Thematic
Union Budget FY14-15
| August 2014
Oil & Gas
Marketing freedom: A win-win for all
Part 2 of 3
Harshad Borawake
(HarshadBorawake@MotilalOswal.com); +91 22 3982 5432
Nitish Rathi
(Nitish.Rathi@MotilalOswal.com); +91 22 3982 5558
July 2014
2

Oil & Gas | Thematic
Marketing freedom: A win-win for all
OMC’s to move into structural investment plays
Page No.
Summary…………………………………………………………………………………..…………………….…………………..
Story in charts…………………………………………………………………………….…………………….…………………
Diesel deregulation - Higher marketing margin = higher profitability………………………………..
Small dose of diesel price hikes - a palatable solution, will kero/LPG follow?
Expect overall under-recovery to reduce by ~50% by FY16E
OMCs profitability on a structural upturn
Working capital reduction to increase EPS by 8-16%
Free market to improve marketing profitability, expect 18-35% EPS upside
3
5-6
7 - 12
Private entry unlikely to dent OMCs volume………………...…………………………………………………...
OMCs seem well prepared v/s previous deregulation period
Fuel retail outlet economics challenging at low volumes
Indian demand potential has room for PSUs and private as well
22,000 new fuel retail stations required in the next five years
Absolute volume loss for OMCs unlikely
Long term winning strategy for fuel retailers
13 - 19
Expect OMC’s could benefit by forward integration………………………………………………….…….....
Pure refining business becoming more challenging…
…..investments inevitable to survive in the new normal
Petchem integration to offer diversification and stability in earnings
Integration into downstream chemical can significantly reduce risks
20 - 22
OMC’s to benefit from diesel deregulation and likely marketing margin increase………….…
Expect OMCs to move from trading plays to structural investment plays
BPCL is our top pick in OMC’s
23 - 24
Annexure 1: Petroleum product price trend in India………………………………………………….….…..
Annexure 2: Petroleum product consumption trend and drivers…………………….…………….….
Annexure 3A: Refineries in India………………………………………………………………………….…….…………
Annexure 3B: Map of refinery locations…………………………………………………………….………………..
Annexure 4: Under-recovery and their sharing……………………………………………………..…….……..
Annexure 5: Petroleum pricing in India…………………………………………………….…….…………………..
Annexure 6: Key recommendations of oil sector expert committees……………….………………..
Annexure 7: OMC’s 1 year forward P/E and P/B charts (15 years)………….…………….……………
Company section
BPCL
HPCL
IOCL
25
26
27
28
30-31
32
33
34
36 - 41
42 - 46
47 - 51
22 August 2014
2

Oil & Gas | Thematic
Oil & Gas
Companies Covered
Pg
36
Marketing freedom: A win-win for all
OMC’s to move into structural investment plays
BPCL
HPCL
IOCL
The diesel reforms of January 2013 partly addressed investor skepticism, shifting the
focus from “whether” to “when”. However, these reforms were only ‘incremental’ and
not ‘big bang’ due to the imminent election cycle.
42
47
Now, with a strong government in place and its growth-focused agenda, we believe
the reform dialogue will shift from “when” to “how much and how soon”.
In a follow-up to our report, “Breaking free...WHEN?”, this is the second in a three-
part series where we cover (1) upstream, (2) downstream and (3) gas chain
companies, and attempt to assess the required and likely changes to achieve full
potential.
Also refer to part 1 of our
“Breaking free” series
released on July 2014
Diesel deregulation = higher marketing margins = higher profitability
Post INR11/ltr hike in the last 19 months, diesel is set to be deregulated in the
coming months, leading to ~50% reduction in gross under recoveries to INR750b
by FY16. And a realistic kero/LPG hike could cut under-recovery by 70%.
We expect 26-51% increase in the OMCs earnings in the medium term led by
a) Diesel reforms leading to deregulation, lower working capital loans
translating into savings in interest costs and,
b) Likely higher marketing margins on auto fuels (INR0.5/ltr higher diesel
marketing margin will increase OMCs’ PBT by INR40b = 24% of FY14 PBT).
Private competition unlikely to dent OMCs profitability
Private companies’ comeback, post diesel deregulation, is unlikely to dent OMCs
volumes in the near-to-medium term due to OMCs scale and pump economics.
Private players can gain market share in the bulk segment, but retail could be
tough, unlike 2004-07, as over the last 10 years, OMCs (a) have addressed
adulteration issues, (b) increased reach and (c) tied up with high volume fleet
operators.
Over the long term, winners in petroleum retail will be players who can (a)
modernize (value/service to customers, non-fuel retail), (b) have scale (reach to
cater fleet operators), (c) have multi-fuel outlets and (d) be efficient
(profitability focus, real-time monitoring).
OMC’s to benefit by forward integration
Investors are advised to refer
through disclosures made at the
end of the Research Report.
In an era of volatile refining margins, apart from marketing business, forward
integration could be an effective value creation route for OMC’s in our view.
Overall RoE’s will improve by (1) utilizing surplus naphtha, (2) cost savings by
shared utilities and infrastructure, and (3) exploitation of potential in
specialty/niche products.
Also, risks would reduce with (1) stable company-level margins, (2) higher
operational flexibility with well integrated hydrocarbon processes, and (3)
control on feedstock supply chain.
3
22 August 2014

Oil & Gas | Thematic
Valuation and view
Ongoing reforms leading to earnings predictability and RoE improvement have
the potential to transform OMCs into a structural investment plays in our view.
Diesel price is set to be market linked in coming months and as anticipated
(Refer report March 2013), in the initial period of diesel reforms OMC’s earnings
are (a) being benefited from lowering of interest and (b) later will be benefited
by likely increase in the diesel margins in our view.
BPCL is our top pick (stable refining margins, E&P upsides, strong balance sheet)
followed by IOCL (diversified earnings, EPS accretive Paradip refinery) and HPCL.
Oil & Gas: Earnings and valuation summary
M Cap CMP TP Var v/s Reco
USDb (INR) (INR) TP (%)
Integrated/Upstream
53.4 998 1,027
3
Neutral
RIL
¹
ONGC
CAIRN
OINL
OMC's
IOC
BPCL²
HPCL
MRPL
GAIL
GSPL
PLNG
IGL
14.5
8.0
2.6
1.8
9.1
0.8
2.2
0.9
362
673
458
63
433
88
177
371
449
795
527
65
410
90
190
342
24
18
15
4
-5
2
8
-8
Buy
Buy
Buy
Neutral
Neutral
Neutral
Neutral
Neutral
EPS (INR)
FY15E FY16E FY17E
81.6
34.3
56.4
61.4
32.6
42.8
42.4
4.2
28.2
8.1
10.3
32.7
89.9
42.7
50.6
71.5
39.5
48.3
50.3
8.0
32.0
9.5
11.1
35.2
112.8
44.8
39.5
74.9
47.2
56.8
57.5
8.6
35.7
10.2
15.2
36.3
P/E (x)
EV/EBITDA (x)
P/B (x)
FY15E FY16E FY17E FY15E FY16E FY17E FY15E FY16E FY17E
12.2
12.5
5.8
9.7
11.1
15.7
10.8
NA
15.3
10.9
17.1
11.3
11.1
10.0
6.4
8.4
9.2
13.9
9.1
7.8
13.5
9.3
15.9
10.5
8.8
9.5
8.2
8.0
7.7
11.9
8.0
7.3
12.1
8.7
11.6
10.2
10.1
5.4
4.1
6.4
8.0
10.6
10.4
10.0
5.4
6.1
9.7
6.0
9.6
4.6
4.1
5.3
6.8
9.6
8.0
5.5
4.7
5.6
8.7
5.2
7.2
4.4
4.1
4.9
5.3
8.4
7.0
4.8
4.9
5.2
6.8
4.7
1.3
1.9
0.9
1.6
1.2
2.3
1.0
1.4
1.8
1.3
2.4
2.5
1.2
1.7
0.9
1.4
1.1
1.1
0.9
1.3
1.7
1.2
2.1
2.1
1.1
1.5
0.8
1.3
1.0
1.0
0.9
1.1
1.5
1.1
1.8
1.8
Dvd
RoE (%)
FY15E FY16E FY17E Yld %
11.5
16.3
17.4
17.0
11.2
15.3
9.4
NA
12.5
13.1
14.5
23.7
11.5
18.2
13.9
18.0
12.6
15.6
10.4
17.2
13.0
13.6
14.0
21.5
13.2
17.0
10.0
17.1
13.5
16.5
11.1
16.2
13.4
13.0
17.0
19.0
1.0
2.3
3.0
4.0
2.8
2.0
2.8
1.3
1.8
1.1
1.1
1.9
60.3
10.1
5.9
427
325
598
486
358
700
14
10
17
Buy
Neutral
Buy
Independent Refiners
Gas Companies
CGD Companies
¹ No. of shares adj. for treasury shares; ²P/B adjusted for E&P valueof INR223/sh; Dividend yield on FY15E basis
Source: MOSL
22 August 2014
4

Oil & Gas | Thematic
Story in charts
Diesel set to be deregulated in the next few months (INR/ltr)
Diesel U/R (INR/ltr)
28
20
12
4
-4
3.8
20.4
14.9
17.1
Diesel Price (Inr/ltr) - RHS
60
14.5
10.5
45
30
1.8 15
0
…leading to ~50% reduction in under-recovery by FY16
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0
201
400 494
Petrol
Diesel
Kerosene
LPG
Total
1,610
1,381 1,399
1,033
773
461
780
948
750 689
Source: PPAC, MoPNG, MOSL
Source: PPAC, MoPNG, MOSL
We model OMC’s subsidy sharing at 2% (%)
Government
Upstream
SA Refiners
OMC's
-
-
1 2 2 2 2
-
-
-
-
-
10
12 9
-
- 21
-
32
35
40 37
-
48
31 39
42
64 64 64
70 2
33
35
69
-
56 53 60 62 51
49 46
34 34 34
30 29
-
Diesel deregulation set to cut OMC’s debt significantly (INRb)
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0
HPCL
BPCL
IOCL
Source: Company, MOSL
Source: PPAC, IMF, Shell, Industry, Australia govt., MOSL
Global diesel marketing margin meaningfully above India’s
level (INR/ltr)
7.33
5.42
4.50
2.83
1.41
3.49
3.40
…likely increase in OMC’s marketing margin to increase
earnings significantly (INR/sh)
HPCL
68
63
39
BPCL
76
67
42
IOCL
84
91
52
48
44
31
53
34
0.25
60
58
36
72
45
77
47
India
US
Canada Thailand South Australia
Africa
UK
FY14 adj.
EPS
0.50
0.75
1.00
1.25
1.50
Additional Marketing Margin (INR/ltr)
*gross basis, costs typically ~50%
Source: Company, MOSL *Sensitivity only for diesel
Source: Company, MOSL
22 August 2014
5

Oil & Gas | Thematic
Story in charts
At a domestic GDP growth of 6-9%, expect Indian auto fuel
demand to grow 35-50% in 5 years at a 5-7% CAGR (b ltr)
Petrol + Diesel
(in b litres)
5% CAGR
6% CAGR
7% CAGR
Private competition unlikely to dent OMC volume: Even at
15% market share loss, OMC volume to grow at 2-4% (b ltr)
Worst case OMC volume
Best case private volume (~15% market share)
Total
160
152
143
24
107
23
21
107
122
@5% CAGR
129
136
107
160
150 143
140 136
131 130
124
122
152
143
112 114 118
135
127
120
113
@6% CAGR
FY20
@7% CAGR
FY14
FY15
FY16
FY17
FY18
FY19
FY20
FY14
Source: MOSL *Auto fuel volume growth assumed at ~6%
Source: MOSL
Challenging refining business: Declining GRM/crude ratio (%)
is evident of challenges being faced by pure refining players
25
20
15
10
5
0
Aug-04
Aug-06
Aug-08
Aug-10
Aug-12
Aug-14
Integrated players across globe realize higher average RoCE
(%)
15
12
9
6
3
0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Petchem
Refining
Integrated
GRM/Brent crude price (%)
Source: Bloomberg, Reuters, MOSL
Source: Bloomberg, MOSL
Segmental EBITDA break-up (%): HPCL has leverage to
reforms while IOCL earnings are well diversified
Higher marketing margins can significantly drive earnings and
fair value of OMC’s
FY16 E EPS
Fair value
67
55
-
6
39
45
9
29
17
Marketing
Petchem
Pipelines
Refining
-
18
15
HPCL
BPCL
IOCL
Source: MOSL
Source: MOSL
22 August 2014
6

Oil & Gas | Thematic
Diesel deregulation = higher marketing margins
OMC’s profitability set to increase
Post INR10/ltr hike in the last 20 months, diesel is set to be deregulated in the coming
months, leading to ~50% reduction in gross under-recovery to INR750b by FY16. And a
realistic kero/LPG hike could cut under-recovery by 70%.
We expect 26-51% increase in the OMCs earnings in the medium term led by: a)
Diesel reforms leading to deregulation, lower working capital loans translating into
savings in interest costs and, b) Likely higher marketing margins on auto fuels
(INR0.5/ltr higher diesel marketing margin will increase OMCs’ PBT by INR40b = 24%
of FY14 PBT).
Small dose of diesel price hikes - a palatable solution
Retail petroleum prices for controlled products (Diesel, Gasoline, Kerosene and
LPG) in India historically witnessed ad-hoc increases and that too with a lag,
leading to significant under-recovery for the oil marketing companies.
After deregulating Petrol (gasoline) in June 2010 and with continued high
subsidy payouts, the Government was forced to undertake diesel reforms.
The decision to increase diesel prices in small doses of INR0.5/ltr per month was
the most palatable decision and witnessed very little resistance across the
populace and political parties.
Now, after 21 months of monthly price hikes, diesel is set to be market-linked in
the next few months.
Retail petroleum product price hikes lagged international price trends, resulting in high under-recovery
Gasoline price (YoY %)
Diesel price (YoY %)
Brent price in INR (YoY %)
Under recoveries (INRb)
1,381
1,033
201
6
(2)
FY04
FY05
FY06
12 21 64
400
15 16 25
(1) (1)
FY07
FY08
494
3
773
461
17 15 51
(11) (3) (40)
FY09
FY10
FY11
FY12
780
1,610
1,399
93
1
6 5 35
23 6 43
12 8 20
4 19
(6)
FY13
6 14 8
FY14
Source: IOC, MoPNG, PPAC, MOSL
Will LPG/kero follow?
After a market-linked pricing of diesel, we expect the Government to take up
LPG and kerosene reforms.
PDS kerosene has been an important fuel for the economically weaker sections
in rural India. (its price has been at ~INR10/ltr since 2002). Hence, we expect the
Government to first take up LPG price deregulation, which could later be
followed by kerosene in the longer term.
The initial thrust should be on widening the base for direct benefit transfer
scheme, followed by removal of dual pricing in LPG and kerosene.
22 August 2014
7

Oil & Gas | Thematic
Substantial quantities (~35%, translates into USD3b black market) of kerosene
are supposedly diverted for adulteration with diesel due to the large pricing
difference between diesel and kerosene. Elimination of dual pricing in kerosene
by adopting direct subsidy transfer to the genuine consumers will eliminate the
scope for adulteration.
Fast rollout of PNG through CGD in cities, and akin to diesel,
small price hikes should help to cut LPG subsidies
Domestic LPG price in India has been increased at 5%
CAGR in the last 10 years v/s 11% CAGR of international
crude prices.
Rural households belonging to the four poorest deciles use
less than 6 cylinders per year, while households belonging
to the poorest decile of urban consumers use 8 cylinders.
As per NSSO survey, households have the flexibility to
absorb certain additional costs on LPG by adjusting the
expenditure on discretionary items.
The Kirit Parikh committee, after studying the household
expenditure pattern, had recommended an immediate
price hike of INR100/cyl to be followed by periodic
revision, based on the paying capacity as reflected in the
per capita income.
Kerosene deregulation could take time, but dual pricing
should be eliminated in the interim
PDS kerosene is primarily used for lighting purpose in the
absence of electricity and its allocation has been on the
decline (-5% consumption CAGR in last five years) as more
and more households are connected to electricity grid.
The Kirit Parikh Committee had argued that the rural
household in the poorest decile spends ~2% of monthly
expenditure on kerosene. This is equivalent to 13% of its
discretionary spend and hence there is scope to increase
PDS kerosene prices.
A case in point is the pilot project at Kotkasim tehsil of
Rajasthan's Alwar district, where the shift to direct benefit
transfer reduced the kerosene consumption substantially
as it curbed leakages of kerosene to the black market.
As per NSSO survey, most of the households use ~3.5 litres
per month and allocation of 5 litres per household per
month should be adequate.
The Kirit Parikh committee in its February 2010
recommendations had proposed an immediate hike of
66% in Kerosene to INR15/ltr and yearly revision in-line
with the growth in per capita agricultural GDP at nominal
prices.
Expect overall under-recovery to reduce by ~50% by FY16E
Significant volume growth (6.3% CAGR in the last 10 years) coupled with
increasing under-recovery (peaked at ~INR21/ltr in 1QFY09 and ~INR17/ltr in
Aug-12) led to increase of diesel share in the overall under-recovery to 45-60%,
thereby making the reforms critical.
Led by monthly price hikes of INR0.5/ltr since Jan-13, diesel under-recovery now
stands at INR1.8/ltr, and is set to be market-linked in the next few months (sans
any sharp increase in oil price of INR/USD depreciation).
We estimate the overall under-recovery to reduce by 46% by FY16E to INR750b
from INR1,399b in FY14.
We estimate that if the government increases domestic LPG and PDS kerosene
prices similar to diesel (Kero: INR1/ltr per month, LPG: INR50/cylinder per
quarter), the FY16 under recoveries could be lower by 70% to INR440b v/s
INR1,399b in FY14.
22 August 2014
8

Oil & Gas | Thematic
Share of diesel under-recovery was almost 60% in recent years (INRb)
Petrol
Diesel
38%
46%
Kerosene
51%
20%
773
494
400
201
107
102
179
84
144
188
126
2295
FY05
FY06
FY07
156
191
353
FY08
1,033
176
282
523
FY09
461
143
174
93
FY10
780
205
200
348
FY11
LPG
45%
1,381
284
278
819
FY12
1,610
399
296
915
FY13
Total
59%
Diesel share
57%
45%
1,399
465
306
628
FY14
32%
11%
Source: PPAC, MoPNG, MOSL
Diesel set to be deregulated in the next few months (INR/ltr)…
28
20
12
4
-4
3.8
20.4
14.9
Diesel U/R (INR/ltr)
17.1
Diesel Price (Inr/ltr) - RHS
60
45
10.5
30
1.8 15
0
14.5
Source: PPAC, MoPNG, MOSL
…leading to ~50% reduction in under-recovery by FY16 (INRb)
Petrol
Diesel
Kerosene
1,381
1,033
773
201
84
95
2
22
FY05
400
102
144
126
27
FY06
494
107
179
188
20
FY07
156
191
353
73
FY08
176
282
523
52
FY09
780
461
143
174
93
52
FY10
205
200
348
27
FY11
284
278
819
-
FY12
FY13
399
296
915
465
306
628
-
948
474
290
184
-
498
252
-
470
220
-
750
689
LPG
1,610
Total
1,399
FY14 FY15E FY16E FY17E
Source: PPAC, MoPMG, MOSL
OMCs profitability on a structural upturn
High under-recovery coupled with delayed subsidy payments from the
Government had resulted in significantly high working capital related debt for
OMCs (HPCL, BPCL and IOCL).
The combined debt of OMCs had increased at 22% CAGR in the last 10 years and
interest cost increased at a CAGR of 27%.
22 August 2014
9

Oil & Gas | Thematic
Over the last few years, Government subsidy receivables formed 30-40% of the
OMCs debt and with the diesel deregulation, this will reduce to a minimal level,
leading to reduction in debt and interest cost.
Interest cost continued to remain high (INR b)
INR billion
1.4
1.5 1.5
87
42
26
17
6
3
15
17
27
33
24
21
38
17
11
9
30
12
9
23
17
25
18
51
HPCL
BPCL
IOCL
Total
99
71
59
114
94
OMCs debt peaked in FY14 to INR1.5t (INR t)
INR trillion
HPCL
BPCL
IOCL
Total
0.9 1.0
0.7
0.5 0.5
1.1
0.9
0.8 0.8
59
0.6
0.5 0.5
0.4
0.3 0.2
0.3 0.3 0.3
0.2 0.2
0.3
0.2 0.3 0.3
0.3
0.2
0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1
0.3 0.3
0.1
0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
9
11
9 5
8
2 5 1 3 12
18
17
13
7
5
3
4 8
2
20
15
Source: Company, MOSL
Source: Company, MOSL
Delayed Government compensation led to significant increase in working capital-led debt (INR b)
INR b
Receivables from government
29%
39%
22%
9%
298
325
319
11%
19%
Other debt
30%
26%
Gross debt
29%
13%
473
16%
495
Receivable a % of total
26%
800
28%
840
23%
885
9%
14%
18%
19%
578
228
213
250
242
267
252
302
329
333
FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14
HPCL
FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14
BPCL
FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14
IOCL
Source: Company, MOSL
Working capital reduction to increase EPS by 8-16%
While OMCs received the upstream subsidy through discounts, Government
compensation was delayed. Hence, OMCs had to fund the under-recovery till
the compensation was received from the Government.
During the last 12 months diesel under recoveries have come down significantly
leading to meaningful reduction in the OMC’s working capital requirement.
We estimate OMCs debt to reduce by 15-25% in the next one year, leading to 8-
16% EPS benefit, with HPCL at 16%, followed by BPCL at 9% and IOCL at 8%.
22 August 2014
10

Oil & Gas | Thematic
Diesel deregulation to reduce interest cost by 15-25%, leading to 8-16% increase in OMCs
earnings (INR b)
INR Billion
HPCL
BPCL
IOCL
Annual diesel sales (b ltrs)
16
20
40
FY14 avg. loss (INR/ltr)
8.4
8.4
8.4
Annual Diesel loss (INRb)
134
171
337
Daily Diesel loss - A
0.4
0.5
0.9
~48% Upstream Subsidy - B
0.2
0.2
0.4
Daily additional working capital = A - B
0.2
0.2
0.5
Cash subsidy delay (# of days)
200
200
200
Reduction in Debt
(38)
(49)
(96)
Interest rate on WC loans (%)
9.5%
9.5%
9.5%
Interest savings / PBT addition
4
5
9
Tax rate (%)
34%
34%
34%
Increase in PAT
2.4
3.0
6.0
# of shares
339
723
2428
Increase/ Decrease in EPS
7.0
4.2
2.5
Current FY14 Adj. EPS
44.2
48.5
30.9
EPS upside
16%
9%
8%
FY14 interest (INRb)
15
20
59
Savings as a % of FY14 interest
24
23
15
* FY14 EPS adjusted for forex change, inventory change and other exceptional
Source: Company, MOSL
Free market to improve marketing profitability, expect 18-35% EPS upside
The marketing margin component for OMCs’ marketing sales was fixed by the
Government in 2006 and despite the cost increases of 8-10%, OMCs got only
~4% of annual escalation. This led to a severe reduction in the marketing
division’s profitability.
Post the deregulation, we expect OMCs’ marketing division profitability to
increase meaningfully as we expect they will be able to charge higher marketing
margins.
Global comparison shows that the current marketing margin in diesel in India at
~INR1.4/ltr is way below the global averages.
HPCL being the highest leveraged to marketing volumes (standalone
marketing/refining ratio of 2x), we estimate an EPS increase of INR15.5/sh for
INR0.5/ltr increase in the diesel marketing margins, followed by BPCL and IOCL.
7.3
5.4
4.5
2.8
1.4
3.5
3.4
Global diesel marketing margin meaningfully above India’s level (INR/ltr)
India
US
Canada
Thailand
South
Africa
Australia
UK
*marketing margin includes costs. Costs in India are at ~50%
Source: PPAC, IMF, Shell, Industry, Australia govt., MOSL
22 August 2014
11

Oil & Gas | Thematic
INR0.5/ltr increase in marketing margin will upgrade OMCs EPS by 18-35%
INR Billion
Diesel Volumes (mmt)
Diesel Volumes (b ltrs)
Addl. mktg margin (INR/ltr)
Additional revenues
Addition to PBT
Tax rate (%)
Increase in net profit
# of shares
Increase/ Decrease in EPS
Current FY14 Adj. EPS
EPS upside
HPCL
13.1
16
0.50
8
8
34
5
339
15.5
44.2
35
BPCL
IOCL
16.8
33.1
20
40
0.50
0.50
10
20
10
20
34
34
7
13
723
2428
9.3
5.4
48.5
30.9
19
18
Source: Company, MOSL
EPS sensitivity to increase in marketing margin (INR/sh)
HPCL
68
63
39
BPCL
76
67
42
IOCL
84
91
High marketing/refining ratio leads to highest EPS sensitivity
in HPCL to marketing margin change
HPCL
BPCL
IOCL
89%
107%
52
48
44
31
FY14 adj.
EPS
53
34
0.25
60
58
36
72
45
77
47
36%
18%
10%
FY14 adj.
EPS
9%
0.25
19%
18%
71%
53%
39%
29%
27%
36%
48%
45%
58%
54%
0.50
0.75
1.00
1.25
1.50
Additional Marketing Margin (INR/ltr)
1.00
1.25
1.50
0.50
0.75
Additional Marketing Margin (INR/ltr)
Source: Company, MOSL
Source: Company, MOSL
22 August 2014
12

Oil & Gas | Thematic
Private entry unlikely to dent OMCs volume
Domestic volume growth to provide enough opportunity for all players
Private companies’ comeback, post diesel deregulation, is unlikely to dent OMCs
volumes in the near-to-medium term due to OMCs scale and pump economics.
Private players can gain market share in the bulk segment, but retail could be tough,
unlike 2004-07, as over the last 10 years, OMCs (a) have addressed quality perception
issues, (b) increased reach and (c) tied up with high volume fleet operators.
Over the long term, winners in the petroleum retail will be players who can (a)
modernize (value/service to customers, non-fuel retail), (b) have scale (reach to cater
fleet operators), (c) operate multi-fuel outlets and (d) be efficient (profitability focus,
real-time monitoring).
OMCs seem well prepared v/s previous deregulation period
We do not expect the re-entry of private players into the fuel retailing business
to meaningfully dent OMCs market share in the near to medium term. The long
term impact would be driven by differentiated strategies adopted by these
companies in the medium term.
In the previous period of brief deregulation (FY04-07), private players’ market
share had reached ~5% in gasoline and ~10% in diesel.
However, this time around, we do not expect the journey to be smooth for
private players, given that over the last decade, OMCs have been:
a)
Improving Purity Perception:
GPS tracker, surprise checks at dealer outlets,
tamper proofing, branding;
b)
Extending Reach:
Doubled retailed outlets at 9% CAGR to >49,000 in the last
decade;
c)
Customer engagement:
Loyalty cards, prepaid cards for transporters, and
d)
Automation:
Real-time tracking, superior inventory management etc.
Further, challenging retail fuel pump economics will be a major issue for private
player expansion.
OMCs have automated 100% of high volume (>200KLPM) retail outlets
Converted
35%
12,503
8,103
4,400
BPCL
Yet-to-convert
100%
16%
12,869
10,760
2,109
HPCL
25%
23,993
17,916
6,077
IOCL
HPCL
BPCL
2,108
3,945
5,877
-
IOCL
7,000
7,000
HPCL
9,730
565
9,165
BPCL
VMS on Trucks
100%
Total
100%
Automated /TPC as a % of total
100%
94%
80%
18,505
3,710
14,795
IOCL
Automation (full network)
Automation (>200KLPB)
Source: Company, MOSL
22 August 2014
13

Oil & Gas | Thematic
Earlier typical rural fuel pumps
OMCs have come a long way now:
Latest, highway fuel pumps also focus on non-fuel retailing
Source: Industry, MOSL
Source: Industry, MOSL
Key retail fuel brands in India
HPCL
BPCL
IOCL
Shell
Essar
RIL
Source: Company, MOSL
22 August 2014
14

Oil & Gas | Thematic
Fuel retail outlet economics challenging at low volumes
At an all-India level, average monthly fuel volume stood at ~179KLPM in FY14
and we estimate CRoCI of ~17% at these volumes.
We note that the retail fuel economics will vary widely depending on location
and volumes and land price will play a major role in pace of expansion for new
outlets.
As the calculation suggests, it is imperative to have higher throughput at the fuel
pump to make decent returns.
Excluding land costs, retail fuel pump economics get into not-so-attractive zone at lower volumes
in INR '000
Volumes (KLPM)
Annual volumes ('000 Litres)
Diesel dealer margin (INR/ltr)
Petrol diesel margin (INR/ltr)
Average Dealer Margin (INR/ltr)
Annual dealer revenues
Employee Cost
S,G&A
EBITDA
EBITDA (INR/ltr)
Depreciation (@ 5%)
Interest on WC (@ 11%)
PBT
Income tax (@ 30%)
PAT
PAT (INR/ltr)
CRoCI
Investment
*Cash return on cash invested
Case 1
100
1,200
1.2
2.0
1.4
1,716
720
401
595
0.50
225
95
275
82
192
0.16
9.3%
4,500
Case 2
125
1,500
1.2
2.0
1.4
2,145
900
444
801
0.53
225
119
456
137
319
0.21
12.1%
4,500
Case 3
150
1,800
1.2
2.0
1.4
2,574
1,080
508
986
0.55
225
143
618
185
433
0.24
14.6%
4,500
Case 4
175
2,100
1.2
2.0
1.4
3,003
1,260
563
1,180
0.56
225
167
788
236
551
0.26
17.3%
4,500
Case 5
200
2,400
1.2
2.0
1.4
3,432
1,440
644
1,348
0.56
225
191
932
280
653
0.27
19.5%
4,500
Comments
Last revised by INR0.1/ltr in Dec-13
Last revised by INR0.21/ltr in Dec-13
Petrol @1.99: Diesel @1.19 in ratio of
30: 70
Annual revenues to the retail outlet
Would vary between Highway and City
locations
Electricity, fuel shrinkage
Assumed inventory days at 4
Investment could vary between INR30-
60 lakh; excludes land cost
Source: Industry, MOSL
Indian demand potential has room for PSUs and private as well
Domestic diesel demand increased at 8% CAGR during FY08-13 period led by
economic growth, before remaining flat in FY14 led by (a) longest period of
continuous price increases effected by the Government and (b) shift-back to
alternate fuels like FO, which despite low quality had become cheaper than
diesel.
Over the next five year period, we estimate domestic auto fuel demand to grow
by 35-50% at a CAGR range of 5-7%.
22 August 2014
15

Oil & Gas | Thematic
Indian auto fuel demand has increased at 7% CAGR, with petrol at 8% and diesel at 6%
Diesel sales (b litres)
Gasoline sales (b litres)
20
21
22
24
9
46
10
44
11
44
11
45
12
48
12
49
13
52
15
16
18
58
63
68
73
78
84
83
FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14
Source: MoPNG, Industry, MOSL
At a domestic GDP growth of 6-9%, expect Indian auto fuel demand to grow 35-50% in the
next 5 years at a 5-7% CAGR (b ltr)
Petrol +
Diesel
(in b litres)
112
107
114
5% CAGR
6% CAGR
131
7% CAGR
130
140
136
150
143
152
160
118
122
124
113
120
127
135
143
FY14
FY15
FY16
FY17
FY18
FY19
FY20
Source: MOSL
22,000 new fuel retail stations required in the next five years
The continuous outlet growth by OMCs over the last decade brought down the
average volume per outlet from 241KLPM (kilo litre per month) to 170KLPM in
FY04.
At an average throughput of 170KLPM and at 5% CAGR of demand growth, we
estimate that additional 22,000 new outlets will be required by FY20.
Estimate requirement of 22,000 new retail fuel outlets by FY20
241 241
Outlets (No.)
214
194
Throughput (KLPM)
189 185 190 185
170 170 170 170 170 170 170
168 162 164 180
*Auto fuel volume growth assumed at ~6%
Source: MOSL
22 August 2014
16

Oil & Gas | Thematic
Highlighted states would see a significant outlet addition in the coming decade
6,500
5,200
UP
AP
TN
3,900
Punjab
Karnataka
Rajasthan
Haryana
Maharashtra
2,600
WB
1,300
Bihar
MP
Kerala
Gujarat
0
100
Jharkhand Odisha
Chhattisgarh
Goa
Uttarakhand Pondicherry
J&K
Delhi
Assam
Meghalaya
Chandigarh
HP
Volume (KLPM) - Logarithmic scale
400
Source: MoPNG, PPAC, MOSL
Absolute volume loss for OMCs unlikely
Now, in the worst case scenario, even if we assume a 15% market share loss on
a full volume in FY20 to private players, OMCs will still have a volume CAGR of 2-
4%.
Low market share loss was seen in gasoline (largely urban
Private players opened outlets in highways, impacting diesel
fuel) as OMCs were well entrenched in large cities and towns market share of OMCs
Gasoline
-
25
32
0
25
31
IOCL
1
25
30
BPCL
5
24
29
HPCL
5
24
28
Private
5
24
28
1
25
29
Diesel
-
21
24
IOCL
0
20
24
4
19
23
BPCL
10
18
21
HPCL
6
18
23
Private
3
19
24
1
20
24
44
44
45
43
43
43
45
55
55
54
51
53
53
54
FY03
FY04
FY05
FY06
FY07
FY08
FY09
FY03
FY04
FY05
FY06
FY07
FY08
FY09
Source: MoPNG, Industry, MOSL
Source: MoPNG, Industry, MOSL
Even at 15% market share loss, OMC volume will grow at 2-4% through FY20 (b litres)
Worst case OMC volume
107
107
Best cas private volume (~15% market share)
143
21
122
@5% CAGR
FY14
152
23
129
136
160
24
Total
@6% CAGR
FY20
@7% CAGR
Source: MOSL
22 August 2014
17

Oil & Gas | Thematic
Long term winning strategy for fuel retailers
Indian domestic fuel retail business has come a long way from a traditional pure
fuel dispensing station to a multiservice model creating a cross selling
opportunity.
While the underlying growth drivers for the fuel retail industry will continue to
be demand growth led by new vehicle addition and miles travelled, winners in
the business will be in a free market driven by multiple factors and not presence
alone, which is the current case.
Likely evolution of downstream fuel retailing business
Rise of Hyper markets
Focus on service/non-
fuel
Focus on efficiency /
reach
- Increased
competition with
entry of new players.
- Profitability focus
through elimination
of low profit outlets
and improve internal
efficiencies.
- Modernization of
outlets to give more
value and service to
the consumer
- Innovative schemes
to promote
customer loyalty
- Focus on non-fuel
retailing leading to
multiple retail outlet
formats.
- Focus on branding
as fuel sales could
shift to
hypermarket model
which will have
multi brand fuels
- Focus on multi fuel
outlets
- Dynamic real-time
pricing to improve
profitability
Source: Industry, MOSL
Some of the new themes which will drive the market share for various fuel
retailers will be:
a)
Outlet modernization and branding:
value/service to customers through
proactive interaction, non-fuel retail business, brand development.
b)
Scale:
control on supply chain, presence at strategic locations and nation-
wide reach to cater fleet operators.
c)
Multi-fuel selling capability:
Ability to supply petrol, diesel, CNG, LNG (not
yet in India) and electric charging (longer term) and,
d)
Efficiency:
Profitability focus, real-time monitoring for inventory
management, dynamic pricing.
22 August 2014
18

Oil & Gas | Thematic
Expect multiple retail formats to emerge in coming years
Source: Industry, MOSL
22 August 2014
19

Oil & Gas | Thematic
Expect OMC’s to benefit by forward integration
In an era of volatile refining margins, apart from marketing business, forward
integration could be an effective value creation route for OMC’s in our view.
Overall RoE’s will improve by (1) utilizing surplus naphtha, (2) cost savings by shared
utilities and infrastructure, and (3) exploitation of potential in specialty/niche
products.
Also, risks would reduce with (1) stable company-level margins, (2) higher operational
flexibility with well integrated hydrocarbon processes, and (3) control on feedstock
supply chain.
Pure refining business becoming more challenging...
Over the last decade, refining business has become more challenging with
volatile/low GRM and high energy costs.
Higher
global refining complexity
and scale has enabled heavier crude
consumption, increased distillate yields and reduced refining costs, leading to
narrowing of
light-heavy crude spreads
and
declining GRM/crude cost ratio.
Over last five years, crude cost has increased by USD30 / bbl, while operating
cost are increasing @ 8-10% leading to USD3-4/bbl impact on GRM.
…investments inevitable to survive in the new normal
While the short-term opportunities include optimization of multiple CDU’s and
other processes along with the crude mix, long-term opportunities for refining
companies are:
1. Up-gradation of scale for
2. Lowering of energy cost,
3. higher complexity, with focus shift from reforming and cracking to coking, to
destruct heavier products (FO and coke),
4. investments to produce low sulphur/cleaner fuels, and
5. deep integration of refining with downstream petchem businesses, utilizing
naphtha and gaining flexibility.
Declining GRM/crude ratio (%) is evident of challenges being faced by pure refining players
25
20
15
10
5
0
Aug-04
Aug-06
Aug-08
Aug-10
Aug-12
Aug-14
GRM/Brent crude price (%)
Source: Bloomberg, Reuters, MOSL
22 August 2014
20

Oil & Gas | Thematic
Refiners globally shifting focus towards (1) higher complexity, (2) larger scale, and (3) vertical integration
North America
Europe
Higher utilization led by low
Dieselization has led
cost WTI
to imbalance target
Gearing refineries to process
product mix (long
heavier Canadian oil sand
gasoline, short
diesel)
crudes
Targeting to increase scale
Low capacity
utilization leading to
uneconomical
operations
Middle East
Production exports being
shifted to local refining and
downstream products
Cheaper raw material and
energy costs are the key
drivers
Asia Pacific
Shifting to larger scale and
increasing complexity
Source: MOSL
Petchem integration to offer diversification and stability in earnings
While, naphtha spread over crude has remained negative and volatile, value
added petrochemical manufacturing through naphtha shall improve
profitability.
We expect significant cost reduction through (1) shared utilities, infrastructure
and services, (2) reliable feedstock availability and lower transportation costs,
and (3) energy savings in integrated hydrocarbon processes.
Expect higher margin realizations and better yield patterns, led by diversification
across the value chain and exploitation of higher margin plastics, and niche
products.
Integrated players across globe realize higher average RoCE (%)
15
12
9
6
3
0
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Petchem
Refining
Integrated
Source: Bloomberg, MOSL
Integration into downstream chemical can significantly reduce risks
While, globally competitive refining has led to pressure on its margins,
integration into petchem shall provide stability to the margins realized.
Expect risk reduction led by improved flexibility of operation among products
and processes, adjusting to the changing markets.
Expect minimal or lower dependence for feedstocks and product supply
markets.
22 August 2014
21

Oil & Gas | Thematic
5 year RoCE average (%): Integrated players show better returns as against pure petchem and refining companies
50
40
30
20
10
0
-10
Petchem Companies
5-year average pre-tax RoCE (%)
Refining & Marketing companies
Integrated Companies
Source: Company, MOSL
5 year RoA average (%): Integrated players show better returns as against pure petchem and refining companies
14
10
6
2
-2
Petchem Companies
5-year avg. RoA (%)
Refining & Marketing compaies
Integrated companies
Source: Company, MOSL
22 August 2014
22

Oil & Gas | Thematic
OMC’s to benefit from diesel deregulation and
likely marketing margin increase
BPCL is our top pick in OMC’s
Ongoing reforms leading to earnings predictability and RoE improvement have the
potential to transform OMCs into a structural investment plays in our view.
Diesel price is set to be market linked in coming months and as anticipated (Refer
report March 2013), in the initial period of diesel reforms OMC’s earnings are (a) being
benefited from lowering of interest and (b) later will be benefited by likely increase in
the diesel margins in our view.
BPCL is our top pick (stable refining margins, E&P upsides, strong balance sheet)
followed by IOCL (diversified earnings, EPS accretive Paradip refinery) and HPCL.
Expect OMCs to move from trading plays to structural investment plays
Significant unpredictability in the earnings of OMCs was preventing investors
from take a long term view and thereby making them a trading play.
Ongoing reforms have the potential to transform OMCs to a structural
investment play in our view, for the following reasons:
a) Earnings predictability will improve and normalization of earnings will be a
key catalyst
Diesel deregulation to lower overall under-recovery significantly and subsidy
sharing is likely to be rationalized
Large savings in interest cost with freeing up of working capital debt
b) RoEs likely to move up from single digit to double digits
c) Inherent business triggers to increase profitability
A INR0.5/ltr increase in diesel marketing margin will increase OMCs PBT by
INR40b (@80n liters of India diesel consumption), which equals 24% of
combined OMCs PBT in FY14.
BPCL is our top pick in OMCs due to its relatively strong balance sheet,
operational upsides through capacity additions/complexity improvement and
E&P upside potential (key differentiator vis-à-vis HPCL and IOCL).
FY16 E EPS
Fair value
980
1,073
449
497
544
592
Earnings and fair value show high sensitivity to diesel marketing margins (INR/sh)
527
649
771
893
96.8
795
888
50.3
65.8
81.3
48.3
57.6
66.8
76.1
39.5
44.9
50.4
55.8
Base case
MM
MM
MM
@0.5/ltr @1.0/ltr @1.5/ltr
HPCL
Base case
MM
MM
MM
@0.5/ltr @1.0/ltr @1.5/ltr
BPCL
Base case
MM
MM
MM
@0.5/ltr @1.0/ltr @1.5/ltr
IOCL
*fair value sensitivity based on implied P/E on our target price post investments
Source: MOSL
22 August 2014
23

Oil & Gas | Thematic
We expect that OMC’s RoE’s which had fallen to single digit are now likely to improve to a
healthy double digit range (%)
25
20
15
10
5
0
FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17
HPCL
BPCL (Cons)
IOCL (Cons)
Source: Company, MOSL
HPCL has highest sensitivity to marketing margins given high marketing to refining ratio (x)
HPCL
2.2
1.9
1.6
1.3
1.0
FY09
FY10
FY11
FY12
FY13
FY14
2.0
BPCL
IOCL
HPCL (incl. JV share)
BPCL (incl. JV share)
1.55
1.5
1.4
1.29
Source: Company, MOSL
Segmental EBITDA break-up (%): IOCL has well diversified earnings with large pipeline and
petchem contribution
67
55
45
Marketing
9
29
Petrochemicals
Pipelines
Refining
-
6
-
18
15
HPCL
BPCL
39
17
IOCL
Source: Company, MOSL
22 August 2014
24

Oil & Gas | Thematic
Annexure 1: Petroleum product price trend in India
Diesel price trend in India
68
54
40
26
12
Aug-04
Aug-06
Aug-08
Aug-10
Aug-12
Diesel (INR/ltr)
Chg (%) - RHS
20%
10%
0%
-10%
-20%
Aug-14
Petrol price trend in India
Petrol (INR/ltr)
84
67
50
33
16
Aug-04
Aug-06
Aug-08
Aug-10
Aug-12
Chg (%) - RHS
20%
10%
0%
-10%
-20%
Aug-14
Source: MOSL, Company
Source: MOSL, Company
Kerosene remained regulated in the past decade (INR/ltr)
20
15
10
5
0
Aug-04
Aug-06
Aug-08
Aug-10
Aug-12
Kerosene (INR/ltr)
Chg (%) - RHS
30%
20%
10%
0%
-10%
Aug-14
LPG price trend in India (INR/cyl)
500
425
350
275
200
Aug-04
Aug-06
Aug-08
Aug-10
Aug-12
LPG (INR/Cyl)
Chg (%) - RHS
20%
10%
0%
-10%
-20%
Aug-14
Source: MOSL, Company
Source: MOSL, Company
Petrol-diesel price differential declining as diesel gets deregulated
Retail prices (INR/ltr)
90
70
50
30
10
Petrol
Diesel
Price Difference - RHS
36
28
20
12
4
Source: Company, MOSL
22 August 2014
25

Oil & Gas | Thematic
Annexure 2: Petroleum product consumption trend and drivers
Auto and domestic fuel growth (%):
20%
13%
5%
-3%
-10%
FY02
FY04
FY06
FY08
FY10
FY12
FY14
Total (YoY %)
MS
HSD
LPG
SKO
26%
12%
-2%
-16%
-30%
FY02
FY04
FY06
FY08
FY10
FY12
FY14
Industrial fuel/feedstock growth (%):
Total (YoY %)
FO
Naptha
Source: MOSL, Industry
Source: MOSL, Industry
Diesel demand break-up: Transport sector accounts for 70%
of India’s diesel demand (%)
Cars/UVs -
Private
13.2%
Mobile
tower
1.5%
Others
5.0%
Gensets
10.5%
HCV/LCV
28.3%
Cars/UVs -
Comm.
8.9%
Buses
9.6%
3-wheelers
6.4%
Railways
3.2%
Agriculture
13.0%
Aviation/shi
pping
0.5%
Petrol demand break-up: Two-wheelers dominate petrol
demand, with 61% share (%)
3-wheelers
2.3%
SUVs
1.5%
Others
0.4%
2-wheelers
61.4%
Cars
34.3%
Source: MOSL, PPAC
Source: MOSL, PPAC
HCV/LCV sales drive diesel sales with a lag
HCV/LCV Sales('000)
300
225
150
75
0
Diesel Sales (kbpd) - RHS
1,800
1,350
900
450
0
Strong correlation of two-wheeler and petrol sales
2-wheeler Sales ('000)
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
Petrol sales (kbpd) - RHS
440
330
220
110
0
Source: Industry, SIAM, PPAC, MOSL
Source: Industry, SIAM, PPAC, MOSL
22 August 2014
26

Oil & Gas | Thematic
Annexure 3A: Refineries in India
Company / Location
Year
Capacity
Comments
(mmt) (kbpd)
0.7
1.0
13.7
13
20
274
Barauni, Bihar
Haldia, West Bengal
July-1975
Jan-1975
6.0
7.5
120
150
Visakh, Andhra Pradesh
1957
8.3
166
Reliance Industries Ltd (RIL)
Jamnagar, Gujarat
Jul-1999
Jamnagar (SEZ), Gujarat
Dec-2008
Essar Oil (Vadinar), Gujarat
Nov-2006
Total
33.0
29.0
20.0
217.1
660
580
Established by Assam Oil Co. and was later taken over by IOCL in 1981.
Capacity Change (mmtpa): 0.5 (1901), 0.65 (1996) and currently at 0.7.
First public sector refinery set up (~INR 173m) in Romanian
collaboration.
Built with Soviet collaboration (INR260m); to process crude from
Ankleshwar, Kalol and Nawagam in Gujarat.
Capacity (mmtpa): 2 (1965), 4.3 (1967), 7.3 (1978), 9.5 (1989), 12.5
(1999) and now at 13.7mmtpa.
Built in collaboration with the Soviet Union at a cost of INR494m.
Capacity mmtpa): 3.3 (1969), 4.2 (2000), 6.0 (2002) and now at 6.0.
In collaboration with France (fuel products) and Romania (Lube oil base).
Capacity (mmtpa): 2.5 (1975), 3.2 (1988), 3.4 (1996), 4.4 (1997), 5.8
(1999) and 7.5 (2010)
Cost of INR2.5b; Capacity (mmtpa): 6 (1982), 7.5 (1989) and now at 8.
Cost ~INR39b; Cap. (mmtpa): 6 (1998), 12 (2006), 15 (2010) & now at 15.
Capacity Chg (mmtpa): 1 (1979), 1.35 (1987), 2.35 (1995) and now at 2.4.
First owned by Standard Vacuum (StanVac); renamed ESSO India in
1962
In 1969 Lube India formed to manufacture LOBS; in 1974 ESSO and Lube
India nationalized and merged to form HPCL
Capacity (mmtpa): 1.25 (1952), 2.5 (1969), 3.5 (1983), 5.5 (1985), 6.5
(2009) and now at 6.5.
First oil Refinery on the East Coast, commissioned by Caltex Oil
Taken over by the Government of India in 1976 and was consequently
amalgamated with HPCL in 1978.
Cap (mmtpa): 0.68 (1957), 4.5 (1985), 7.5 (1999), 8.3 (2010); now at 8.3.
A JV between HPCL and Mittal Energy Ltd. located in Bathinda, Punjab
First owned by Burmah Shell Refineries Ltd.; later acquired by Govt and
transferred to BPCL in 1976.
Capacity (mmtpa): 2.2 (1955), 6 (1985), 12 (2005) and now at 12.
Set up under agreement between Govt. of India, Philips Petroleum Co. of
USA and Duncan Brothers of Calcutta.
BPCL acquired Govt's stake in 2001 and amalgamated with BPCL in 2006
Cap (mmtpa): 2.5 (1963), 3.3 (1973), 7.5 (1994), 9.5 (2010) & now at 9.5.
Set up by Bharat Oman Refineries Limited (BORL), a JV of BPCL and
Oman Oil Corp Ltd (OOCL) at a cost of INR122b.
Setup to fulfill the commitment by govt. under " Assam Accord" of 1985
Shareholders: BPCL (61.65%), OINL (26%) and Govt of Assam (12.35%).
JV of Govt. (74%), AMOCO (13%) & National Iranian Oil Co. (NIOC – 13%)
IOCL acquired govt stake in FY01; Cap.(mmtpa): 2.5 (1965) & now at
10.5.
Capacity (mmtpa): 0.5 (1993) and currently at 1mmtpa.
Built at an approved cost of INR270m.
Set up as a JV of HPCL and A V Birla Group; In 2003 ONGC acquired Birla
stake and infused equity making MRPL a majority held ONGC subsidiary.
Capacity change (mmtpa): 3.7 (1996), 11.8 and currently at 15mmtpa.
Is the World’s largest grassroots Refinery.
Amalgamation Reliance Petroleum Ltd with RIL in 2009.
Capacity (mmtpa): 10.5 (2006), 14 (2009) and now at 20mmtpa.
Indian Oil Corporation (IOC)
Digboi, Assam
1901
Guwahati, Assam
Koyali, Gujarat
Jan-1962
Oct-1965
Mathura, UP
Panipat, Haryana
Bongaigaon, Assam
Jan-1982
1998
Feb-1974
8.0
15.0
2.4
6.5
160
300
47
130
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd (HPCL)
Mumbai,
1952
Maharashtra
HPCL - Mittal JV, Bhatinda
Apr-2012
9.0
12.0
180
240
Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd (BPCL)
Mumbai
Jan-1955
Maharashtra
Kochi, Kerala
Apr-1963
9.5
190
BPCL- OOCL JV; Bina, MP
Numaligarh, Assam
May-2011
Oct-2000
6.0
3.0
120
60
Chennai Petroleum Corporation Ltd (CPCL)
Manali, Tamilnadu
1967
10.5
210
Narimanam, Tamilnadu
ONGC; Tatipaka, AP
MRPL;
Mangalore, Karnataka
1993
Sep-2001
Mar-1996
1.0
0.1
15.0
20
1
300
400
4,341
22 August 2014
27

Oil & Gas | Thematic
Annexure 3B: Map of refinery locations
Source: MOSL
22 August 2014
28

Oil & Gas | Thematic
Annexure 4: Under-recovery and their sharing
Under-recovery: Our FY16 subsidy estimate assumes Brent at USD105/bbl
Marketing
Losses
LPG
INR493/cyl
INR531b
Kerosene
INR31.2/ltr
INR244b
MS
nil
nil
Diesel
nil
nil
HPCL (~24%): INR181b
BPCL (~23%): INR170b
IOC (~53%): INR399b
Gross under-recovery:
INR751b
64%
Upstream
INR480b
Subsidy
Sharing
ONGC (84.4%): INR405b
34%
Oil bonds
INR255b
HPCL: INR61b
BPCL: INR58b
IOC: INR135b
2%
OMCs
INR15b
HPCL: nil
BPCL: nil
IOC: nil
GAIL (2.4%): INR11b
OIL (13.2%): INR11b
Source: MOSL
Under-recovery: We model upstream sharing at INR588/480b for FY15E/16E
(INR b)
FY06
Fx Rate (INR/USD)
44.3
Brent (USD/bbl)
58
Product Sales (mmt)
64
Product-wise Gross under-recovery (INR b)
Petrol
27
Diesel
126
Kerosene
144
LPG
102
Total
400
Sharing of Gross under-recovery (INR b)
Government
115
Upstream
140
OMC's
138
Total
400
Sharing of Gross under-recovery (%)
Government
29
Upstream
35
OMC's
35
Total
100
Sharing within Upstream Sharing (INR b)
ONGC
120
OIL
10
GAIL
11
Total
140
Sharing within Upstream Sharing (%)
ONGC
85
OIL
7
GAIL
8
Total
100
FY07
45.2
64
69
20
188
179
107
494
241
205
48
494
49
42
10
100
170
20
15
205
83
10
7
100
FY08
40.3
82
76
73
353
191
156
773
353
257
163
773
46
33
21
100
220
23
14
257
86
9
5
100
FY09
46.0
85
83
52
523
282
176
1,033
713
329
(9)
1033
69
32
(1)
100
282
30
18
329
86
9
5
100
FY10
47.5
70
91
52
93
174
143
461
260
145
56
461
56
31
12
100
116
15
13
144
80
11
9
100
FY11
45.6
86
96
27
348
200
205
780
410
303
67
780
53
39
9
100
249
33
21
303
82
11
7
100
FY12
47.9
114
100
0
812
278
284
1,385
829
552
0
1,385
60
40
0
100
445
74
32
550
81
13
6
100
FY13
54.5
111
104
0
915
296
399
1,610
1,000
600
10
1,610
62
37
1
100
494
79
27
600
82
13
4
100
FY14 FY15E FY16E FY17E
60.6
59.0
58.0
58.0
108
108
105
100
98
111
117
122
0
628
306
465
1,399
707
671
21
1,399
51
48
2
100
564
88
19
671
84
13
3
100
0
186
275
457
918
312
588
18
918
34
64
2
100
496
78
14
588
84
13
2
100
0
0
244
597
750
255
480
15
750
34
64
2
100
405
63
11
480
0
0
210
481
691
235
443
14
691
34
64
2
100
374
58
11
443
84
84
13
13
2
2
100
100
Source: MOSL
22 August 2014
29

Oil & Gas | Thematic
Under-recovery: sensitivity analysis
For every USD1/bbl variation in oil price:
Gross under-recovery (U/R) changes by INR41b.
Diesel U/R changes by INR27b (~65% of gross change).
Kerosene U/R changes by INR3b (~8% of gross change); LPG U/R changes by
INR11b (~27% of gross change).
Every INR1/USD variation in exchange rate changes U/R by INR98b (oil at USD110-
120/bbl). Impact of INR1/ltr price hike on U/R: Diesel – INR81b; Kero – INR12b, and
LPG hike of INR25/cyl – INR24b.
Under-recovery: sensitivity analysis
Gross Under recoveries (INRb)
Brent (USD/bbl)
90
56
510
58
547
60
583
62
710
64
871
Diesel (INRb)
Brent (USD/bbl)
56
58
60
62
64
66
Kerosene (INRb)
Brent (USD/bbl)
56
58
60
62
64
66
LPG (INRb)
Brent (USD/bbl)
56
58
60
62
64
66
90
0
0
0
90
214
338
90
188
199
210
220
231
242
90
322
348
374
400
426
451
100
641
683
787
964
1,142
100
0
0
63
199
335
470
100
217
229
241
253
265
277
100
424
454
483
513
543
572
105
707
750
906
1,092
1,278
105
0
0
112
253
395
537
105
231
244
256
269
281
294
105
475
507
538
570
601
633
110
811
870
1,064
1,258
1,452
110
38
51
199
346
494
642
110
246
259
272
285
298
311
110
526
560
593
626
660
693
115
1,007
1,111
1,313
1,515
1,718
115
169
224
378
531
685
839
115
260
274
287
301
315
328
115
577
613
648
683
718
753
120
1,203
1,352
1,562
1,773
1,984
120
299
397
557
716
876
1,035
120
275
289
303
317
331
345
120
629
666
703
740
777
814
Gross U/R without Diesel (INRb)
90
100
105
510
641
707
547
683
750
583
724
794
620
766
838
657
807
882
Diesel (INR/ltr)
90
100
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.4
0.0
3.1
Kerosene (INR/ltr)
90
100
24.2
27.9
25.6
29.4
27.0
30.9
28.3
32.3
29.7
33.8
31.1
35.3
LPG (INR/cylinder)
90
100
322
417
346
444
369
471
393
498
416
525
440
552
105
0.0
0.0
0.3
2.0
3.7
5.5
105
29.7
31.2
32.8
34.4
35.9
37.5
105
464
493
522
550
579
608
110
772
818
865
911
958
110
0.0
0.6
2.4
4.2
6.0
7.8
110
31.5
33.1
34.7
36.4
38.0
39.6
110
512
542
572
603
633
663
115
838
886
935
984
1,033
115
0.8
2.7
4.6
6.5
8.4
10.2
115
33.3
35.0
36.7
38.4
40.1
41.8
115
559
591
623
655
687
719
120
903
954
1,006
1,057
1,108
120
2.9
4.8
6.8
8.7
10.7
12.6
120
35.1
36.9
38.6
40.4
42.1
43.9
120
607
640
674
708
741
775
Source: MOSL
22 August 2014
30

Oil & Gas | Thematic
Annexure 5: Petroleum pricing in India
Era
Period
Till 1939
Details
Burmah - Shell, London office computed/advised on prices.
Retail selling price in India was worked out after adding railway freight, local taxes
etc.
1939-1948
Market determined
Burmah - Shell, Stanvac, Caltex and BOC operated a price pool for Kerosene and
Petrol.
For HSD, daily prices were fixed by individual oil companies.
1948-1958
Value Stock Accounting
Under VSA agreement, a cost plus formula with import parity price linked to
(VSA): First regulation
‘Abadan’ Iran plus freight to India, insurance, ocean loss, import duty and other
attempt - Fore-runner to levies/charges)
oil pool mechanism
Burmah - Shell, maintained VSA for each product. Collections at provisional basic
selling price were set off against actual costs. Surplus/deficit were either
ploughed back/recouped from by adjusting selling price.
1958-1961
Ad-hoc arrangement
1961-1965
Oil Price Enquiry
Committee (OPEC)
1966-1970
K.R. Damle committee
found out that sales to other countries were at a
significant discount, hence proposed the linkage of Prices to lowest prices at
Abadan, Iran less discounts.
Working Group on Oil
Talukdar committee
recommended no major change, but asked for higher
Prices (WGOP) Formula
discount
on
FOB
basis.
Effective September 1967, prices were linked to posted prices at ‘Bandar
Mahshahr’ in Iran.
Oil Prices Committee
Shantilal Shah committee
concluded that Import parity pricing was not correct,
but due to lack of cost data and govt. commitment to oil companies it is adopting
(OPC)
import
parity
pricing.
Also, inland refineries were also made pricing points to compensate from
additional freight cost
After 1973 Oil Crisis,
OPC under K. S. Krishnaswamy recommended shift from import parity to “cost
plus basis” (APM).
govt. formed Oil Prices
Committee (OPC) and
In 1984, OCRC, under J. S. Iyer changed compensation basis from a flat rate on CE
to 12% post tax RONW and weighted cost of borrowings; Applicable till March 31,
later in 1984 Oil Cost
Review Committee
1998.
(OCRC)
a) Upstream: Crude FOB = Normative opex + 15% post-tax RoCE + levies like
royalty and cess;
b) Refining: Ex-refinery price = Cost of crude + normative opex + 12% post-tax
RONW;
c) Price to Consumers = Marketing Margin (MM) + Ex. refinery price +
Surcharges + other duties/taxes; MM = Normative opex, and a 12% post-tax
RONW.
Oil Pool Accounts maintained by Oil Co-ordination Committee (OCC): Crude Oil
Price Equalisation (COPE) Account, Cost and Freight (C&F) Account, Product Price
Adjustment (PPA) Account
Lubricants decontrolled in 1993
Import Parity Pricing
In November 1997, government notified phased dismantling of APM with full
dismantling by April 2002.
From April 1, 1998, moved to adjusted import parity pricing for MS, HSD, SKO, ATF
and LPG
De-regulated Naphtha, FO/LSHS, and Bitumen from April 1998 and ATF from April
2001.
In Oct 2003, MOP&NG approved a sharing of OMCs losses on PDS kero/dom. LPG
by upstream companies.
Trade Parity Pricing
Rangarajan committee recommendation implemented from June 2006 to move to
trade parity pricing (with weight of 80 % Import Parity Pricing and 20 % Export
Parity Pricing)
Petrol deregulated in June 2010.
In June 2013, allowed INR0.5/ltr monthly price hikes in diesel, set to be
deregulated in next few months. Bulk consumers to pay market linked price
Limited LPG cylinders to 12/household/yr, and shift to direct benefit transfer
(DBT) in LPG and PDS Kerosene
Pricing mechanism
Market determined
Till 1974
Market
Determined
Pricing
(MNC's were
actively doing
business in India
1970-1975
1975-1998
APM Era: 1975-
1998
(A cost-plus
pricing system for
producers,
together with
cross-
subsidization
scheme for end-
users )
1998-2006
Post APM Era
2006
2010-till
date
On-going reforms
22 August 2014
31

Oil & Gas | Thematic
Annexure 6: Key recommendations of oil sector expert committees
Recomm-
endations
on
Rangarajan
Committee
(Feb-06)
Pricing methodology for
Petroleum products
Chaturvedi
Committee
(2008)
Pricing of Petroleum
products should be
on trade parity
pricing (TPP) -
weighted avg of
import (IPP) and
export (EPP) parity
price in 80:20 ratio.
Pricing of petroleum
products should be
EPP, as the IPP prices
are higher than the
International/FOB
prices.
Shift retail prices
from incl. of state
taxes to before state
tax prices (to avoid
inter-state tax
differences.
Petrol and diesel
pricing and
subsidy
OMC's should
be allowed to
fix retail prices
of petrol and
diesel, subject
to ceiling.
Kerosene pricing
and subsidy
LPG pricing and
subsidy
Subsidy sharing
recommendations
Subsidy in
kerosene to be
given only to
BPL families.
Increase LPG
price by
INR75/cyl,
and gradually
deregulate
LPG.
Subsidies from ONGC, OINL
and GAIL should be
discontinued
OIDB cess collected from
ONGC/OINL to be increased
from INR1,800/MT to
INR4,800/MT.
Diesel prices to
be adjusted in
24 months by
small gradual
price hikes.
Petrol and
diesel prices to
be deregulated
by March
2009.
Restrict
subsidized
kerosene supply
only to BPL
families
through issuing
smart cards.
Subsidy on
LPG to be
phased out in
three years.
Kirit Parikh
Committee
(Feb-10)
Kirit Parikh
Committee
(Oct-13)
Deregulate
Petrol &
diesel
Well-off
people use
vehicles,
hence no
need for
subsidy.
Impact on
agriculture
can be
compensated
by higher
MSP.
Petrol prices
to be
adjusted by
March 2009.
Increase
kerosene
price by
INR6/ltr and
revise it in
steps with
growth in per
capita
agricultural
GDP at
nominal
prices.
LPG price
increase by
at least
INR100/cyl
and to
revise
based on
increase in
per capita
income
Retail prices to be brought in-
line with market, under-
recoveries should be financed
temporarily through special oil
tax:
1. 100% tax on realization
above USD75/bbl for
ONGC/OINL; 40% tax for
private players/JVs prior to
NELP.
2. Cut-off price of USD75/bbl
be reviewed periodically in
view of investment needs of
E&P companies.
3. Subsidy contribution from
GAIL to be fixed at INR5b.
ONGC and OINL subsidy on
slab-based taxes at different
oil prices
ONGC's formula: Tax nil till
USD60/bbl; incremental tax-
slabs of 20/40/60/80% on
incremental revenue for
USD60-70-80-90/bbl crude
price respectively.
Rest to be shared by GoI.
Increase
kerosene
price by
INR6/ltr and
revise it in
steps with
growth in per
capita
agricultural
GDP at
nominal
prices.
LPG price
increase by
at least
INR100/cyl
and to
revise
based on
increase in
per capita
income.
Subsidy to be shared by
ONGC and OINL to bear tax
on slab-based on rates at
different crude oil prices
ONGC's formula): Nil tax till
USD60/bbl crude;
incremental tax-slabs of
20/40/60/80% on
incremental revenue for
USD60-70-80-90/bbl crude
price respectively.
Rest to be shared by GoI.
Source: MoPNG, PPAC, MOSL
*TPP - Trade Parity Price;
EPP
- Export Parity Price;
IPP
- Import Parity Price;
OIDB
- Oil Industry Development Board
22 August 2014
32

Oil & Gas | Thematic
Annexure 7: OMC’s 1 year forward P/E and P/B charts (15 years)
BPCL: 1 year forward P/E (x) chart
32
24
16
12.6
8
0
10.3
13.4
14.9
P/E (x)
5 Yrs Avg(x)
15 Yrs Avg(x)
10 Yrs Avg(x)
BPCL: 1 year forward P/B (x) chart
P/B (x)
5 Yrs Avg(x)
Adj. P/BV (excl. E&P)
15 Yrs Avg(x)
10 Yrs Avg(x)
2.2
1.3
1.4
1.3
2.6
2.0
1.4
0.8
0.2
Source: Company, MOSL
Source: Company, MOSL
HPCL: 1 year forward P/E (x) chart
30
23
16
9.2
9
2
9.4
P/E (x)
5 Yrs Avg(x)
15 Yrs Avg(x)
10 Yrs Avg(x)
HPCL: 1 year forward P/B (x) chart
2.2
1.7
1.2
10.0
0.7
0.2
1.0
0.8
0.9
1.0
P/B (x)
5 Yrs Avg(x)
15 Yrs Avg(x)
10 Yrs Avg(x)
10.9
Source: Company, MOSL
Source: Company, MOSL
IOCL: 1 year forward P/E (x) chart
28
21
14
7
0
9.9
8.2
P/E (x)
5 Yrs Avg(x)
15 Yrs Avg(x)
10 Yrs Avg(x)
IOCL: 1 year forward P/B (x) chart
2.8
2.2
1.5
P/B (x)
5 Yrs Avg(x)
1.3
1.2
1.1
1.2
15 Yrs Avg(x)
10 Yrs Avg(x)
9.9
10.2
0.9
0.2
Source: Company, MOSL
Source: Company, MOSL
22 August 2014
33

Oil & Gas | Thematic
KEPT BLANK INTENTIONALLY
22 August 2014
34

Oil & Gas | Thematic
Companies
BSE Sensex: 26,420
Companies Covered
S&P CNX: 7,913
Pg
36
42
47
August 2014
BPCL
HPCL
IOCL
22 August 2014
35

22 August 2014
Update | Sector: Oil & Gas
BPCL
BSE Sensex
26,420
S&P CNX
7,913
CMP: INR672
TP: INR795
Buy
On track to become an integrated player
Reforms to boost near term earnings; E&P a long-term value creator
Stock Info
Bloomberg
Equity Shares (m)
52-Week Range (INR)
1, 6, 12 Rel. Per (%)
M.Cap. (INR b)
M.Cap. (USD b)
BPCL IN
723.1
693/257
11/59/83
486.6
8.0
BPCL is set to become an integrated hydrocarbon player with successful E&P
business, along with refining and marketing presence, to be followed by forward
integration at Kochi.
Near term earnings boost is expected from (a) halving of under-recoveries by
FY16 helping in interest cost reduction, (b) likely higher marketing margins.
Maintain Buy, with a target price of INR795, implying 18% upside.
Near-term growth from lower interest, likely higher marketing margin
Financial Snapshot (INR b)
Y/E Mar
2015E 2016E 2017E
Net Sales
2,653 2,761 2,701
EBITDA
Adj PAT
EPS (INR)
Gr. (%)
BV/Sh (INR)
RoE (%)
RoCE (%)
P/E (x)
P/BV (x)
68.7
31.5
43.5
-19.5
15.8
7.3
15.5
2.3
75.8
35.0
48.3
11.1
15.8
8.8
13.9
2.1
87.3
41.1
56.8
17.5
16.7
10.7
11.9
1.9
293.6 325.6 363.6
Continued monthly diesel price hikes have helped OMC’s to reduce the
working capital debt. Consequently, we estimate ~20% reduction in interest
cost for BPCL.
Post the diesel deregulation, OMC’s would be able to fix the retail prices
and we expect an increase in the retail auto fuel marketing margins that
were fixed in 2006.
India’s current marketing margins are ~60% below global averages and a
mere INR0.5/ltr increase in diesel marketing margin would increase BPCL’s
earnings by INR9.3/sh.
BPCL has been successful in adding substantial reserves in its Mozambique
(10% stake in 50-70+ tcf of gross reserves) and Brazil portfolio (Wahoo
discovery - 200mmbbl). We expect further upsides from Mozambique and
meaningful reserve addition from Petrobras operated SEAL basin in Brazil.
We currently value BPCL’s E&P portfolio at INR223/sh (Mozambique –
INR185 and Brazil – INR12) and would watch out for FID and execution
timelines at Mozambique block.
BPCL is set to increase its refining capacity to 47.5mmt by FY18 from
30.5mmt led by Kochi and NRL expansion and Bina debottlenecking.
BPCL is well funded for its capex plans with gross debt of INR152b,
government receivable of INR96, bonds on the balance sheet at INR52b and
treasury shares of INR45b (~9% of equity).
Key risks include delay in E&P project execution, ad-hoc subsidy sharing and
sharp increase in crude price and INR depreciation.
Our positive stance is led by comfort from E&P value, net D/E of 0.8, RoE
moving up to 22% and strong earnings growth led by lower interest and
potentially higher marketing margin.
The stock trades at 13.9x FY16E EPS of INR48.3 and 1.1x FY16E BV (adjusted
for investments). BPCL is our top pick among OMCs for its E&P potential.
Buy.
36
Expect further upsides from BPCL’s E&P portfolio
Shareholding pattern % (Jun-14)
Jun-14 Mar-14 Jun-13
Promoter
DII
FII
Others
54.9
15.9
12.2
16.9
54.9
16.8
11.4
16.9
54.9
16.9
10.2
18.0
Notes: FII includes depository receipts
Balance sheet strong; core capex to benefit in integration
Stock Performance (1-year)
BPCL
Sensex - Rebased
700
575
450
325
200
Valuation and view
22 August 2014

BPCL
Valuation and view
Ongoing reforms have the potential to transform OMCs to a structural
investment play, in our view, led by higher earnings predictability, increase in
profitability, thus leading to higher RoEs.
Potential increase in diesel marketing margin: For OMC’s, in the initial period of
reforms, earnings growth would be driven by reduction in interest cost.
The next big earnings jump for OMC’s would come from likely higher marketing
margin in Diesel. Even if private players gain market share as high as 15%,
OMC’s will still benefit.
An INR0.5/ltr (we model INR0.25/ltr increase in our FY17 estimates) increase in
diesel marketing margin increases BPCL’s EPS by INR9.3/sh.
Our fair value stands at INR795/share – an average of P/B multiple of 1.6x,
EV/EBITDA multiple of 6x and P/E multiple of 12x. We value BPCL’s investments
at INR313/share, which comprises of E&P potential: INR223/share, listed
investments: INR41/share (post 25% discount), and treasury shares:
INR47/share.
The stock trades at 13.9x FY16E EPS of INR48.3 and 1.1x FY16E BV (adjusted for
investments). BPCL is our top pick among OMCs for its E&P potential. Buy.
BPCL: Key assumptions
Exchange Rate (INR/USD)
Brent Crude (USD/bbl)
Market Sales (MMT)
GRM (USD/bbl)
Singapore GRM (USD/bbl)
Prem/(disc) (USD/bbl)
Refinery Throughput (mmt)
Under recoveries Sharing (INR b)
Gross under recoveries
Upstream sharing
Govt. sharing
Net sharing
FY07
45.3
64.4
23.3
3.57
6.1
(2.5)
19.8
107
45
52
10
FY08
40.2
82.3
25.8
5.67
7.6
(2.0)
20.9
180
60
86
34
FY09
45.8
84.8
27.1
5.42
5.75
(0.3)
20.4
238
76
162
0
FY10
47.5
69.6
27.7
3.01
3.55
(0.5)
20.4
101
36
44
21
FY11
45.7
86.5
29.1
4.5
5.2
(0.7)
21.8
180
70
65
45
FY12
47.9
114.5
31.1
3.2
8.2
(5.1)
22.9
326
130
197
0
FY13
54.5
110.0
33.3
5.0
7.7
(2.7)
23.2
390
168
219
2
FY14
60.6
107.8
34.0
4.3
5.6
(1.3)
23.4
345
156
184
5
FY15E
59.0
108.0
35.0
4.3
5.5
(1.2)
23.9
219
140
74
4
FY16E
58.0
105.0
36.1
4.8
6.0
(1.2)
23.9
FY17E
58.0
100.0
37.2
4.9
6.0
(1.1)
24.1
169
157
109
101
58
53
3
3
Source: MOSL
22 August 2014
37

BPCL
BPCL: Story in charts
BPCL’s GRM have been low but stable in recent years
Prem/(Disc) to Singapore
Singapore GRM 8.2
7.7
5.8
5.2
3.6
5.4
(0.3)
3.0
(0.5)
4.5
(0.7)
(5.1)
3.2
5.0
(2.7)
BPCL GRM (USD/bbl)
5.6
4.3
(1.3)
5.5
4.3
(1.2)
6.0
4.8
(1.2)
6.0
67
However, no secular trend seen in profitability (INRb)
EBIDA (INRb)
92
69
41
19
17
9
31
73
48
33
PAT (INRb)
85
4.9
34
(1.1)
7
31
17
43
40
Source: Company, MOSL
Source: Company, MOSL
With reforms expect interest cost to reduce (INRb)
23
26
22
14
14
20
13
… and stabilize return ratio’s at higher levels (%)
RoE (%)
RoCE (%)
21.7
11.9
11.1
9.5
3.9
5.0
11.5
15.1
11.4
11.7
15.3
14.8
12.1
16.1
13.7
11
10
8.4
5.9
4.8
FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15E FY16E FY17E
Source: Company, MOSL
Source: Company, MOSL
Silver lining led by E&P successes, current value at INR223/share
Country
Mozambique
Brazil (Wahoo & Others)
Brazil (SEAL Basin)
Successful wells
13
3
5
Reserves announced
50-70 tcf
150-200mmbbl (includes only
Wahoo discover)
Reserves not declared yet
Comments
We value the block at USD4/boe, assuming recoverable reserves o
production from 2019, implying INR212/share
We value the block at USD10/boe, assuming recoverable reserves
of production from 2018, implying INR12/share
We currently do not assign any value to this block
Source: Company, MOSL
22 August 2014
38

BPCL
BPCL: Story in charts
Refining capacity set to increase by 1.6x
Deregulated era could increase marketing profitability
FY16E EPS
68.6
59.4
48.3
50.2
our base
case
1.4
1.5
2
2.5
Marketing margin on Diesel (INR/ltr)
Source: Company, MOSL
Source: Company, MOSL
Expect overall under recovery to reduce 46% by FY16 (INRb)
Petrol
Diesel
Kerosene
LPG
Total
1,610
1,399
1,381
1,033
773
93
201
400 494
461
780
918
750 691
Marketing and refining throughput trend (mmt)
Marketing Sales (mmt)
27
28
29
31
33
Refinery Throughput (mmt)
38
36
35
34
20
20
22
23
23
23
24
24
24
Source: Company, MOSL
Source: Company, MOSL
Trading at multiyear low valuation (1x adj. BV)
P/B (x)
5 Yrs Avg(x)
Adj. P/BV (excl. E&P)
1.4
15 Yrs Avg(x)
10 Yrs Avg(x)
1.3
1.3
2.2
BPCL: Fair value at INR795/share (INR/sh)
EV/EBITDA (FY16E 6x)
P/B (FY16E 1.6x)
P/E (FY16E 12x)
Average
793
709
883
795
Source: Company, MOSL
2.6
2.0
1.4
0.8
0.2
Source: Company, MOSL
22 August 2014
39

BPCL
Financials and valuation
Income statement
Y/E Mar
Net Sales
Change (%)
EBITDA
EBITDA Margin (%)
Depreciation
EBIT
Interest
Other Income
Extraordinary items
PBT
Tax
Tax Rate (%)
Reported PAT
Adjusted PAT
Change (%)
Min. Int. & Assoc. Share
Adj Cons PAT
2012
2,121.4
38.1
48.1
2.3
24.1
24.0
22.6
14.6
0.0
16.0
7.5
46.8
8.5
7.8
-52.2
-0.7
7.1
2013
2,421.8
14.2
66.7
2.8
24.6
42.1
25.2
15.3
0.0
32.2
12.8
39.9
19.4
18.8
140.9
-0.6
18.3
2014
2,642.6
9.1
92.1
3.5
26.1
66.0
19.8
15.5
0.0
61.7
21.1
34.3
40.5
39.1
107.9
-1.4
37.7
2015E
2,653.2
0.4
68.7
2.6
30.0
38.7
12.8
23.8
0.0
49.7
17.8
35.8
31.9
31.5
-19.5
-0.4
31.0
(INR Billion)
2016E
2,761.2
4.1
75.8
2.7
31.1
44.8
10.9
19.4
0.0
53.3
17.9
33.6
35.4
35.0
11.1
-0.4
34.5
2017E
2,701.0
-2.2
87.3
3.2
32.0
55.3
10.1
16.6
0.0
61.7
20.2
32.8
41.5
41.1
17.5
-0.4
40.6
Balance sheet
Y/E Mar
Share Capital
Reserves
Net Worth
Debt
Deferred Tax
Total Capital Employed
Gross Fixed Assets
Less: Acc Depreciation
Net Fixed Assets
Capital WIP
Investments
Current Assets
Inventory
Debtors
Cash & Bank
Loans & Adv, Others
Curr Liabs & Provns
Curr. Liabilities
Provisions
Net Current Assets
Total Assets
2012
7.2
151.6
158.8
301.5
16.8
487.5
416.7
174.4
242.3
45.3
78.9
404.0
211.0
52.0
13.3
127.8
290.7
271.4
19.2
113.3
487.5
2013
7.2
160.5
167.8
328.6
16.1
523.2
437.8
198.2
239.6
74.6
74.7
399.1
199.6
43.6
28.5
127.5
272.5
240.8
31.7
126.6
523.2
2014
7.2
185.2
192.5
333.2
16.1
553.9
483.1
224.3
258.8
74.6
113.0
430.9
192.1
59.5
78.4
100.8
331.0
298.4
32.7
99.9
553.9
2015E
7.2
205.0
212.3
261.6
16.9
503.4
499.8
254.3
245.6
100.1
128.0
366.2
211.3
57.8
36.3
60.8
344.1
311.2
32.9
22.1
503.4
(INR Billion)
2016E
2017E
7.2
7.2
228.2
255.7
235.4
262.9
245.5
227.6
17.7
19.2
511.7
523.2
514.8
526.0
285.3
317.3
229.4
208.7
135.1
180.1
148.0
173.0
337.8
308.4
211.9
207.0
59.1
57.9
26.0
2.6
40.8
40.8
346.3
354.6
313.2
321.3
33.1
33.3
-8.5
-46.2
511.7
523.2
E: MOSL Estimates
22 August 2014
40

BPCL
Financials and valuation
Ratios
Y/E Mar
Basic (INR)
EPS
Cash EPS
Book Value
DPS
Payout (incl. Div. Tax.)
Valuation(x)
P/E
Cash P/E
Price / Book Value
EV/Sales
EV/EBITDA
Dividend Yield (%)
Profitability Ratios (%)
RoE
RoCE
Turnover Ratios (%)
Asset Turnover (x)
Debtors (No. of Days)
Inventory (No. of Days)
Creditors (No. of Days)
Leverage Ratios (%)
Net Debt/Equity (x)
2012
10.8
43.2
219.6
5.5
35.5
62.3
15.6
3.1
0.1
6.0
0.8
5.5
5.2
4.6
8.9
36.3
0.0
1.9
2013
26.0
59.3
232.0
11.0
35.2
25.9
11.3
2.9
0.1
4.5
1.6
11.9
8.3
4.8
6.6
30.1
0.0
2.0
2014
54.1
88.2
266.2
17.0
35.4
12.4
7.6
2.5
0.1
2.8
2.5
22.5
12.3
4.9
8.2
26.5
0.0
1.7
2015E
43.5
84.4
293.6
13.8
35.2
15.5
8.0
2.3
0.1
3.3
2.1
15.8
7.3
5.0
7.9
29.1
0.0
1.2
2016E
48.3
90.7
325.6
14.0
33.9
13.9
7.4
2.1
0.1
2.9
2.1
15.8
8.8
5.4
7.8
28.0
0.0
1.0
2017E
56.8
100.4
363.6
16.0
33.0
11.9
6.7
1.9
0.1
2.6
2.4
16.7
10.7
5.2
7.8
28.0
0.0
0.9
Cash flow statement
Y/E Mar
OP/(Loss) before Tax
Depreciation
Others
Interest
Direct Taxes Paid
(Inc)/Dec in Wkg Cap
CF from Op. Activity
(Inc)/Dec in FA & CWIP
(Pur)/Sale of Invt
Others
CF from Inv. Activity
Inc/(Dec) in Net Worth
Inc / (Dec) in Debt
Interest Paid
Divd Paid (incl Tax)
CF from Fin. Activity
Inc/(Dec) in Cash
Add: Opening Balance
Closing Balance
2012
16.0
24.1
0.0
22.3
-6.9
-40.4
19.1
-42.2
19.4
0.0
-22.8
0.0
-14.9
-21.9
-6.5
-43.8
-47.5
60.7
13.3
2013
32.2
24.6
0.0
24.7
-9.2
-11.3
59.2
-73.8
37.8
0.0
-36.0
0.0
42.0
-25.5
-5.0
2.3
25.5
3.0
28.5
2014
61.7
26.1
0.0
19.8
-21.1
76.7
163.2
-45.3
-38.3
0.0
-83.6
0.0
4.6
-19.8
-14.4
-29.6
49.9
28.5
78.4
2015E
49.7
30.0
0.0
12.8
-17.0
35.6
111.1
-42.2
-15.0
0.0
-57.2
0.0
-71.6
-12.8
-11.7
-96.1
-42.1
78.4
36.3
(INR Billion)
2016E
2017E
53.3
61.7
31.1
32.0
0.0
0.0
10.9
10.1
-17.1
-18.8
20.2
14.4
98.3
99.4
-49.9
-56.2
-20.0
-25.0
0.0
0.0
-69.9
-81.2
0.0
0.0
-16.1
-17.9
-10.9
-10.1
-11.8
-13.5
-38.8
-41.6
-10.4
-23.3
36.3
26.0
26.0
2.6
E: MOSL Estimates
22 August 2014
41

22 August 2014
Update | Sector: Oil & Gas
HPCL
BSE Sensex
26,420
S&P CNX
7,913
CMP: INR458
TP: INR527
Buy
High earnings leverage to ongoing reforms
Improving profitability to reduce balance sheet vulnerability
Stock Info
Bloomberg
Equity Shares (m)
52-Week Range (INR)
1, 6, 12 Rel. Per (%)
M.Cap. (INR b)
M.Cap. (USD b)
HPCL IN
338.6
475/158
15/53/107
155.1
2.6
HPCL’s high marketing-to-refining ratio (standalone basis) of 2x gives it highest
leverage to reforms compared with its peers, led by interest cost reduction and
likely higher auto fuel marketing margins.
Key positives include: (a) Under-recoveries to halve by FY16 led by on-going
diesel reforms (Diesel de-regulation in 3-6 months), (b) Likely higher marketing
margin allowed to OMC’s, post diesel-deregulation, and (c) Likely steps such as
‘direct cash benefit transfer’ to reduce subsidy – directly by selective allocation,
and indirectly by reducing surplus allocation.
Financial Snapshot (INR b)
Y/E Mar
2015E 2016E 2017E
Net Sales
2,168 2,175 2,139
EBITDA
Adj PAT
EPS (INR)
Gr. (%)
BV/Sh (INR)
RoE (%)
RoCE (%)
P/E (x)
P/BV (x)
43
14
42
-17.2
465
9
6
10.8
1.0
48
17
50
18.7
498
10
7
9.1
0.9
53
19
57
14.3
535
11
9
8.0
0.9
Maintain Buy, with a target price of INR527, implying 15% upside.
HPCL’s earnings most sensitive to reforms among PSU OMC’s
Continued monthly diesel price hikes have helped OMC’s to reduce the
working capital debt. Consequently, we estimate ~20% interest cost
reduction for HPCL.
Post the diesel deregulation, OMC’s will be able to fix the retail prices.
Marketing margins which were fixed in 2006 are also likely to increase, in
our view.
India’s current marketing margins are 60% below global averages and a
mere INR0.5/ltr increase in diesel marketing margin will increase HPCL’s
earnings by INR15.4/sh.
New project capex to stretch balance sheet in the medium term
Shareholding pattern % (Jun-14)
Jun-14 Mar-14 Jun-13
Promoter
DII
FII
Others
51.1
20.6
12.5
15.8
51.1
22.2
10.6
16.1
51.1
23.0
9.9
16.0
HPCL has commissioned its 9mmtpa JV Bhatinda refinery in March 2012 and
now plans to set up a new refinery at Rajasthan.
While Bhatinda refinery (49% stake) is yet to become EPS accretive, the
planned Rajasthan refinery venture could entail further capital commitment
leading to stretched balance sheet.
Notes: FII includes depository receipts
Earnings diversification could help in the long term
Stock Performance (1-year)
HPCL
Sensex - Rebased
470
390
310
230
150
HPCL has a strong marketing presence compared to its refining capacity.
However, its earnings are relatively non-diversified leading to a heavy
dependence on reforms.
Forward integration in petrochemicals could help company tide over the
weaker refining margins and give earnings stability at the company level.
Key risks include cost escalation and delays in new projects, ad-hoc subsidy
sharing, and sharp increase in crude price and INR depreciation.
We value HPCL at INR INR527, based on average of EV/EBITDA, P/E and P/B
valuation. The stock trades at 9.1x FY16E EPS of INR50.3 and 0.9x FY16E BV.
Maintain
Buy.
42
Valuation and view
22 August 2014

HPCL
Valuation and view
Ongoing reforms have the potential to transform OMCs to a structural
investment play led by higher earnings predictability and increase in
profitability, in our view, in turn leading to higher RoE’s.
Our positive stance on the stock is driven by likely diesel deregulation in coming
months, which could reduce under recoveries by ~51% in FY17 to INR689b v/s
INR1.4t in FY14. For OMC’s, in the initial period of reforms, earnings growth
would be from reduction in interest cost which could be followed by likely large
delta in diesel marketing margins post deregulation.
Potential increase in diesel marketing margin:
The next big earnings jump for
OMC’s would come from likely higher marketing margin in Diesel. We believe
that OMC’s could at least earn additional marketing margin of INR0.5/ltr. Even if
private players take market share as high as 15%, on a net basis OMC’s will still
benefit.
An INR0.5/ltr increase in diesel marketing margin increases HPCL’s FY16E EPS by
36%. Our earnings upgrade is driven by lower interest cost in FY15 v/s FY14
which was higher due to INR depreciation.
We value HPCL on FY16E at INR527, based on average of (a) 6x EV/EBITDA; (b)
1x P/B and c) 9x P/E and investment value (INR131/sh, post 25% discount). The
stock trades at 9.1x FY16E EPS of INR50.3 and 1x FY16E BV. Maintain
Buy.
BPCL: Key Assumptions
Exchange Rate (INR/USD)
Brent Crude (USD/bbl)
Market Sales (MMT)
GRM (USD/bbl)
HPCL Blended GRM
Singapore GRM (USD/bbl)
Prem/(disc) (USD/bbl)
Total Refinery throughput (MMT)
Refining capacity utilization (%)
Pipeline throughput (mmt)
Under recoveries Sharing (INRb)
Gross under recoveries
Upstream sharing
Govt. sharing
Net sharing
FY07
45.3
64.4
21.7
3.57
6.09
(2.52)
16.7
128%
6.7
100
42
49
10
FY08
40.2
82.3
24.5
5.61
7.65
(2.04)
16.8
120%
7.8
162
54
77
31
FY09
45.8
84.8
25.4
5.17
5.75
(0.58)
16.5
118%
10.6
213
66
147
(0.0)
FY10
47.5
69.6
26.3
2.97
3.55
(0.58)
16.3
116%
12.0
100
33
49
18.6
FY11
45.7
86.5
27.0
4.47
5.18
(0.70)
15.8
106%
13.0
171
66
61
43.4
FY12
47.9
114.5
29.5
5.20
8.17
(2.96)
16.1
99%
13.6
304
121
183
0.1
FY13
54.5
110.6
30.3
2.08
7.70
(5.62)
15.8
98%
13.8
362
112
248
2.3
FY14
60.6
107.8
31.0
3.43
5.62
(2.19)
15.4
95%
15.7
325
168
152
4.8
FY15E
59.0
108.0
31.9
3.20
6.13
(2.93)
15.6
96%
15.3
225
144
76
4.1
FY16E
58.0
105.0
32.8
3.25
6.13
(2.88)
16.0
99%
15.3
FY17E
58.0
100.0
33.7
3.50
6.13
(2.63)
16.0
99%
15.3
182
168
116
107
62
57
3.4
3.1
Source: MOSL
22 August 2014
43

HPCL
Story in charts
HPCL’s GRMs have underperformed Singapore GRM
(USD/bbl)
Prem/(Disc) to Singapore
Singapore GRM
5.8
5.2
(0.6)
3.6
3.0
(0.6)
5.2
4.5
(0.7)
5.2
2.1
(3.0)
(5.6)
8.2
7.7
HPCL Blended GRM
5.6
3.4
(2.2)
6.1
3.2
(2.9)
6.1
3.3
(2.9)
6.1
25
3.5
(2.6)
17
16
16
16
16
15
16
16
16
While refining capacity has been largely flat, marketing sales
have shown steady increase
Marketing Sales (mmt)
29
30
Refinery Throughput (mmt)
34
33
32
31
26
27
Source: Company, MOSL *Does not include Bhatinda JV
Source: Company, MOSL
HPCL FY14 EBITDA and PAT boosted by product inventory
gains and lower interest cost
EBIDA (INRb)
52
29
33
25
9
6
13
15
17
9
14
17
34
39
43
PAT (INRb)
48
53
Expect D/E ratio to decline with increasing profitability (x)
D/E Ratio
2.1
1.8
2.0
2.3
2.4
2.1
1.6
1.2
19
1.0
Source: Company, MOSL
Source: Company, MOSL
Diesel deregulation to reduce working capital leading to
lower interest costs
Total Debt (INRb)
21
17
9
9
Interest Cost (INRb)
18
15
7
298
325
319
250
6
200
HPCL: 1 Year Forward P/B Chart
2.2
1.7
1.2
0.7
0.2
1.0
0.8
0.9
1.0
P/B (x)
5 Yrs Avg(x)
15 Yrs Avg(x)
10 Yrs Avg(x)
8
168
228
213
250
Source: Company, MOSL
Source: Company, MOSL
22 August 2014
44

HPCL
Financials and valuations
Income statement
Y/E Mar
Net Sales
Change (%)
EBITDA
EBITDA Margin (%)
Depreciation
EBIT
Interest
Other Income
Extraordinary items
PBT
Tax
Tax Rate (%)
Reported PAT
Adjusted PAT
Change (%)
Min. Int. & Assoc. Share
Adj Cons PAT
(INR Million)
2012
2013
2014
2015E
2016E
2017E
1,781,392 2,065,293 2,231,454 2,168,166 2,174,703 2,138,649
36.1
15.9
8.0
-2.8
0.3
-1.7
34,082
39,424
52,081
42,624
48,202
53,021
1.9
1.9
2.3
2.0
2.2
2.5
17,129
19,315
21,884
24,478
26,368
28,096
16,953
20,109
30,197
18,146
21,835
24,925
16,977
18,377
15,046
6,681
6,188
5,625
12,222
12,300
11,004
10,220
9,872
9,881
-5
714
0
0
0
0
12,202
13,318
26,155
21,685
25,519
29,181
3,077
5,699
8,817
7,323
8,477
9,693
25.2
42.8
33.7
33.8
33.2
33.2
9,125
7,620
17,338
14,362
17,042
19,488
9,115
9,047
17,338
14,362
17,042
19,488
-40.8
-0.7
91.6
-17.2
18.7
14.3
0
0
0
0
0
0
9,125
7,620
17,338
14,362
17,042
19,488
Balance sheet
Y/E Mar
Share Capital
Reserves
Net Worth
Debt
Deferred Tax
Total Capital Employed
Gross Fixed Assets
Less: Acc Depreciation
Net Fixed Assets
Capital WIP
Investments
Current Assets
Inventory
Debtors
Cash & Bank
Loans & Adv, Others
Curr Liabs & Provns
Curr. Liabilities
Provisions
Net Current Assets
Total Assets
2012
3,390
127,835
131,225
298,312
30,853
460,390
334,590
126,094
208,496
44,445
103,705
354,427
194,545
35,652
2,264
121,967
250,683
230,847
19,836
103,744
460,390
2013
3,390
133,874
137,264
324,583
35,984
497,830
370,062
144,575
225,487
51,729
106,269
378,962
164,387
49,350
1,471
163,754
264,617
241,622
22,995
114,345
497,830
2014
3,390
145,064
148,454
319,000
39,085
506,538
435,291
166,460
268,831
18,000
106,269
376,905
189,876
56,642
4,625
125,762
263,467
241,622
21,845
113,438
506,538
2015E
3,390
154,388
157,778
250,000
41,253
449,031
471,291
190,937
280,354
12,000
106,269
341,917
185,152
55,036
2,562
99,168
291,509
268,571
22,938
50,408
449,031
(INR Million)
2016E
2017E
3,390
3,390
165,441 178,107
168,831 181,497
200,000 175,000
43,805
46,723
412,636 403,220
505,291 535,291
217,305 245,401
287,986 289,890
8,000
8,000
106,269 106,269
290,852 277,778
185,254 182,655
55,202
54,287
13,211
3,653
37,184
37,184
280,471 278,719
256,386 253,430
24,084
25,290
10,381
-941
412,636 403,218
E: MOSL Estimates
22 August 2014
45

HPCL
Financials and valuation
Ratios
Y/E Mar
Basic (INR)
EPS
Cash EPS
Book Value
DPS
Payout (incl. Div. Tax.)
Valuation(x)
P/E
Cash P/E
Price / Book Value
EV/Sales
EV/EBITDA
Dividend Yield (%)
2012
26.9
77.4
387.1
8.5
36.9
17.0
5.9
1.2
0.2
8.7
1.9
2013
26.7
79.5
404.9
8.5
44.2
17.2
5.8
1.1
0.2
8.2
1.9
2014
51.1
115.7
437.9
15.5
35.5
9.0
4.0
1.0
0.1
6.0
3.4
2015E
42.4
114.6
465.4
12.7
35.1
10.8
4.0
1.0
0.1
5.8
2.8
2016E
50.3
128.0
498.0
15.1
35.1
9.1
3.6
0.9
0.1
3.9
3.3
2017E
57.5
140.4
535.4
17.2
35.0
8.0
3.3
0.9
0.1
3.2
3.8
Profitability Ratios (%)
RoE
RoCE
Turnover Ratios (%)
Asset Turnover (x)
Debtors (No. of Days)
Inventory (No. of Days)
Creditors (No. of Days)
Leverage Ratios (%)
Net Debt/Equity (x)
7.1
3.9
4.1
7.3
39.9
0.0
2.3
5.7
4.2
4.3
8.7
29.1
0.0
2.4
12.1
6.0
4.4
9.3
31.1
0.0
2.1
9.4
3.8
4.5
9.3
31.2
0.0
1.6
10.4
5.1
5.0
9.3
31.1
0.0
1.2
11.1
6.1
5.2
9.3
31.2
0.0
1.0
Cash flow statement
Y/E Mar
OP/(Loss) before Tax
Depreciation
Others
Interest
Direct Taxes Paid
(Inc)/Dec in Wkg Cap
CF from Op. Activity
(Inc)/Dec in FA & CWIP
(Pur)/Sale of Invt
Others
CF from Inv. Activity
Inc/(Dec) in Net Worth
Inc / (Dec) in Debt
Interest Paid
Divd Paid (incl Tax)
CF from Fin. Activity
Inc/(Dec) in Cash
Add: Opening Balance
Closing Balance
2012
12,192
17,129
0
21,392
-2,715
-27,301
15,291
-41,359
6,378
6,345
-28,636
0
37,919
-14,836
-5,509
17,574
4,230
-1,966
2,264
2013
14,746
19,344
0
20,193
-1,072
-30,945
11,496
-36,807
-2,404
5,505
-33,706
0
37,072
-22,187
-3,344
11,540
-10,670
12,141
1,471
2014
26,155
21,884
0
15,046
-5,716
4,062
61,431
-31,500
0
0
-31,500
0
-5,583
-15,046
-6,148
-26,776
3,154
1,471
4,625
2015E
21,685
24,478
0
6,681
-5,155
60,966
108,655
-30,000
0
0
-30,000
0
-69,000
-6,681
-5,037
-80,718
-2,063
4,625
2,562
(INR Million)
2016E
2017E
25,519
29,181
26,368
28,096
0
0
6,188
5,625
-5,925
-6,775
50,677
1,762
102,826
57,889
-30,000
-30,000
0
0
0
0
-30,000
-30,000
0
0
-50,000
-25,000
-6,188
-5,625
-5,989
-6,822
-62,177
-37,447
10,649
-9,558
2,562
13,211
13,211
3,653
E: MOSL Estimates
22 August 2014
46

22 August 2014
Update | Sector: Oil & Gas
IOC
BSE Sensex
26,420
S&P CNX
7,913
CMP: INR362
TP: INR449
Buy
Sector reforms and Paradip to drive earnings growth
On-going reforms to reduce subsidy, and higher marketing margin to
boost profitability
Stock Info
Bloomberg
Equity Shares (m)
52-Week Range (INR)
1, 6, 12 Rel. Per (%)
M.Cap. (INR b)
M.Cap. (USD b)
IOCL IN
2,428.0
385/195
7/21/28
879.8
14.5
IOCL, the largest refiner of India, shall be the key beneficiary of the subsidy
reduction and likely higher marketing margins in diesel.
Key positives include: (a) Under-recoveries to halve by FY16 led by on-going diesel
reforms, (b) Likely higher marketing margin post diesel-deregulation, (c)
Commissioning of Paradip refinery, and (d) likely steps to further reduce LPG and
kero subsidy.
Financial Snapshot (INR Billion)
Y/E Mar
2015E 2016E 2017E
Net Sales
EBITDA
Adj PAT
EPS (INR)
Gr (%)
BV/Sh (INR)
RoE (%)
RoCE (%)
P/E (x)
P/BV (x)
4,360
188
79
33
48
301
11
10
11.1
1.2
4,378
212
96
40
21
327
13
12
9.2
1.1
4,194
258
115
47
19
374
13
14
7.7
1.0
Near-term growth from lower interest, likely higher marketing margin
Continued monthly diesel price hikes have helped OMC’s to reduce the
working capital debt to that extent and we estimate ~xx% interest cost
reduction for IOCL.
Post the diesel deregulation OMC’s will be able to fix the retail prices and
we expect the marketing margins which were fixed in 2006 to increase.
India’s current marketing margins are xx% below global averages and a
mere INR0.5/ltr increase in diesel marketing margin will increase IOCL’s
earnings by INR5.4/sh.
Paradip refinery to commission by end-FY15; full benefit in FY17
Shareholding pattern % (Jun-14)
Jun-14 Mar-14 Jun-13
Promoter
DII
FII
Others
68.6
4.6
2.4
24.4
68.6
4.8
2.2
24.5
78.9
4.5
2.0
14.7
IOCL’s first port-based 15mmtpa Paradip refinery is set to be mechanically
complete in 2HFY15 and reach ~100% utilization by end-FY16 or early FY17.
With a break-even GRM of ~USD7/bbl and distillate yield at 81%, Paradip
refinery would be very competitive and add meaningfully to its earnings.
Further addition of INR36b downstream 700KTA polypropylene unit will
boost overall complex IRR.
Diversified earnings provide stability; core capex focus continues
Notes: FII includes depository receipts
Stock Performance (1-year)
IOC
Sensex - Rebased
While refining and marketing continue to be a mainstay (EBITDA share:
63%), pipelines and petchem (EBITDA share at 38%) businesses, provide
earnings stability. Recent venture into shale gas will further diversify its
earnings in the long term.
IOCL to spend INR562b in FY13-17 (47% refining, 28% E&P) v/s INR487b
(60% refining, 27% petchem) in FY08-15. Capex cycle.
IOCL’s long term plans include refinery capacity expansion at Gujarat (13.7
to 18mmt), Mathura (8 to 11mmt) and Panipat (15 to 20mmt).
400
340
280
220
160
Valuation and view
Key risks include cost escalation and delays in new projects, ad-hoc subsidy
sharing, and sharp increase in crude price and INR depreciation.
We value IOCL at INR INR449, based on average of EV/EBITDA, P/E and P/B
valuation. The stock trades at 9.2x FY16E EPS of INR39.5 and 1.1x FY16E BV.
Maintain Buy.
47
22 August 2014

IOC
Valuation and view
Ongoing reforms have the potential to transform OMCs to a structural
investment play, in our view, led by higher earnings predictability and increase
in profitability, in turn leading to higher RoEs.
Our positive stance on the stock is driven by likely diesel deregulation in the
coming months, which could lower under-recovery by ~46% in FY16E to
INR750b v/s INR1.4t in FY14. For OMCs, in the initial period of reforms, earnings
growth would be from reduction in interest cost, which could be followed by
potentially large delta in post-deregulation diesel marketing margins.
Potential increase in diesel marketing margin:
The next big earnings jump for
OMCs would come from a potentially higher marketing margin in diesel. We
believe that OMCs could earn an additional marketing margin of INR0.5/ltr on
diesel. Even if private players take the market share as high as 15%, OMCs will
still benefit. An INR0.5/ltr (we model INR0.25/ltr increase in our FY17 estimates)
increase in diesel marketing margin increases IOCL’s EPS ~15%.
We value IOCL on FY16E at INR449, based on average of (a) 6x EV/EBITDA; (b)
1.1x P/B and c) 10x P/E and investment value (INR104/sh, post 25% discount).
The stock trades at 9.2x FY16E EPS of INR39.5 and 1.1x FY16E BV. Maintain
Buy.
IOCL: Key Assumptions
Exchange Rate (INR/USD)
Conversion (MT to bbl)
Brent Crude (USD/bbl)
Market Sales Volume (MMT)
GRM (USD/bbl)
Singapore GRM (USD/bbl)
Prem/(disc) (USD/bbl)
Refining capacity
Refining capacity utilization (%)
Refinery throughput (mmt)
Pipeline throughput (mmt)
Under recoveries Sharing (INRb)
FY07
45.3
7.37
64.4
58.0
4.2
6.1
(1.9)
49.7
89%
44.0
55.7
286
119
139
0
FY08
40.2
7.37
82.3
64.4
9.0
7.6
1.4
49.7
95%
47.4
57.1
431
143
190
98
FY09
45.8
7.37
84.8
66.8
3.7
5.8
(2.1)
49.7
103%
51.4
59.6
586
182
404
(0)
FY10
47.5
7.37
69.6
69.8
4.5
3.6
0.9
51.2
99%
50.7
64.5
259
75
152
32
FY11
45.7
7.37
86.5
72.9
5.9
5.2
0.8
54.2
98%
53.0
67.8
431
167
226
38
FY12
47.9
7.37
114.5
75.7
3.6
8.2
(4.5)
54.2
103%
55.6
70.3
755
300
455
0
FY13
54.5
7.37
110.0
76.2
2.2
7.6
(5.4)
54.2
101%
54.7
70.9
858
320
533
5
FY14
60.6
7.37
107.8
75.5
4.2
5.6
(1.4)
54.2
98%
53.1
70.2
729
347
372
11
FY15E
59.0
7.37
105.0
78.0
3.3
6.1
(2.9)
54.2
98%
53.1
74.4
504
322
171
11
FY16E
58.0
7.37
105.0
80.4
3.9
6.1
(2.2)
69.2
90%
62.3
76.7
FY17E
58.0
7.37
100.0
82.2
4.8
6.1
(1.4)
69.2
100%
69.2
78.4
Gross under recoveries
Upstream sharing
Govt. sharing
Net sharing
399
365
255
233
135
124
9
8
Source: MOSL
22 August 2014
48

IOC
Story in charts
IOCL’s GRM is hovering at a discount to Singapore GRM since Marketing sales grew at a CAGR 3%, while Refinery
FY12 (USD/bbl)
throughput at a CAGR 2% for the past 6 years (FY08-14)
Prem/(Disc) to Singapore
Singapore GRM
7.6
5.9 8.2
4.5
3.6
3.6 5.2
1
2.2
1
5
5
IOCL GRM
5.6
4.2
1
6.1
6.1
3.8
2
6.1
4.5
2
Marketing Sales (mmt)
67
70
73
76
76
Refinery Throughput (mmt)
76
78
80
82
5.8
3.7
2
3.3
3
51
51
53
56
55
53
53
62
69
Source: Company, MOSL
*Bongaigaon refinery amalgamated in FY09 and 3mmt Panipat
expansion in FY11
Diesel deregulation to reduce working capital, leading to
lower interest costs
Expect D/E to decline as earnings increase (x)
Total Debt (INRb)
56
40
27
15
450
446
527
754
783
832
650
550
500
64
51
37
31
29
1.0
0.9
1.0
Interest Cost (INRb)
1.3
D/E Ratio
1.3
1.3
0.9
0.7
0.6
Source: Company, MOSL
Source: Company, MOSL
RoE subdued led by subsidy sharing (%)
RoE (%)
16
14
13
11
7
8
9
8
20
11
10
13
12
14
14
RoCE (%)
IOCL: one-year forward P/B
2.8
2.2
1.5
0.9
0.2
1.1
1.2
P/B (x)
5 Yrs Avg(x)
1.3
15 Yrs Avg(x)
10 Yrs Avg(x)
22
6
8
1.2
Source: Company, MOSL
Source: Company, MOSL
22 August 2014
49

IOC
Financials and valuation
Income statement
Y/E Mar
Net Sales
Change (%)
EBITDA
EBITDA Margin (%)
Depreciation
EBIT
Interest
Other Income
Extraordinary items
PBT
Tax
Tax Rate (%)
Reported PAT
Adjusted PAT
Change (%)
Min. Int. & Assoc. Share
Adj Cons PAT
2012
4,072.3
32.2
180.3
4.4
53.1
127.2
58.9
48.8
77.1
40.0
-2.7
-6.8
42.7
119.3
52.4
-0.4
41.9
2013
4,607.5
13.1
127.4
2.8
56.9
70.5
70.8
45.4
0.0
45.0
8.8
19.5
36.3
44.5
-62.7
8.2
52.7
2014
4,872.6
5.8
159.7
3.3
63.6
96.1
59.1
45.3
17.5
64.8
30.1
46.4
34.7
53.4
20.0
1.2
37.1
2015E
4,359.7
-10.5
187.9
4.3
69.9
118.1
42.2
44.1
0.0
120.0
38.7
32.2
81.3
79.2
48.3
-2.1
77.1
(INR Billion)
2016E
4,378.1
0.4
212.4
4.9
77.1
135.3
36.5
42.9
0.0
141.7
44.0
31.0
97.7
95.9
21.2
-1.8
94.2
2017E
4,193.8
-4.2
258.1
6.2
88.7
169.4
34.7
43.2
0.0
177.8
59.1
33.3
118.7
114.6
19.4
-4.1
110.5
Balance sheet
Y/E Mar
Share Capital
Reserves
Net Worth
Debt
Deferred Tax
Total Capital Employed
Gross Fixed Assets
Less: Acc Depreciation
Net Fixed Assets
Capital WIP
Investments
Current Assets
Inventory
Debtors
Cash & Bank
Loans & Adv, Others
Curr Liabs & Provns
Curr. Liabilities
Provisions
Net Current Assets
Total Assets
2012
24.3
579.5
603.7
800.2
59.7
1,483.0
1,076.3
430.4
645.8
154.5
175.9
1,221.8
638.5
115.5
8.2
459.6
715.2
561.2
154.0
506.6
1,483.0
2013
24.3
609.9
634.1
840.3
63.3
1,549.0
1,105.3
487.4
618.0
193.4
178.4
1,406.1
656.6
137.8
98.9
512.9
847.0
665.2
181.8
559.0
1,549.0
2014
24.3
656.0
680.3
885.4
64.2
1,639.9
1,226.6
551.0
675.7
268.8
174.0
1,467.9
736.1
130.7
111.5
489.6
946.7
756.7
190.0
521.1
1,639.9
2015E
24.3
706.8
731.1
705.3
71.1
1,519.6
1,354.3
620.8
733.5
243.8
174.0
1,252.8
636.7
149.2
137.1
329.9
884.8
692.3
192.5
368.0
1,519.6
(INR Billion)
2016E
2017E
24.3
24.3
768.6
883.2
792.9
907.5
608.3
561.3
79.1
80.8
1,494.3
1,567.6
1,492.2
1,782.1
698.0
786.7
794.3
995.4
218.8
43.8
174.0
174.0
1,194.7
1,214.8
638.7
613.5
145.5
141.1
100.2
149.8
310.2
310.5
887.8
860.8
695.6
666.8
192.2
194.0
306.9
354.0
1,494.3
1,567.6
E: MOSL Estimates
22 August 2014
50

IOC
Financials and valuation
Ratios
Y/E Mar
Basic (INR)
EPS
Cash EPS
Book Value
DPS
Payout (incl. Div. Tax.)
Valuation(x)
P/E
Cash P/E
Price / Book Value
EV/Sales
EV/EBITDA
Dividend Yield (%)
Profitability Ratios (%)
RoE
RoCE
Turnover Ratios (%)
Asset Turnover (x)
Debtors (No. of Days)
Inventory (No. of Days)
Creditors (No. of Days)
Leverage Ratios (%)
Net Debt/Equity (x)
2012
49.2
39.1
248.7
5.0
33.9
7.4
9.3
1.5
0.4
9.3
1.4
7.2
9.3
3.0
10.4
57.2
0.0
1.3
2013
18.3
45.2
261.2
6.2
33.4
19.8
8.0
1.4
0.4
12.7
1.7
5.9
4.6
3.0
10.9
52.0
0.0
1.3
2014
22.0
41.5
280.2
8.7
66.6
16.5
8.7
1.3
0.3
10.4
2.4
5.3
6.0
3.1
9.8
55.1
0.0
1.3
2015E
32.6
60.5
301.1
10.0
36.9
11.1
6.0
1.2
0.3
7.7
2.8
11.5
7.5
2.8
12.5
53.3
0.0
1.0
2016E
39.5
70.6
326.6
12.0
36.2
9.2
5.1
1.1
0.3
6.5
3.3
12.8
9.0
2.9
12.1
53.3
0.0
0.8
2017E
47.2
82.1
373.8
14.0
36.0
7.7
4.4
1.0
0.3
5.0
3.9
14.0
11.1
2.7
12.3
53.4
0.0
0.6
Cash flow statement
Y/E Mar
OP/(Loss) before Tax
Depreciation
Others
Interest
Direct Taxes Paid
(Inc)/Dec in Wkg Cap
CF from Op. Activity
(Inc)/Dec in FA & CWIP
(Pur)/Sale of Invt
Others
CF from Inv. Activity
Inc/(Dec) in Net Worth
Inc / (Dec) in Debt
Interest Paid
Divd Paid (incl Tax)
CF from Fin. Activity
Inc/(Dec) in Cash
Add: Opening Balance
Closing Balance
2012
40.0
49.8
0.0
59.0
-4.1
-132.2
-7.7
-170.2
39.7
0.0
-130.5
0.0
222.7
-63.6
-28.1
131.0
-7.2
15.4
8.2
2013
45.0
56.9
0.0
70.8
-5.1
38.2
205.9
-67.9
-2.6
0.0
-70.5
0.0
40.2
-70.8
-14.1
-44.7
90.6
8.2
98.9
2014
99.8
63.6
0.0
59.1
-29.3
50.6
243.8
-196.8
4.4
0.0
-192.4
0.0
45.1
-59.1
-24.7
-38.7
12.7
98.9
111.5
2015E
120.0
69.9
0.0
42.2
-31.7
178.7
379.0
-102.7
0.0
0.0
-102.7
0.0
-180.1
-42.2
-28.4
-250.8
25.5
111.5
137.1
(INR Billion)
2016E
2017E
141.7
177.8
77.1
88.7
0.0
0.0
36.5
34.7
-36.0
-57.5
24.3
2.4
243.7
246.2
-112.9
-114.9
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
-112.9
-114.9
0.0
0.0
-97.0
-47.0
-36.5
-34.7
-34.1
0.0
-167.6
-81.7
-36.8
49.5
137.1
100.2
100.2
149.8
E: MOSL Estimates
22 August 2014
51

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