.

Now, with the information available on household debt, household income, effective interest rate and maturity, we can build estimates of the DSR for Indian households using equation (1) above and compare it with its counterparts in other nations.

Explanation of Investment Rating	
Investment Rating	Expected return (over 12-month)
BUY	>=15%
SELL	< - 10%
NEUTRAL	< - 10 % to 15%
UNDER REVIEW	Rating may undergo a change
NOT RATED	We have forward looking estimates for the stock but we refrain from assigning recommendation

*In case the recommendation given by the Research Analyst is inconsistent with the investment rating legend for a continuous period of 30 days, the Research Analyst shall be within following 30 days take appropriate measures to make the recommendation consistent with the investment rating legend.

Disclosures

The following Disclosures are being made in compliance with the SEBI Research Analyst Regulations 2014 (herein after referred to as the Regulations).

Motilal Oswal Financial Services Ltd. (MOFSL) is a SEBI Registered Research Analyst having registration no. INH000000412. MOFSL, the Research Entity (RE) as defined in the Regulations, is engaged in the business of providing Stock broking services, Depository participant services & distribution of various financial products. MOFSL is a listed public company, the details in respect of which are available on www.motilaloswal.com. MOFSL (erstwhile Motilal Oswal Securities Limited - MOSL) is registered with the Securities & Exchange Board of India (SEBI) and is a registered Trading Member with National Stock Exchange of India Ltd. (NSE) and Bombay Stock Exchange Limited (BSE), Multi Commodity Exchange of India Limited (MCX) and National Commodity & Derivatives Exchange Limited (NCDEX) for its stock broking activities & is Depository participant with Central Depository Services Limited (CDSL) National Securities Depository Limited (NSDL), NERL, COMRIS and CCRL and is member of Association of Mutual Funds of India (AMFI) for distribution of financial products and Insurance Regulatory & Development Authority of India (IRDA) as Corporate Agent for insurance products. Details of associate entities of Motilal Oswal Financial Services Limited are available on the website at

<http://onlinereports.motilaloswal.com/Dormant/documents/List%20of%20Associate%20companies.pdf>

MOFSL and its associate company(ies), their directors and Research Analyst and their relatives may; (a) from time to time, have a long or short position in, act as principal in, and buy or sell the securities or derivatives thereof of companies mentioned herein. (b) be engaged in any other transaction involving such securities and earn brokerage or other compensation or act as a market maker in the financial instruments of the company(ies) discussed herein or act as an advisor or lender/borrower to such company(ies) or may have any other potential conflict of interests with respect to any recommendation and other related information and opinions.; however the same shall have no bearing whatsoever on the specific recommendations made by the analyst(s), as the recommendations made by the analyst(s) are completely independent of the views of the associates of MOFSL even though there might exist an inherent conflict of interest in some of the stocks mentioned in the research report.

MOFSL and / or its affiliates do and seek to do business including investment banking with companies covered in its research reports. As a result, the recipients of this report should be aware that MOFSL may have a potential conflict of interest that may affect the objectivity of this report. Compensation of Research Analysts is not based on any specific merchant banking, investment banking or brokerage service transactions. Details of pending Enquiry Proceedings of Motilal Oswal Financial Services Limited are available on the website at <https://galaxy.motilaloswal.com/ResearchAnalyst/PublishViewLitigation.aspx>

A graph of daily closing prices of securities is available at www.nseindia.com, www.bseindia.com. Research Analyst views on Subject Company may vary based on Fundamental research and Technical Research. Proprietary trading desk of MOFSL or its associates maintains arm's length distance with Research Team as all the activities are segregated from MOFSL research activity and therefore it can have an independent view with regards to Subject Company for which Research Team have expressed their views.

Regional Disclosures (outside India)

This report is not directed or intended for distribution to or use by any person or entity resident in a state, country or any jurisdiction, where such distribution, publication, availability or use would be contrary to law, regulation or which would subject MOFSL & its group companies to registration or licensing requirements within such jurisdictions.

For Hong Kong:

This report is distributed in Hong Kong by Motilal Oswal capital Markets (Hong Kong) Private Limited, a licensed corporation (CE AYY-301) licensed and regulated by the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) pursuant to the Securities and Futures Ordinance (Chapter 571 of the Laws of Hong Kong) "SFO". As per SEBI (Research Analyst Regulations) 2014 Motilal Oswal Securities (SEBI Reg. No. INH000000412) has an agreement with Motilal Oswal capital Markets (Hong Kong) Private Limited for distribution of research report in Hong Kong. This report is intended for distribution only to "Professional Investors" as defined in Part I of Schedule 1 to SFO. Any investment or investment activity to which this document relates is only available to professional investor and will be engaged only with professional investors." Nothing here is an offer or solicitation of these securities, products and services in any jurisdiction where their offer or sale is not qualified or exempt from registration. The Indian Analyst(s) who compile this report is/are not located in Hong Kong & are not conducting Research Analysis in Hong Kong.

For U.S.

Motilal Oswal Financial Services Limited (MOFSL) is not a registered broker - dealer under the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the "1934 act") and under applicable state laws in the United States. In addition MOFSL is not a registered investment adviser under the U.S. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended (the "Advisers Act" and together with the 1934 Act, the "Acts"), and under applicable state laws in the United States. Accordingly, in the absence of specific exemption under the Acts, any brokerage and investment services provided by MOFSL, including the products and services described herein are not available to or intended for U.S. persons. This report is intended for distribution only to "Major Institutional Investors" as defined by Rule 15a-6(b)(4) of the Exchange Act and interpretations thereof by SEC (henceforth referred to as "major institutional investors"). This document must not be acted on or relied on by persons who are not major institutional investors. Any investment or investment activity to which this document relates is only available to major institutional investors and will be engaged in only with major institutional investors. In reliance on the exemption from registration provided by Rule 15a-6 of the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the "Exchange Act") and interpretations thereof by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") in order to conduct business with Institutional Investors based in the U.S., MOFSL has entered into a chaperoning agreement with a U.S. registered broker-dealer, Motilal Oswal Securities International Private Limited. ("MOSIPL"). Any business interaction pursuant to this report will have to be executed within the provisions of this chaperoning agreement.

The Research Analysts contributing to the report may not be registered /qualified as research analyst with FINRA. Such research analyst may not be associated persons of the U.S. registered broker-dealer, MOSIPL, and therefore, may not be subject to NASD rule 2711 and NYSE Rule 472 restrictions on communication with a subject company, public appearances and trading securities held by a research analyst account.

For Singapore

In Singapore, this report is being distributed by Motilal Oswal Capital Markets Singapore Pte Ltd ("MOCMSPL") (Co. Reg. NO. 201129401Z) which is a holder of a capital markets services license and an exempt financial adviser in Singapore. As per the approved agreement under Paragraph 9 of Third Schedule of Securities and Futures Act (CAP 289) and Paragraph 11 of First Schedule of Financial Advisors Act (CAP 110) provided to MOCMSPL by Monetary Authority of Singapore. Persons in Singapore should contact MOCMSPL in respect of any matter arising from, or in connection with this report/publication/communication. This report is distributed solely to persons who qualify as "Institutional Investors", of which some of whom may consist of "accredited" institutional investors as defined in section 4A(1) of the Securities and Futures Act, Chapter 289 of Singapore ("the SFA"). Accordingly, if a Singapore person is not or ceases to be such an institutional investor, such Singapore Person must immediately discontinue any use of this Report and inform MOCMSPL.

Specific Disclosures

- 1 MOFSL, Research Analyst and/or his relatives does not have financial interest in the subject company, as they do not have equity holdings in the subject company.
- 2 MOFSL, Research Analyst and/or his relatives do not have actual/beneficial ownership of 1% or more securities in the subject company
- 3 MOFSL, Research Analyst and/or his relatives have not received compensation/other benefits from the subject company in the past 12 months
- 4 MOFSL, Research Analyst and/or his relatives do not have material conflict of interest in the subject company at the time of publication of research report
- 5 Research Analyst has not served as director/officer/employee in the subject company
- 6 MOFSL has not acted as a manager or co-manager of public offering of securities of the subject company in past 12 months
- 7 MOFSL has not received compensation for investment banking/ merchant banking/brokerage services from the subject company in the past 12 months
- 8 MOFSL has not received compensation for other than investment banking/merchant banking/brokerage services from the subject company in the past 12 months
- 9 MOFSL has not received any compensation or other benefits from third party in connection with the research report
- 10 MOFSL has not engaged in market making activity for the subject company

The associates of MOFSL may have:

- financial interest in the subject company
- actual/beneficial ownership of 1% or more securities in the subject company at the end of the month immediately preceding the date of publication of the Research Report or date of the public appearance.
- received compensation/other benefits from the subject company in the past 12 months
- any other potential conflict of interests with respect to any recommendation and other related information and opinions.; however the same shall have no bearing whatsoever on the specific recommendations made by the analyst(s), as the recommendations made by the analyst(s) are completely independent of the views of the associates of MOFSL even though there might exist an inherent conflict of interest in some of the stocks mentioned in the research report.
- acted as a manager or co-manager of public offering of securities of the subject company in past 12 months
- be engaged in any other transaction involving such securities and earn brokerage or other compensation or act as a market maker in the financial instruments of the company(ies) discussed herein or act as an advisor or lender/borrower to such company(ies)
- received compensation from the subject company in the past 12 months for investment banking / merchant banking / brokerage services or from other than said services.
- Served subject company as its clients during twelve months preceding the date of distribution of the research report.

The associates of MOFSL has not received any compensation or other benefits from third party in connection with the research report

Above disclosures include beneficial holdings lying in demat account of MOFSL which are opened for proprietary investments only. While calculating beneficial holdings, It does not consider demat accounts which are opened in name of MOFSL for other purposes (i.e holding client securities, collaterals, error trades etc.). MOFSL also earns DP income from clients which are not considered in above disclosures.

Analyst Certification

The views expressed in this research report accurately reflect the personal views of the analyst(s) about the subject securities or issues, and no part of the compensation of the research analyst(s) was, is, or will be directly or indirectly related to the specific recommendations and views expressed by research analyst(s) in this report.

Terms & Conditions:

This report has been prepared by MOFSL and is meant for sole use by the recipient and not for circulation. The report and information contained herein is strictly confidential and may not be altered in any way, transmitted to, copied or distributed, in part or in whole, to any other person or to the media or reproduced in any form, without prior written consent of MOFSL. The report is based on the facts, figures and information that are considered true, correct, reliable and accurate. The intent of this report is not recommendatory in nature. The information is obtained from publicly available media or other sources believed to be reliable. Such information has not been independently verified and no guaranty, representation of warranty, express or implied, is made as to its accuracy, completeness or correctness. All such information and opinions are subject to change without notice. The report is prepared solely for informational purpose and does not constitute an offer document or solicitation of offer to buy or sell or subscribe for securities or other financial instruments for the clients. Though disseminated to all the customers simultaneously, not all customers may receive this report at the same time. MOFSL will not treat recipients as customers by virtue of their receiving this report.

Disclaimer:

The report and information contained herein is strictly confidential and meant solely for the selected recipient and may not be altered in any way, transmitted to, copied or distributed, in part or in whole, to any other person or to the media or reproduced in any form, without prior written consent. This report and information herein is solely for informational purpose and may not be used or considered as an offer document or solicitation of offer to buy or sell or subscribe for securities or other financial instruments. Nothing in this report constitutes investment, legal, accounting and tax advice or a representation that any investment or strategy is suitable or appropriate to your specific circumstances.

The securities discussed and opinions expressed in this report may not be suitable for all investors, who must make their own investment decisions, based on their own investment objectives, financial positions and needs of specific recipient. This may not be taken in substitution for the exercise of independent judgment by any recipient. Each recipient of this document should make such investigations as it deems necessary to arrive at an independent evaluation of an investment in the securities of companies referred to in this document (including the merits and risks involved), and should consult its own advisors to determine the merits and risks of such an investment. The investment discussed or views expressed may not be suitable for all investors. Certain transactions -including those involving futures, options, another derivative products as well as non-investment grade securities - involve substantial risk and are not suitable for all investors. No representation or warranty, express or implied, is made as to the accuracy, completeness or fairness of the information and opinions contained in this document. The Disclosures of Interest Statement incorporated in this document is provided solely to enhance the transparency and should not be treated as endorsement of the views expressed in the report. This information is subject to change without any prior notice. The Company reserves the right to make modifications and alternations to this statement as may be required from time to time without any prior approval. MOFSL, its associates, their directors and the employees may from time to time, effect or have effected an own account transaction in, or deal as principal or agent in or for the securities mentioned in this document. They may perform or seek to perform investment banking or other services for, or solicit investment banking or other business from, any company referred to in this report. Each of these entities functions as a separate, distinct and independent of each other. The recipient should take this into account before interpreting the document. This report has been prepared on the basis of information that is already available in publicly accessible media or developed through analysis of MOFSL. The views expressed are those of the analyst, and the Company may or may not subscribe to all the views expressed therein. This document is being supplied to you solely for your information and may not be reproduced, redistributed or passed on, directly or indirectly, to any other person or published, copied, in whole or in part, for any purpose. This report is not directed or intended for distribution to, or use by, any person or entity who is a citizen or resident of or located in any locality, state, country or other jurisdiction, where such distribution, publication, availability or use would be contrary to law, regulation or which would subject MOFSL to any registration or licensing requirement within such jurisdiction. The securities described herein may or may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to certain category of investors. Persons in whose possession this document may come are required to inform themselves of and to observe such restriction.

Neither the Firm, not its directors, employees, agents or representatives shall be liable for any damages whether direct or indirect, incidental, special or consequential including lost revenue or lost profits that may arise from or in connection with the use of the information. The person accessing this information specifically agrees to exempt MOFSL or any of its affiliates or employees from, any and all responsibility/liability arising from such misuse and agrees not to hold MOFSL or any of its affiliates or employees responsible for any such misuse and further agrees to hold MOFSL or any of its affiliates or employees free and harmless from all losses, costs, damages, expenses that may be suffered by the person accessing this information due to any errors and delays.

Investment in securities market are subject to market risks. Read all the related documents carefully before investing.

Registration granted by SEBI and certification from NISM in no way guarantee performance of the intermediary or provide any assurance of returns to investors.

Registered Office Address: Motilal Oswal Tower, Rahimtullah Sayani Road, Opposite Parel ST Depot, Prabhadevi, Mumbai-400025; Tel No.: 022 - 71934200 / 71934263;

www.motilaloswal.com. Correspondence Address: Palm Spring Centre, 2nd Floor, Palm Court Complex, New Link Road, Malad (West), Mumbai- 400 064. Tel No: 022 71881000.

Details of Compliance Officer: Neeraj Agarwal, Email Id: na@motilaloswal.com, Contact No.:022-40548085.

Grievance Redressal Cell:

Contact Person	Contact No.	Email ID
Ms. Hemangi Date	022 40548000 / 022 67490600	query@motilaloswal.com
Ms. Kumud Upadhyay	022 40548082	servicehead@motilaloswal.com
Mr. Ajay Menon	022 40548083	am@motilaloswal.com

Registration details of group entities.: Motilal Oswal Financial Services Ltd. (MOFSL): INZ000158836 (BSE/NSE/MCX/NCDEX); CDSL and NSDL: IN-DP-16-2015; Research Analyst: INH000000412 . AMFI: ARN : 146822. IRDA Corporate Agent – CA0579. Motilal Oswal Financial Services Ltd. is a distributor of Mutual Funds, PMS, Fixed Deposit, Insurance, Bond, NCDs and IPO products.

Customer having any query/feedback/clarification may write to query@motilaloswal.com. In case of grievances for any of the services rendered by Motilal Oswal Financial Services Limited (MOFSL) write to grievances@motilaloswal.com, for DP to dpgrievances@motilaloswal.com.