Initiating Coverage | 10 December 2015
Sector: Aviation
Interglobe Aviation
Aiming for higher altitudes
Harshad Borawake
(HarshadBorawake@MotilalOswal.com); +91 22 3982 5432
Rajat Agarwal
(Rajat.Agarwal@motilaloswal.com); +91 22 3982 5558

InterGlobe Aviation
InterGlobe Aviation: Aiming for higher altitudes
Aiming for higher altitudes ............................................................................................. 3
Story in charts ................................................................................................................ 5
Indian aviation market set to become 3rd largest ........................................................... 7
Indigo to remain market leader by a distance ............................................................... 16
Profitability way ahead of peers ................................................................................... 23
Some key things to know ............................................................................................. 23
Initiate coverage with a Buy; TP at INR1,478 ................................................................ 35
Key risks ...................................................................................................................... 40
Company background .................................................................................................. 41
Annexures ................................................................................................................... 44
Financials and valuations ............................................................................................. 53
Key terms used throughout the report
ASK: Available Seat Kilometer - The Basic Measure of Capacity
One seat (empty or filled) flying one kilometer is an ASK
A 180-seat A320 flying 100 kilometers creates 18,000 ASKs
RPK: Revenue Passenger Kilometer - The Basic Measure of Production
A paying passenger flying one kilometer creates an RPK
150 passengers flying 100 kilometers generate 15,000 RPKs
Load Factor: Production Compared to Capacity
To calculate the load factor, divide RPKs by ASKs
For an individual flight, 15,000 RPKs divided by 18,000 ASKs, or 83%
Higher load factors are desirable but how much each passenger pays is also
important
Investors are advised to refer through important disclosures made at the last page of the Research Report.
Motilal Oswal research is available on
www.motilaloswal.com/Institutional-Equities,
Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters, Factset and S&P Capital.
10 December 2015
2

InterGlobe Aviation
BSE Sensex
25,252
S&P CNX
7,683
InterGlobe Aviation
Initiating Coverage | Sector: Aviation
CMP: INR998
TP: INR1,478 (+48%)
Buy
Aiming for higher altitudes
Unique strategy + leadership credentials = sustainable cash machine
Stock Info
Bloomberg
Equity Shares (m)
4-Week Range (INR)
1, 6, 12 Rel. Per (%)
M.Cap.(INR b)/(USD b)
Avg Val ( INR m)
Free float (%)
INDIGO IN
360.3
1,169/848
34/-/-
359.7/5.4
7,159
100.0
Financial Snapshot (INR Billion)
Y/E MAR
2016E 2017E 2018E
Sales
163.1 203.1 244.4
EBITDA
NP
EPS (INR)
EPS Gr. (%)
BV/Sh. (INR)
RoE (%)
RoCE (%)
P/E (x)
P/BV (x)
D.Yield (%)
38.0
25.9
71.9
100.1
58.9
203.6
76.0
13.9
17.0
5.0
45.3
31.3
86.9
20.9
93.8
113.9
77.5
11.5
10.6
4.4
54.4
38.5
106.9
23.0
136.8
92.7
76.7
9.3
7.3
5.4
InterGlobe Aviation-operating the 'IndiGo' brand, the market leader by a distance
in domestic aviation, with 34% share-is set to comfortably ride the domestic
passenger CAGR of 12% over the next decade, potentially making India the 3rd
largest aviation market in the world.
IndiGo is the only airline in India to be profitable for the last seven years and we
believe this sustainable advantage is due to its unique fleet strategy, which
significantly reduces its aircraft ownership cost and makes it the lowest-cost
operator.
We estimate EBITDA/PAT CAGR of ~44% over FY15-18 (EBITDA margin expansion
of ~900bp), led by (a) continued fleet addition (94 to 154) and (b) passenger CAGR
of 21% (load factor at >80%).
Expect dividend payout to remain high, led by management focus on profitability,
negative working capital and unique fleet strategy leading to higher distributable
free cash flow.
Despite our 44% earnings CAGR through FY18, we assign lower FY17E target P/E
multiple of 17x (10% premium to comparable global LCC player RyanAir)-owing to
high earnings sensitivity to oil prices-to arrive at a fair value of INR1,478 (an upside
of 48%).
On FY17E, the stock currently trades at 11.5x EPS and adj. EV/EBITDAR of 7.4x with
an implied dividend yield of >4%. We initiate coverage with a Buy rating.
Huge growth potential, India one of the most underpenetrated markets
Shareholding pattern (%)
As On
Promoter
DII
FII
Others
Sep-15
86.2
5.9
0.0
7.9
FII Includes depository receipts
Despite double-digit passenger CAGR of 12% over the last two decades, the
Indian aviation sector is significantly underpenetrated-per capita seats at
0.08 v/s 2.6/1.6 in the US/Canada and average of 0.5 in Brazil, Thailand,
Indonesia and China.
However, India is set to become the 3rd largest aviation market by 2030,
driven by (a) value migration from rail to air, (b) increasing per capita GDP
and disposable income, (c) growing tourism and (d) favorable aviation policy.
Compared with the passenger growth estimate of 13% CAGR through FY20,
YTD growth has been very robust at 20% (v/s last 5-/10-year CAGR of
9%/13%)-supported by lower ticket prices owing to benign oil prices.
Indigo, the best aviation franchise, expected to remain market leader
by a distance
Please click here for Video Link
10 December 2015
IndiGo, a low-cost carrier (LCC) with 94 planes (FY15, 24% fleet share of the
Indian market) and operating primarily on domestic routes, has steadily
improved its market share from 18% in FY11 to 34% in FY15 and 37% in YTD
FY16 through fleet expansions and load factor of >80%.
Management focus on (a) network depth v/s breadth and (b) on-time and
reliable customer experience to bring in repeat customer has resulted in
sharp market share gains culminating in leadership position for Indigo, in our
view.
3

InterGlobe Aviation
Stock Performance (1-year)
We expect Indigo to maintain its leadership position, given the benign
competition and planned fleet expansion from 94 to 154 by FY18.
Unique fleet addition strategy imparts competitive advantage…
We believe Indigo's fleet strategy delivers savings on opex and capex and, in
turn, acts as its
"secret sauce"
for industry-leading profitability.
IndiGo's unique fleet strategy to (a) use single-type aircraft (reduces
maintenance and training costs) and (b) keep the average fleet age low (3.2
years v/s Jet@5.9, SpiceJet@4.1) improves reliability and lowers fuel costs-
thereby giving it a significant advantage over peers. We believe it is difficult for
the competitors to replicate the strategy in the short-medium term.
The company's strategy to place bulk purchase orders significantly reduces its
ownership costs as it gets discounts on price; we expect the benefit to continue
over the long term-given its fleet expansion plans.
…which coupled with operating cost leadership, drives industry-leading
profitability
We expect Indigo's fuel cost leadership over competitors to widen as it gets
deliveries of 15% more fuel-efficient A320 neo aircrafts, which are expected to
form 33% of Indigo's fleet by FY18.
Focus on a) high-density routes, (b) consistently high load factor and
c)improving aircraft utilization will help it remain the most profitable airline, in
our view.
We estimate EBITDA/PAT CAGR of ~44% over FY15-18, led by revenue passenger
kilometer (RPK) CAGR of 21% (v/s 28% in the last four years) and expansion in
EBITDA margin from 13.4% in FY15 to 22.3% FY18.
Valuation and view
Key assumptions:
In our estimates through FY18, we model (a) fleet size growth
from 94 in FY15 to 154 in FY18 and (b) load factor (seat utilization) moving from
80% in FY15 to 84% in FY18.
Upside to payout assumptions:
Our dividend payout assumption of 60% has an
upside risk as the last three years average payout was 91%. Nevertheless, we
note that even on our reduced payout ratio assumption, the dividend yield is
attractive at >4%.
BUY for a ~48% upside:
Despite our 44% earnings CAGR through FY18, we
assign lower FY17E target P/E multiple of 17x (10% premium to comparable
global LCC player RyanAir) owing to high earnings sensitivity to oil prices to
arrive at a fair value of INR1,478 (an upside of 48%). At our target price, implied
FY17E EV/EBITDAR stands at 9.7x (v/s 9.6x for RyanAir).
On FY17E, the stock currently trades at 11.5x EPS and adj. EV/EBITDAR of 7.4x
with an implied dividend yield of >4%. Initiate coverage with a Buy.
Key risks:
A sharp slowdown in the Indian economy, sudden jump in oil prices,
high cash burn strategy by competitors and any adverse regulatory move.
10 December 2015
4

InterGlobe Aviation
Story in charts
Exhibit 1: India aviation underpenetrated despite the last
decade domestic passenger CAGR of 12%
Annual domestic seats per capita (2014)
4.79
2.59
0.08
0.65
0.48
0.35
1.12
48
36
24
12
0
(12)
FY99 FY01 FY03 FY05 FY07 FY09 FY11 FY13 FY15
Source: CAPA, Company, MOSL
Source: DGCA, MOSL
Exhibit 2: Domestic aviation: Demand follows supply; RPK
growth at 2.3x real GDP growth
Domestic ASK (YoY %)
Domestic RPK (YoY %)
Exhibit 3: India to be the 3rd largest aviation market by FY25
218
129
70
51
82
120
Exhibit 4: Like globally, value migrating to LCCs even in India
Low cost carriers
Full service carriers
60%
54%
50%
39%
37%
38%
FY15
FY20
FY25
FY15
FY20
FY25
41%
FY10
46%
FY11
50%
FY12
61%
63%
62%
Domestic passengers (m)
Share on basis of future fleet
International passengers
(m)
Source: Industry, Company, MOSL
FY13
FY14
FY15
Source: DGCA, CAPA, Company MOSL
Exhibit 5: IndiGo, the market leader to benefit most from
this trend
IndiGo
GoAir
Air India
AirAsia
2 2
7
18
19
16
36
Jet Airways
Vistara
32
9
19
17
14
37
SpiceJet
42
11
20
15
13
36
2-
8
17
20
17
35
Exhibit 6: Indigo has >50% market share
destinations
IndiGo
-
9
17
18
16
40
Top 10 Metro to
Metro routes
Jet Airways
Air India
1
19
17
13
10
39
SpiceJet
in non-metro
Go Air
-
14
20
11
3
53
Others
Top 10 Metro to Non- Top 10 Non-metro to
metro routes
Non-metro routes
Source: DGCA, CAPA, Company, MOSL
2015
2016
Share on basis of future fleet
2017
2018
Source: Industry, Company, MOSL
10 December 2015
5

InterGlobe Aviation
Story in charts
Exhibit 7: Continued profitability indicates focus on cost
controls
FY09
IndiGo
SpiceJet
Jet
Airways
GoAir
Air India
Kingfisher
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
FY10
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
FY11
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
FY12
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
FY13
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
FY14
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
FY15
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Exhibit 8: Lowest-cost proposition makes it the most
profitable Indian airline
Maintenance
Fuel
Rentals
Operations
Total Cost
9.82
3.39
2.62
3.47
0.34
Air India
9.05
2.86
2.01
3.23
0.95
Jet Airways
6.68
1.64
1.2
2.94
0.9
SpiceJet
6.37
1.42
1.23
3.37
0.35
Go Air
5.95
1.73
0.97
3.07
0.18
IndiGo
Ceased Operations
Source: SAP, Company, MOSL
Source: SAP, Company, MOSL
Exhibit 9: Strong fleet orderbook to ensure higher market
share
430
Exhibit 10: 15% more fuel efficient A320neo aircraft to form
33% of FY18 fleet, giving significant competitive advantage
A320neo
A320
% Improvement in fuel consumption
192
140
72
Go Air
50
29
94
0
94 0%
FY15
111
9
102
134
32
4%
1%
102
FY17
154
52
5%
IndiGo
SpiceJet *
Jet
Airways
Air Costa Air India
102
FY18
Source: Company, MOSL
*Based on media reports
Source: Industry, CAPA, DGCA, Company
FY16
Exhibit 11: FY15-18 EPS (INR) to grow at 44% CAGR
106.9
86.9
71.9
36.0
13.2
FY14
FY15
FY16E
FY17E
FY18E
Exhibit 12: Sensitivity of FY17 EPS (INR) to passenger growth
assuming 50% pass-through of changes in crude price
Base Case (21%)
25% passenger growth
113
98
83
109
94
79
106
91
75
15% passenger growth
50% pass-through
102
87
99
83
67
60
Source: MOSL
71
40
45
50
55
Brent Crude Price (USD/bbl)
Source: Company, MOSL
10 December 2015
6

InterGlobe Aviation
Indian aviation market set to become 3rd largest
Owing to factors such as rise in per capita GDP and disposable income
Indian aviation sector is significantly underpenetrated, with per capita seats at 0.08
v/s 2.6/1.6 in the US/Canada and average of 0.5 in Brazil, Thailand, Indonesia and
China.
India is expected to become the 3rd largest aviation market by 2030 and LCC’s (low
cost carriers) are rightly placed to benefit the most, in our view. Key drivers include (a)
value migration from rail, (b) increasing per capita GDP and disposable income, (c)
growing tourism and (d) favorable aviation policy.
Compared with passenger growth estimate of ~13% CAGR through FY20, YTD growth
has been robust at 20% (v/s last 5/10 yr CAGR of 9%/13%)—supported by lower ticket
prices owing to benign oil prices.
Indian aviation market significantly underpenetrated
Indian aviation sector
despite ranked sixth in the
world….
…however remains
significantly
underpenetrated
Indian aviation market global ranking respectable...:
India's air travel market is
the sixth largest globally in terms of total domestic seats and ninth largest in the
world by total domestic and international seats.
…however, still the most underpenetrated:
Indian aviation sector while
being in the existence since decades still remains significantly
underpenetrated due to relative high costs and commercial airline services
being limited to metros.
India, despite boasting of favorable factors such as (a) being the second
most populous country, (b) seventh largest in terms of area, (c) among the
top 10 in terms of GDP and more importantly (d)the last two-decade air
passenger CAGR of 12% (70m passengers in FY15), still remains the most
underpenetrated aviation market in the world.
India’s annual domestic seats per capita (as defined by CAPA) stand 0.08—
significantly lower than other developing countries like Brazil and China,
where penetration rates are between 0.65 and 0.35.
Exhibit 13: Indian aviation sector recorded a two-decade CAGR of 12-13%
Passengers (million)
ASK (billion)
85
70
7
1995
10
20
28
2005
2015
Source: DGCA, MOSL
10 December 2015
7

InterGlobe Aviation
Exhibit 14: India’s per capita airline seat penetration (2014) is 1/7 of developing countries
th
and 1/30 of developed countries
4.79
3.34
1.03
0.08
2.59
1.58
0.65
0.48
0.41
0.35
1.12
th
*based on annual domestic seats per capita
Source: CAPA, Company, MOSL
India’s overall fleet size smaller than even some individual airlines:
Total fleet
size of Indian aviation market is similar to individual airlines like Ryan Air (an
Irish low-cost airline) or half the size of South West Airlines (world's largest low-
cost carrier).
Exhibit 15: India’s total fleet size is significantly smaller than even some of the airlines
(number of aircraft)
6,706
India’s combined (all
airlines) fleet size is very
small compared to even
some individual airlines
2,470
381
207
308
676
564
456
905
Source: CAPA, Industry, MOSL
Historical growth supported by business travellers and tourism
Over the last decade, situation is changing rapidly with the emergence of LCC’s as
well as change in the travel patterns (emergence of time pressed business travellers
post liberalization, increasing tourism with improving disposable Income) and
emergence of LCC’s (low cost carriers) who score high on economics versus
traditional FSCs (full service carriers).
As per DGCA, Indian domestic passenger volumes have grown at a CAGR of 13%
between FY05 to FY15 and at a CAGR of 9% between FY10 to FY15.
While, domestic carrier capacity (as measured in available seat kilometers, or
ASKs) grew at a CAGR of 12% between FY05 to FY15 and at 7% between FY10 to
FY15. And, the domestic passenger traffic (as measured by RPKs) grew at a CAGR
of 14% between FY05 to FY15 and at 9% between FY10 to FY15.
Demand drivers in place; India has an additional, non-traditional driver:
A
CAPA report attributed the growth to increased tourism and business-related
travel, as well as the stimulation of new traffic demand through low fares
offered by LCCs.
10 December 2015
8

InterGlobe Aviation
We believe India has one more driver for air travel growth, social/cultural travel:
Each Indian state has a unique culture (in terms of religion, language, etc.)
and, in turn, unique festivals. Given the migration for jobs to urban areas,
people travel to their native places during festive seasons.
Regional festivals are almost evenly spaced throughout the year and we
believe this also helps to sustain the travel momentum.
Some regional festivals/holidays fall on Friday/Monday, thus increasing the
number of passengers taking advantages of these “extended weekends”.
Exhibit 16: Over the last decade, domestic ASK/PK grew at CAGR of 12%/14% with a trend
of increasing load factor
Domestic ASK (billions)
65
68
69
69
Domestic RPK (billions)
64
72
77
75
79
53
59
Passenger load factor (%)
78
75
73
76
57
81
59
85
67
61
49
28
35
18
24
FY06
34
42
59
38
61
44
68
FY05
FY07
FY08
FY09
FY10
FY11
FY12
FY13
FY14
FY15
*based on annual domestic seats per capita
Source: DGCA, Company, MOSL
India to become the 3
rd
largest aviation market by 2030
According to new IATA Passenger Forecast 2014, India will become the 6
th
largest air passenger market over the next five years, and break into the top 3 in
the 2030s.
On the current base of 400 aircraft, even a 10% growth would imply demand of
40 additional from India and coupled with replacement demand of 40, annual
demand will be 80 aircraft. As the base increases, India is set to become one of
the most important countries in the aviation sector.
India, currently the 9
th
largest market by annual passengers (domestic +
international), will see 367 million passengers annually by 2034 (256 million
passengers more annually than in 2014). It will overtake the UK to become the
3
rd
largest market around 2030.
Exhibit 18: Expected to add 256 mn annual total passengers
2030
US
China
India
UK
Brazil
Japan
Indonesia
Spain
Germany
2034
Source: IATA, MOSL
111
367
Exhibit 17: India to become the 3rd largest market
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
2015
US
China
UK
Japan
Spain
Germany
Italy
France
India
2020
US
China
UK
Japan
Spain
India
Germany
France
Italy
2025
US
China
UK
India
Japan
Spain
Germany
Brazil
France
2014
10
Brazil
Brazil
Indonesia
France
rd
*Domestic + International
*CAPA estimates India to reach 3 position by 2025
Source: IATA, MOSL
10 December 2015
9

InterGlobe Aviation
According to Airbus Report, the domestic Indian aviation market is forecast to
be the world’s fastest growing—with revenue passenger kilometers (RPKs)
growing at a CAGR of 9.5% between 2013 and 2033.
India’s trips per capita are forecast to increase from 0.07 in 2014 to 0.3 in 2034.
Exhibit 19: Indian market to be the fastest growing Origin-and-Destination routes in RPK
CAGR (2013-2033)
9.5%
9.5%
8.9%
8.6%
8.4%
8.4%
8.3%
8.2%
8.0%
7.9%
Source: Airbus 2014 GMF, Company
Exhibit 20: 0.07 trips per capita in 2014
Exhibit 21: By 2034, India will reach the current China levels
Source: Sabre, IHS Economics, Airbus GMF2015
Source: Sabre, IHS Economics, Airbus GMF2015
Going forward, the Indian air travel market is expected to enter a period of
accelerated growth. According to a CAPA Report, domestic ASKs are forecast to
grow at a CAGR of 12.7% between FY15 and FY20, while domestic passenger
volume is forecast to grow at a CAGR of 12.8%.
Exhibit 22: Domestic capacity (ASKs b) to grow at 12.7% CAGR Exhibit 23: Domestic passengers (m) to grow at 12.8% CAGR
154
70
81
103
115
128
85
93
103
120
138
92
FY15E
FY16E
FY17E
FY18E
FY19E
FY20E
FY15E
FY16E
FY17E
FY18E
FY19E
FY20E
Source: CAPA, Company
Source: CAPA, Company
10 December 2015
10

InterGlobe Aviation
Key drivers for Indian Aviation sector growth
The substantial gap between aircraft penetration rates in India and larger aviation
markets suggests significant opportunity for growth. We believe that the
investments in airport infrastructure and airlines going to newer towns will help the
sector grow multifold. We believe the growth for Indian aviation sector will be
supported by (a) value migration from rail, (b) increasing per capita disposable
income, (c) growing tourism and (d) favorable aviation policy
Exhibit 24: Key drivers for Indian aviation sector growth
Value migration from rail to air travel
Increasing per capita GDP and disposable income
Growing tourism
Favourable aviation policy
Source: Airbus 2014 GMF, Company
A. Value migration from rail to air travel
Alternative modes of transport (road and rail) do not offer speed and comfort
from long distance journeys and with increasing per capita GDP, we expect
demand to come from tier 2/3 cities.
India’s domestic air travel market of ~70m passengers in FY15 is comparable
with the AC coach passenger count (~95m) of railways, but represents a very
small percentage (~2% of ex-suburban rail passengers) of total rail passengers.
Capacity constraints of Indian rail (required to book tickets atleast 2-3 months in
advance to get confirmed seat) and comparable ticket prices of AC (Air
conditioned) coach seats to airline ticket prices are driving the shift from rail
travel to air travel.
The price differentials between air and rail AC II tier ticket price becomes very
low during the off-season travel months of July to September and widens during
peak travel season of April to June and October to December.
With rising income levels, air travel is expected to become the preferred mode
of travel (over rail and road) for the Indian middle class because of its
convenience, shorter duration and competitive pricing.
10 December 2015
11

InterGlobe Aviation
Exhibit 25: LCCs’ ticket prices comparable to train tickets
New Delhi to Mumbai (Price in INR)
Normal train
Fastest train
4,745
3,870
2,255
1,560
1A
2A
3A
595
SL
1A
2A
3A
LCC
2,860
2,080
3,200
Exhibit 26: Air travel saves time significantly
New Delhi to Mumbai (Travel time in hours)
22
16
2
Normal Train
Fastest Train
LCC
Source: Industry, MOSL
Source: Industry, Railways, MOSL
*Prices are taken for one month advanced booking
B. Aviation growth closely related to GDP
Air travel is generally costlier than other modes of travel and, hence, is the
preferred mode in countries with high per capita GDP and disposal income.
Though India lags behind on these parameters, we believe it has reached an
inflexion point. With expected GDP growth of >7% and population growth of
1.3%, per capita GDP is set to increase (which in turn will result in more people
opting for air travel).
India RPK growth
@2.3x of GDP
With expected India GDP
growth of >7-8%
aviation passenger CAGR
can be >14-15% in the
medium term
(YTD FY16 growth higher
though at ~20%)
Exhibit 27: Average RPK growth at 2.3x real GDP growth
50
40
30
20
10
0
-10
-20
FY04
FY05
FY06
FY07
FY08
FY09
FY10
FY11
FY12
FY13
FY14
FY15
Domestic RPK growth (y-o-y)
Real GDP growth (y-o-y) - RHS
12
10
8
6
4
2
-
Source: DGCA, EIU, Company
RPK growth was, on average, 2.3x real GDP growth during FY04-FY15. RPK
growth was negative in FY09—mainly due to an increase in oil prices (Brent
crude price crossing USD140/bbl v/s current price of USD42/bbl), which resulted
in very high fares.
Domestic RPK growth was negative in FY2013—mainly due to Kingfisher’s
closure, which resulted in a temporary decline in passenger traffic, also
corroborating our view of demand following supply in Indian aviation.
10 December 2015
12

InterGlobe Aviation
Exhibit 28: Indian economy to be one of the fastest growing major economies
7.1%
6.4%
4.5%
3.6%
2.8%
2.4%
1.9%
1.8%
India
China
APAC
Middle East
Latin
& North
America
Africa
North
America
Estern
Europe
Western
Europe
Source: Figures for 2014 are estimates by the EIU, IMF, Company
Population growth estimated at 1.3%
nd
India is the 2 most populous country with 1.26 billion people. The population is
expected to reach 1.34 billion (1.3% CAGR) by the end of CY19, according to
IMF.
The expected growth in India’s population is higher than the average growth of
top 20 domestic air markets globally.
Exhibit 29: India to grow at 1.3% CAGR from 2014 to 2019
Population CY14 (million)
1.3%
0.5%
0.7%
1.4%
0.8%
0.0%
-0.3%
Population CAGR (CY14-CY19)
2.0%
1.1%
0.2%
Source: IMF, Company
Disposable Income + Consumption = Air Travel
India disposable income doubled:
Spending power of Indians has increased
rapidly in the past two decades on the back of accelerated economic growth.
According to Oxford Economics, real average household disposable income has
more than doubled since 1980 and will continue to grow.
Significant rise in middle class category:
As the size of the middle class grows,
so will the demand for air travel. The Airbus GMF forecasts passenger traffic
to/from India to grow fivefold in the next 20 years.
With rising income, household consumption will increase as will the number of
Indian middle class. The number of households with discretionary income above
USD7,500 per annum is estimated at 66 million households today and will treble
to 180 million by 2030.
Households with disposable income above USD20,000 per year will grow to 67
million, which will be larger than the population of France.
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Exhibit 30: Indian middle income households to grow to 60 million
Household by income segment (millions of house hold)
7
60
1
13
52
20
2014
2
27
76
19
2020
114
17
2030
High consumers
(>$70,000)
Middle class consumers
($20,000-$70,000)
Emerging consumers
($7,500-$20,000)
Basic needs consumers
(<$7,500)
Source: Oxford economics, Airbus
C. Growing tourism to drive passenger volume growth
The tourism industry accounted for INR7.6t or 6.7% of GDP in 2014 and is
forecast to rise by 7.3% per annum to INR16.6t (7.6% of GDP) by 2025,
according to the World Travel and Tourism Council.
During 2014, the number of domestic tourist visitors by all modes of transport
was 1,282 million—grown at a CAGR of 13.9% from 2009 to 2014. During the
same period, the number of Indian tourists going abroad increased at a CAGR of
10.6% to reach 18.3 million in 2014, according to the Ministry of Tourism of
India.
Exhibit 32: …while foreign visits (passengers m) up 10.6%.
16.6
18.3
Exhibit 31: Domestic visits by Indians see 13.9% CAGR…
1,145
1,282
1,045
669
748
865
11.1
13
14
14.9
CY09
CY10
CY11
CY12
CY13
CY14
CY09
CY10
CY11
CY12
CY13
CY14
Source: India Tourism Statistics, Ministry of Tourism, Company
Source: India Tourism Statistics, Ministry of Tourism, Company
In CY14, 7.7 million foreign tourists visited India; the arrivals have witnessed a
CAGR of 8.3% during CY09-CY14, according to the Ministry of Tourism of India.
Recent government initiatives to promote India as a tourist destination, such as
successful implementation of the e-Tourist Visa program for passport holders of
113 countries and plan to make electronic visas available to visitors from over
150 countries, will boost tourism in India.
According to EIU, the number of foreign tourists is expected to increase at a
CAGR of 9.2% during CY15-CY19 to reach 12.0 million in CY19.
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InterGlobe Aviation
Exhibit 33: Foreign tourist arrivals (millions) to grow at 9.2% CAGR
12
5.2
5.8
6.3
6.6
7
7.7
8.5
9.2
10.1
11
CY09
CY10
CY11
CY12
CY13
CY14
CY15
CY16E
CY17E
CY18E
CY19E
Source: India Tourism Statistics, Ministry of Tourism, EIU, Company
D. New civil aviation policy to spur growth and reduce costs
Indian government is in process of finalizing new civil aviation policy and the
recommendations appear encouraging for the sector to add new locations and to
also boost ancillary revenues.
The draft regulation clearly spells out the government desire to take the airlines to
the masses and we believe this augurs well for low cost carriers like Indigo. The
government’s targeting 4-5x passenger growth by 2022 to boost the Indian aviation
market.
Further, its plans to develop a domestic MRO (Maintenance, repair and overhaul)
industry will reduce the maintenance costs for the airlines and in turn increase
profitability.
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InterGlobe Aviation
Indigo to remain market leader by a distance
Fleet size to increase by 64% to 154 by FY18
IndiGo, a low-cost carrier (LCC) with 94 planes (FY15, 24% fleet share of the Indian
market) and operating primarily on domestic routes, has steadily improved its market
share from 18% in FY11 to 34% in FY15 and 37% in YTD FY16 through fleet expansions
and load factor of >80%.
Management focus on (a) network depth v/s breadth and (b) on-time and reliable
customer experience to bring in repeat customer has resulted in sharp market share
gains culminating in leadership position for Indigo, in our view.
We expect Indigo to maintain its leadership position, given the benign competition
and planned fleet expansion from 94 to 154 by FY18.
India aviation demand is supply driven, in our view
Indian aviation market capacity constrained:
An analysis of the last 15 years
analysis shows that all the incremental capacity continued to operate at higher
utilization levels, thereby implying that demand will follow supply in Indian
aviation market till the penetration reaches a respectable level.
More importantly capacity constraints on the alternate long distance travel
option i.e. railways and lower ticket price difference with AC Tier I/II drove the
demand for airlines.
India domestic RPK growth
tracking ASK…
…implying demand largely
following supply
Expect the same to
continue till respectable
penetration
Exhibit 34: Domestic RPK, ASK highly correlated—implying demand follows supply in India
Domestic ASK (YoY %)
48
36
24
12
0
(12)
FY99
FY01
FY03
FY05
FY07
FY09
FY11
FY13
FY15
Source: DGCA, MOSL
Domestic RPK (YoY %)
Exhibit 35: Domestic passenger load factor largely on an uptrend (%)
Passenger load factor (%)
69
69
64
72
77
78
75
75
73
65
60
60
62
56
56
58
68
FY99
FY01
FY03
FY05
FY07
FY09
FY11
FY13
FY15
Source: DGCA, MOSL
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InterGlobe Aviation
IndiGo consistently increased its market share, driven by fleet expansions
Market share tracks capacity share, largely:
India’s aviation market is largely
capacity constrained and hence, market share is largely dependent on an
airline’s fleet size; this is where IndiGo has scored over others.
IndiGo fleet expansion consistent and large:
IndiGo has been able to
consistently increase its fleet, from 39 aircrafts in FY11 to 94 aircrafts in FY15
(~24% fleet share), and hence its market share by constant aircraft induction.
While Jet Airways and Air India have larger fleets, they also served international
routes—reducing their domestic fleet capacity; IndiGo was able to fill this
capacity gap (furthered by fall of Kingfisher) due to fleet expansion.
Exhibit 36: IndiGo fleet size increased ~2.5x during FY11-FY15
94
66
77
55
39
FY11
FY12
FY13
FY14
FY15
Source: Company, MOSL
Exhibit 37: IndiGo has one of the largest fleets on domestic routes
IndiGo
94
AirAsia India
4
Air Costa
4
Go Air
19
SpiceJet
30
Jet Airways
104
Source: CAPA, MOSL
Air India
126
Exhibit 38: Capacity market share increase on the back of fleet expansions
Airline-wise ASK market share (%)
20
5
14
21
24
15
FY10
IndiGo
SpiceJet
Jet Airways
Go Air
2
7
20
20
23
28
FY13
-
8
19
19
21
32
FY14
Air India
Others
2
9
15
18
19
37
FY15
27
3
10
22
29
9
FY08
26
3
12
20
27
12
FY09
16
6
15
20
25
18
FY11
13
6
17
19
24
21
FY12
Source: CAPA, DGCA, Company, MOSL
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InterGlobe Aviation
IndiGo has been able to keep its load factor high despite fleet expansions due to
(a) its recognition for operational reliability and (b) consistent expansion of its
routes.
Exhibit 39: Despite rapid fleet expansions, Indigo managed to keep load factor high
Indigo
95%
90%
85%
80%
75%
70%
CY11
CY12
CY13
CY14
YTD15
Source: DGCA, MOSL
SpiceJet
Jet Airways
GoAir
Exhibit 40: Higher load factor also translate into passenger share increase
Passenger-wise market share (%)
3
29
4
9
17
29
9
FY08
2
28
3
10
16
28
13
FY09
2
23
5
13
17
26
15
FY10
IndiGo
GoAir
-
20
6
14
16
26
18
FY11
Jet Airways
Kingfisher
Air India
Others
-
9
19
18
24
30
FY14
SpiceJet
2
-
9
15
17
22
34
FY15
-
16
6
15
16
27
20
FY12
-
2
8
19
17
26
27
FY13
Source: DGCA, Company, MOSL
Focus on delivering best-in-class operational performance
We believe, Indigo has created a niche positioning for itself by delivering a
consistent operational performance to its customers in terms of on-time flight
departures/arrivals, consistency in customer service. Amongst the Indian carriers,
IndiGo reported (a) highest on-schedule arrival and departures of flights and (b)
lower cancellation rates.
Key drivers for its superior operational performance, in our view include:
1.
Focus on network depth than breadth:
Economies of scale (leading to cost
reduction and improvement in profitability) also apply to airline industry
and hence Indigo prefers to increase frequencies on fewer destinations than
creating new ones. It currently operates only 37 destinations and plans to
open only 2 new destinations per annum.
2.
No code sharing:
Unlike peers, IndiGo doesn’t share codes with other
airlines and doesn’t interline —thus reducing the risk of delay in flights due
to delay of a previous flight. These factors make IndiGo more reliable than
others for frequent fliers and business passengers.
3.
Reliable experience to bring in repeat customer:
India has higher share of
corporate travellers – who are time sensitive but relatively less price
sensitive. Indigo’s strategy to operate on key corporate travel destinations
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InterGlobe Aviation
coupled with on-time performance helps it to get repeat business from
corporate traveller.
4.
Non-unionized employees:
Indigo has no employee unions and is also
consistently ranked in the list of top companies to work for. We believe this
is the reflection of employee morale, which in turn we believe plays an
important role in customer service.
Exhibit 41: IndiGo’s route network per aircraft the most dense
Destinations
Aircrafts
Aircrafts per destination
2.5
126
107
0.9
1.2
1.4
73
37
104
94
0.4
9
4
7
0.6
4
0.7
42
30
22
19
Air India
Jet Airways
IndiGo
Air Costa
AirAsia India
SpiceJet
GoAir
Source: DGCA, Company data, MOSL
Exhibit 42: IndiGo’s route network extensive; offers connectivity to all key destinations
Source: CAPA, Company, MOSL
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InterGlobe Aviation
Exhibit 43: IndiGo’s on-time performance was highest…
88%
86%
83%
81%
81%
78%
74%
Exhibit 44: …while the cancellation rate was lowest in FY15
5.8%
2.2%
1.4%
1.3%
1.1%
0.8%
0.7%
0.6%
IndiGo Air Costa
Jet
Go Air
Airways
AirAsia SpiceJet Air India
India
Source: CAPA, Company
Source: CAPA, Company
Market leader on metro and non-metro routes
IndiGo has utilized its increased capacity to increase flight frequency on some of
the top domestic routes in the country, resulting in almost 40% market share on
the top 10 metro to metro routes.
Indigo is #1 in Top 5 routes (FY15) despite being the last airline to start and the
entry barriers due to non-availability of prime slots in metros.
Among the 3 segments (Metro to Metro, Metro to Non-metro, Non-metro to
Non-metro), Indigo’s market share on the top 10 non-metro to non-metro
routes is equal to all of its competitors combined at ~50%.
We believe it could also have higher profitability given no constraints on the
infrastructure unlike metro airports.
Exhibit 45: IndiGo’s frequency of flights on top domestic routes higher than competitors
Flight schedule as reported on March 31, 2015
Routes and Airlines
Mumbai - New Delhi
Mumbai - Chennai
New Delhi - Chennai
Bangalore - New Delhi
Bangalore - Mumbai
Total
IndiGo
16
6
10
13
7
52
Jet Airways
14
8
4
7
12
45
Air India
19
3
3
6
4
35
GoAir
SpiceJet
8
4
2
1
-
2
3
1
5
2
18
10
Source: DGCA, MOSL
Exhibit 46: IndiGo garners highest market share on top 5 routes in FY15…
IndiGo
17
13
21
19
30
New Delhi -
Mumbai
16
15
10
18
40
Mumbai -
Bengaluru
Jet Airways
Air India
10
14
19
15
42
SpiceJet
13
17
15
23
33
GoAir
0
25
23
14
39
New Delhi -
Chennai
Delhi - Bengaluru Chennai - Mumbai
Source: DGCA, CAPA, Company, MOSL
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InterGlobe Aviation
Exhibit 47: …market share at >50% on the top 10 non-metro routes
IndiGo
-
9
17
18
16
40
Top 10 Metro to Metro routes
Jet Airways
Air India
1
19
17
13
10
39
Top 10 Metro to Non-metro
routes
SpiceJet
Go Air
Others
-
14
20
11
3
53
Top 10 Non-metro to
Non-metro routes
Source: DGCA, CAPA, Company, MOSL
Expect IndiGo’s leadership position to remain intact
Historically, IndiGo has garnered market share with its fleet addition and to
some extent benefitted from ceasing of Kingfisher’s operations. In the near-
medium term we expect IndiGo to maintain/strengthen its market share
position as its new planes are inducted. With the current order book, IndiGo
expects its fleet to increase to 154 aircraft by FY18.
While in the last few years the competitive scenario was benign, led by financial
losses in other airlines, recent low oil prices has given them some respite. Near-
term capacity additions though remain benign for other airlines, with only
SpiceJet and GoAir adding some meaningful capacities till FY18. We expect
IndiGo’s 60 new airplanes by FY18 to further strengthen its market share.
SpiceJet:
SpiceJet has an order book of 42 airplanes and media articles also
indicate that it could add 150 more.
GoAir:
GoAir has a firm order book of 72 airplanes and its delivery is
expected to commence from May 2016.
Others:
Other airlines do not have any meaningful capacity additions
through FY18.
Exhibit 48: IndiGo’s fleet size to increase 64% during FY15-FY18
154
134
94
111
39
55
66
77
FY11
FY12
FY13
FY14
FY15
FY16E
FY17E
FY18E
Source: Company, MOSL
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InterGlobe Aviation
Exhibit 49: Expect IndiGo to maintain its market share – however any delays in fleet
expansion by competitors will increase Indigo’s market share
IndiGo
-
2
8
17
20
17
35
Air India
Jet Airways
2
2
7
18
19
16
36
SpiceJet
GoAir
3
2
9
19
17
14
37
AirAsia
Vistara
4
2
11
20
15
13
36
2015
2016
2017
2018
*other airline data from their presentations and media articles
Source: Industry, Company, MOSL
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InterGlobe Aviation
Profitability way ahead of peers
Unique fleet strategy + low opex = High cash generation
IndiGo’s fleet strategy to (a) use single type aircraft, (b) place bulk orders and (c) keep
average age low gives it an operational and financial edge.
Its ownership cost is 45% lower than competitors, while operating cost leadership will
further improve as it gets A320neo aircraft (15% more fuel efficient delivery) from
November 2015.
IndiGo’s fleet strategy coupled with (a) focus on high-density routes and (b)
consistently high load factor and improving aircraft utilization will help it remain the
most profitable airline, in our view.
IndiGo fleet strategy – a secret sauce for high profitability
IndiGo’s unique fleet strategy to
(a) Use single type aircraft – keeps maintenance/training costs low,
(b) Place bulk orders – gets price discount,
(c) keep route concentration high to keep costs lower and
(d) Keep average age low – low maintenance cost;
gives it an operational and financial edge in our view.
Management confidence in the strategy can be seen from its initial order of 100
airplanes at one go (first in the airline industry!) in 2005. This not only helped it
to bring down the aircraft acquisition costs, but also helped to negotiate better
contract terms with aircraft related suppliers and also service providers.
Exhibit 50: IndiGo’s EBITDAR margins one of the highest among global LCCs
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Source: CAPA, Company, MOSL
Southwest
JetBlue
SkyWest
Hawaiian
Allegiant
Ryanair
Indigo
A. Single type aircraft fleet reduces costs
IndiGo’s fleet comprises solely of Airbus A320s, which lowers costs in
maintenance, spare parts and training.
Due to single type aircraft, spare parts can be used interchangeably and the
company isn’t required to maintain inventories for different aircraft types.
Further, single type aircraft helps in reducing training costs of pilots and crew
members and more effective management of crew rosters.
IndiGo employed 115 employees per aircraft compared with Jet Airways’s 130.
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Exhibit 51: Unique fleet strategy—Indigo uses single-type aircraft unlike comparable peers
120
90
60
30
0
Air India
JetAirways
SpiceJet
IndiGo
GoAir
AirAsia
Vistara
*other airline data from their presentations and media articles
Source: Industry, Company, MOSL
Boeing
Airbus
ATR
Bombardier
Exhibit 52: IndiGo: Lowest maintenance cost per ASK (USD)
in FY14
0.95
0.9
Exhibit 53: IndiGo: Highest employee productivity in FY15 as
measured by ASKs/employee (m)
3.7
3.5
3.2
2.8
2.7
1.5
0.35
0.34
0.18
Indigo
GoAir
Jet
Air India SpiceJet
Airways
Jet Airways
SpiceJet
Go Air
Air India
IndiGo
AirAsia
India
Source: SAP, Company
Source: CAPA, Company
B. A young and fuel efficient fleet the secret to low costs
By FY18, A320Neos will contribute to ~33% of its overall fleet and we expect this
to give a significant advantage over competitors as overall fuel cost will reduce
by 5% for IndiGo.
A young fleet results in lower maintenance costs for an airline, while keeping
the risks of technological obsolescence nil. IndiGo boasts of a very young fleet
(average age 3.2 years), partly managed by constantly turning around older jets.
IndiGo usually leases aircraft for an average of three to six years under the sales
and leaseback model. On short-term leases, the carrier typically leases aircraft
for four years. With deliveries of 180 new aircraft beginning from November
2015, IndiGo will benefit from the advantages associated with a younger fleet.
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InterGlobe Aviation
Exhibit 54: IndiGo’s fleet one of the youngest in the world; average age at 3.2 years
11.7
8.9
8.1
7.6
7.2
6.4
6.1
5.9
5.1
4.7
4.7
4.6
4.1
3.9
3.9
3.7
3.2
2.7
2.6
Source: CAPA, Company, MOSL
Exhibit 55: IndiGo’s fleet one of the youngest; 3.2 years old
on average
8.9
5.9
4.1
3.9
3.9
2.7
3.2
Exhibit 56: IndiGo: Second lowest fuel cost among Indian
airlines (USD/ ASK) in FY14
3.47
3.37
3.23
3.07
2.94
Air India
Jet SpiceJet Air
Airways
Costa
Go Air AirAsia IndiGo
India
Source: CAPA, Company, MOSL
Air India
Go Air
Jet Airways
SpiceJet
IndiGo
Source: CAPA, Company, MOSL
C. Route concentration to keep costs lower
We believe that IndiGo has one of the most dense route networks in India (2.5
destinations per aircraft), with 94 aircrafts servicing only 37 destinations in FY15.
Also, as discussed earlier, Indigo has highest market share in top 5 domestic
destinations and has 50% market share in top 10 non-metro routes.
The airline’s A320 aircraft are primarily small-distance aircraft and the company
has chosen to focus on domestic operations only, albeit on long domestic routes
as it doesn’t consider itself to be a regional player.
Further, IndiGo has chosen international destinations with flight time of less
than five hours. The move enables it to return the same day, thus saving the
airline any international parking charges.
D. Bulk aircraft ordering reduces ownership costs
IndiGo placed orders for 100 A320s in 2005, 180 A320neo (New Engine Option—
NEO) in 2011 and 250 A320neo aircraft in August 2015. The orders were the
largest in Airbus’s history.
By placing orders of these magnitude, IndiGo has been able to aggressively
negotiate aircraft prices. Moreover, IndiGo was one of the anchor customers for
A320Neos—which further helped it negotiate prices in its favor.
IndiGo has also negotiated prices with engine and other parts suppliers,
providing it a huge structural cost advantage over other players. According to a
25
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InterGlobe Aviation
PWC report in 2013, it is not uncommon for airlines to be able to negotiate
discounts above 40% on the list price of aircraft when placing orders in bulk.
Exhibit 57: IndiGo’s current order book bigger than the total
Indian fleet of 400
430
Exhibit 58: IndiGo: Lowest ownership costs* (USD/ASK) in
FY14
2.62
2.01
192
140
72
50
29
1.23
1.2
0.97
IndiGo
SpiceJet*
Jet
Airways
Go Air
Air Costa Air India
Air India
Jet Airways
Go Air
SpiceJet
IndiGo
*Based on media reports Source: Industry, CAPA, DGCA, Company
*Includes rentals, D&A, insurance, interest Source: SAP, Company
Cash incentives improve profitability:
IndiGo is able to pass on the risk of
unutilized aircraft to the lessors through sales and leaseback, receiving cash
upfront on the delivery of each aircraft.
These discounts, carried as deferred incentives, are amortized on a straight-line
basis over the lease duration of the aircraft, ensuring lesser volatility in the
annual earnings. As on FY15, IndiGo had deferred incentives of INR18b.
Exhibit 59: Aggressive negotiations on aircraft prices reduce overall ownership costs
INR Billion
Deferred incentives
Opening Balance
Additions (calc.)
Deductions (from P&L)
Closing Balance
Gross aircraft additions
Deferred Incentive per aircraft (USDm)
FY11
6
3
2
7
13
6
FY12
7
8
3
12
16
10
FY13
FY14
FY15
12
15
18
7
6
4
4
4
4
15
18
18
13
7
3
10
14
19
Source: DGCA, Company, MOSL
Exhibit 60: Amortized incentives and cash incentives form 15% each of FY15 gross rentals
and operating cash flow
Incentives as a % of gross rentals
84%
Cash incentives as a % of operating cashflow
40%
36%
FY11
41%
37%
15%
25%
FY12
21%
FY13
18%
FY14
15%
FY15
Source: Company, MOSL
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InterGlobe Aviation
Operating lease v/s finance lease
Airlines world over now use a mix of operating and financial lease and very low share of owned aircraft. Owing
to high cost of aircraft, airlines typically lease aircrafts from aircraft lessors instead of outright acquisition.
How does an operating lease work?
The aircraft do not appear on the balance sheet of the airlines. Instead, the
airline (called the lessor) pays rent to the aircraft lessee. The system is beneficial to airlines as deterioration in
the market value of aircraft and/or aircraft becoming obsolete does not impact them. As a result, airlines across
the world now prefer to lease aircrafts.
How does a finance lease work?
In a finance lease, the ownership and associated risks of aircraft are passed on
to the airline. Further, since the aircraft is carried on the books of the airline, the latter’s profitability ratios
decline.
Which is the preferred mode of financing?
Operating lease helps the airline company to keep the average fleet
age low as the typical duration of the operating lease (for IndiGo) is three - six years. While financial lease is
preferred immediately after a major technology change. Currently, IndiGo has a lower portion of financial lease
and we believe it will opt more for financial lease only after new A320/321Neos are inducted as typical
technology change in the airline happens once in 12-15 years.
How does a sale leaseback arrangement work?
Under a sale leaseback arrangement, an airline will typically acquire aircraft from the original manufacturer. The
aircraft would then be sold to an aircraft leasing company, which will then lease the aircraft back to the airline.
The aircraft’s price would be paid by the aircraft lessor to the manufacturer instead of the airline. The airline
would only make a minimal pre-delivery payment. A profit will be recognized by the airline on the difference
between the price paid by the lessor and the price negotiated by the airline.
An aircraft leasing company agrees to such an agreement because it gets a customer along with the aircraft,
which drastically reduces its business risk. Further, due to prevailing order backlogs with Boeing and Airbus,
lessors cannot expect quick deliveries of aircraft; if they order in advance, they might have to face risks of
reduction in business activity in the time elapsed between placing an order and receiving the delivery.
Exhibit 61: Illustration of a typical sale and leaseback arrangement (figures for illustration only)
SALE AND LEASEBACK
Aircraft delivery and
leaseback
When placing the order
•
Airline signs
agreement to purchase
E.g. 100 aircrafts for
USD100m/aircraft
•
Pays required down
payment
•
Third party lessor
designated to buy aircraft
or buys from airline
•
Airline company profits if
sale price to lessor higher
than its purchase price
(which typically is)
•
Leasing company rents
back aircraft to airline,
typically for 4-6 years
At the end of lease
•
Aircraft is returned
back to leasing
company
Year 0
Year 2/3
Year 7-9
Exhibit 62: Basic difference between an operating lease and a finance lease
Line items
Income statement impact
Ownership
Balance Sheet impact
10 December 2015
Operating Leases
Only incurs lease rentals
Not transferred
Aircraft is not carried on the balance
sheet
Finance Leases
Incurs depreciation and interest expenses
Transferred to lessor when lease ends
Aircraft carried on balance sheet under tangible assets,
associated lease liabilities are recognized on the
liabilities side.
27

InterGlobe Aviation
Capitalization of operating leases will reduce reported profitability
IASB (International Accounting Standards Board) is currently reviewing IFRS (International Financial Reporting
Standards) accounting policies, including treatment of operating leases. Under the new policies, the leased
aircraft will be accounted for as assets while the associated liabilities will be recognized under liabilities on the
balance sheet.
Further, as the operating lease proportion varies across airlines, we believe that return ratios are not
comparable.
Hence, we have analyzed the possible impact of capitalizing the operating leases. We have capitalized the future
minimum lease payments stated by the company. Accordingly, we have adjusted EBIT for depreciation and lease
rentals.
Exhibit 63: Reported RoCE will reduce if operating leases are capitalized
(INR Billion)
FY11
FY12
FY13
FY14
FY15
Calculating reported RoCE
Reported Capital Employed
PBT
Interest
PBT + Interest
Reported RoCE (%)
10
7
0
8
14
1
1
1
10%
14
35
49
1
2
8
7
18%
24
10
1
10
55%
24
43
67
10
3
14
21
37%
40
5
1
6
19%
40
60
100
6
4
17
19
23%
48
18
1
20
45%
48
61
109
20
4
20
35
34%
Calculating adjusted RoCE for operating lease treatment
Reported Capital Employed
Add: O/S amount of operating leases
Adj. Capital Employed
PBT + Interest
Less: Additional depreciation (@ 6%)
Add: Rentals
Adj. PBT + Interest
Adj. RoCE (%)
10
21
31
8
1
4
Source: Company, MOSL
10 December 2015
28

InterGlobe Aviation
Indigo v/s global LCCs
Exhibit 64: IndiGo operational costs per ASK (excl. fuel, in USD) one of the lowest among global LCCs in 2014…
6.35
5.82
5.67
5.48
5.1
4.75
4.7
3.88
3.74
3.16
3
2.98
2.9
2.88
2.87
2.68
2.54
Source: SAP Report, Company, MOSL
Exhibit 65: …and one of the highest profits per ASK (RASK minus CASK excl. fuel, in USD) among global LCCs in 2014
3.62
3.53
3.34
3.33
3.2
3.14
3.06
2.94
2.89
2.87
2.71
2.65
2.39
2.37
1.89
1.69
0.3
Source: SAP report, Company, MOSL
Exhibit 66: …and one of the highest profits per ASK (RASK minus CASK excl. fuel, in USD) among global LCCs in 2014
175
102
73
54
48
40
35
31
29
28
Southwest
Ryanair
EasyJet
Gol
Lion Air
JetBlue
IndiGo
Norwegian
AirAsia
Malaysia
Vueling
Source: SAP report, Company, MOSL
10 December 2015
29

InterGlobe Aviation
Indigo v/s domestic airlines
Exhibit 67: Indigo’s EBITDAR margins consistently higher than Indian peers
EBITDAR/ASK (INR)
0.9
0.8
0.5
0.5
0.3
0.1
FY11
FY12
Jet Airways
0.9
0.6
0.5
FY13
0.2
0.1
FY14
SpiceJet
IndiGo
1.1
0.7
0.4
0.3
FY15
Source: Company financials, MOSL
Exhibit 68: IndiGo’s rentals comparable to that of Indian peers…
Jet Airways
0.6
0.5
0.3
0.3
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.5
0.4
SpiceJet
IndiGo
0.6
0.6
0.5
0.7
0.6
0.5
FY11
FY12
FY13
FY14
FY15
Source: Company financials, MOSL
Exhibit 69: …resulting in it being the only airline making consistent profits even at EBITDA levels
EBITDA/ASK (INR)
0.6
0.5
0.0
0.1
0.0
-0.1
-0.4
FY12
-0.5
-0.5
FY13
FY14
-0.4
FY15
Source: Company financials, MOSL
0.4
0.2
0.2
Jet Airways
SpiceJet
IndiGo
0.5
-0.1
FY11
10 December 2015
30

InterGlobe Aviation
Indigo—the only domestic airline to remain profitable for last seven years
IndiGo is the only airline in India that remained profitable for the last seven
years. We believe that its fleet strategy plays a pivotal role in this along with
management focus on continually lowering the operating costs – IndiGo’s non-
fuel cost has remained flat for the last five years.
Exhibit 70: Indigo the only airline making consistent profits
IndiGo
SpiceJet
Jet Airways
GoAir
Air India
Kingfisher
FY09
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
FY10
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
FY11
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
FY12
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
FY13
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
FY14
FY15
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Ceased Operations
Source: CAPA, Company, MOSL
Exhibit 71: Lower total costs than competitors in FY14
(USD/ASK)…
Maintenance
Fuel
Rentals
Operations
Total Cost
Exhibit 72: …resulted in only IndiGo making profits* in FY14
(USD/ASK)
0.26
-0.17
9.82
3.39
2.62
3.47
0.34
Air India
9.05
2.86
2.01
3.23
0.95
Jet Airways
6.68
1.64
1.2
2.94
0.9
SpiceJet
6.37
1.42
1.23
3.37
0.35
Go Air
5.95
1.73
0.97
3.07
0.18
IndiGo
-3.17
Air India
Jet Airways
SpiceJet
-1.54
-1.05
Go Air
IndiGo
Source: CAPA, Company
*Profits as determined by RASK – CASK
Source: CAPA, Company
A320 neo induction to be game changer for Indigo
Airbus is introducing new aircraft in its A320 family – A320neo (new engine option),
expected to deliver 15% fuel cost savings. Indigo is one of the early “launch
customers” for A320neo and will start getting deliveries in current financial year. We
estimate the A320neo’s share to reach to ~33% by FY18 and give a significant lead
over its competitors as lower fuel cost will help its to keep ticket prices lower.
10-15% fuel cost savings on A320neos:
Typically, fuel is the largest cost element
of an airline—accounting for ~40-50% of its total costs. Hence, efficient
management of fuel cost is the key to operating cost leadership of an airline.
IndiGo already has the second lowest fuel costs in India. Induction of A320Neos
in its fleet (from November 2015), will result in further 10-15% in fuel cost
savings on new aircrafts.
IndiGo to have first mover advantage:
Since A320Neos have the same sub-
systems as A320s, the maintenance costs aren’t expected to rise. Moreover,
with Boeing and Airbus’s order book full until 2020, the competitors will not be
able to enjoy the same advantages till 2020-2022 by ordering new aircrafts.
Higher seating capacity to improve economies of scale:
A320Neo also have
increased seat capacity (186 v/s 180 in the existing A320s). Hence, its induction
31
10 December 2015

InterGlobe Aviation
is likely to increase the revenue per aircraft while keeping the employee per
aircraft same.
Exhibit 73: Induction of A320Neos to improve fuel consumption progressively
A320
A320neo
% Improvement in fuel consumption
154
94
0
111
9
102
0%
2015
94
1%
2016
102
2017
134
32
4%
102
2018
Source: Company, MOSL
52
5%
10 December 2015
32

InterGlobe Aviation
Some key things to know
1. Increase in block hours
≈
new aircraft addition
As measured by daily block hours, IndiGo’s aircraft utilization has consistently
increased— increased to 11.9 hours in 1QFY16 from 11.4 hours in FY15.
Based on the analysis of global LCCs, we believe IndiGo has room to improve its
block hours performance. For its FY15 fleet size, we estimate that an addition of
0.5 block hours is equivalent to adding four new aircraft!
Exhibit 74: 1QFY16 block hour increase equivalent to addition of four new aircraft
Existing Aircrafts
New Aircraft Equivalent
11.4
2
77
Block hours per day
11.4
0
94
11.9
10.7
10.4
11.1
4
4
39
55
-1
66
97
FY11
FY12
FY13
FY14
FY15
1QFY16
Source: Company, MOSL
2. Indigo is a low-cost but not low-fare airline
Historically, Indigo has stayed away from flash ticket sales and till date it has not
sacrificed profitability for market share.
Analysis of 2014 airfares and profitability makes us conclude that while Indigo
might have higher share of low-priced tickets, its profitability is ahead of
competition. Further, the low-priced ticket cost is comparable to even FSCs —
implying that Indigo is is essentially a low-cost airline and not a low-fare one.
We believe that while other airlines might offer low fares in promotional
schemes from time to time, they are not able to sustain it—possibly due to
higher costs. However, IndiGo is able to keep prices low sustainably owing to its
cost leadership.
Promotional sales are typically characteristic of industries facing strong price
competition, and we believe this will continue to weigh on the profitability of all
the players.
Exhibit 75: Indigo’s minimum fares comparable to FSCs; however, it stays away from high discounts to maintain profitability
Minimum fare offered in 2014
IndiGo
BOM – DEL
BOM - MAA
DEL - MAA
BLR - BOM
BLR - DEL
2,600
2,090
3,170
1,789
2,649
GoAir
2,600
2,141
NA
1,901
3,400
SpiceJet
2,399
2,194
864
486
952
Jet
2,481
2,015
2,186
1,439
2,594
Air India
2,608
2,589
2,385
1,902
2,525
Low air fare bucket in 2014 as % of revenue
IndiGo
20.1
20.1
21.8
22.4
24.3
GoAir
3.3
4.8
2.1
6.2
7.9
SpiceJet
7.9
6.9
8.0
6.8
7.5
Jet
Air India
7.7
1.7
9.4
1.8
9.9
1.6
7.2
1.4
6.9
0.3
Source: DGCA, MOSL
10 December 2015
33

InterGlobe Aviation
Addressing some investor concerns
Negative net worth before IPO due to dividend payout
We believe this is not a concern, given Indigo’s business model. Indigo operates
with a negligible fixed capital (higher share of operating leases) and negative
working capital, resulting in very high conversion of profits into distributable
free cash flows.
During FY11-15, Indigo paid out ~40% of the operating cash flow as dividend.
While the management has not made any promises on dividend, it has indicated
that in future it will follow a similar policy.
Management on dividend:
“We are not in a steady business. This is an airline
business and there will be volatility on fuel, competitors doing things. But our
philosophy on dividends is very simply: We will have a certain amount of profit,
keep what we need for capital needs, excluding aircraft and ground equipment,
and the rest belongs to shareholders, which should go back to them. That is why
we don't have a steady percentage dividend number" (BS, Oct 23, 2015).
Exhibit 76: Indigo’s historical dividend payout significantly high; we model similar trend to
continue
Dividend as % of PAT
98%
81%
Dividend as a % of operating cashflow
93%
100%
65%
0%
FY10
FY11
0%
FY12
37%
54%
28%
FY13
FY14
FY15
Source: Company, MOSL
Are cash incentives on bulk ordering sustainable and predictable
At the outset, we would like to note that almost all airlines globally use a mix of
operating and finance lease—similar to Indigo.
Cash incentives on aircraft
= Purchase price paid by the third-party lessor to
airline manufacturer less negotiated price by Indigo with airline manufacturer
The incentives are recorded in the balance sheet as deferred incentives and
then amortized over the lease term by reducing the rental cost. Amortization
ensures minimal volatility in earnings.
As on June 30, 2015, Indigo had deferred incentives of INR16.5b and amortized
value benefit will be reflected for the remaining period of the lease.
Given that the negotiated aircraft price is lower than the list price, this benefit
will continue (till 2026 for Indigo) as long as the company adds new aircraft.
10 December 2015
34

InterGlobe Aviation
Initiate coverage with a Buy; TP at INR1,478
Valuations driven by rapid capacity growth and high margins
Market leadership likely to strengthen further:
With 34% market share, IndiGo
is well positioned to benefit in the underpenetrated Indian aviation market.
Current macro factors offer favorable conditions for demand drivers and we
expect IndiGo to further strengthen its leadership position.
Low cost a sustainable competitive advantage:
IndiGo is not only the lowest-
cost operator domestically, but is also comparable with global low-cost airlines.
IndiGo’s (a) unique fleet strategy, (b) focus on lowering operating costs, (c)
visionary management and (d) scale gives it a sustainable competitive advantage
over peers.
Highly efficient management:
IndiGo’s management has proven its expertise in
the unique fleet strategy and its focus on containing non-fuel costs (flat for the
last 5 years). Also, management’s commentary that it is a low-cost carrier and
not low-fare carrier implies preference to profitability over market share.
Investor-friendly dividend policy:
IndiGo’s focus to lower fixed costs (through
higher operating leases) and negative working capital helps it to significantly
increase distributable free cash flow. For the last five years, its dividend stood at
30% of operating cash flow and 76% of profit. Management has indicated that it
expects to continue its dividend policy of high payouts.
Key assumptions
In our estimates through FY18, we model (a) fleet size growth from 94 in FY15 to
154 in FY18 and (b) load factor (seat utilization) moving from 80% in FY15 to
84% in FY18.
Expect 43%/44% EBITDA/PAT CAGR through FY18
We model EBITDAR/EBITDA CAGR at 33%/43%, leading to PAT CAGR of 44% led
by revenue passenger kilometer (RPK) CAGR of 21% (v/s 28% in the last four
years) and expansion in EBITDA margin from 13.4% in FY15 to 22.3% FY18.
Exhibit 77: Expect FY15-18 EBITDA CAGR at 43% (INR b)
54.4
45.3
38.0
71.9
36.0
13.2
FY15
FY16E
FY17E
FY18E
FY14
FY15
FY16E
FY17E
FY18E
86.9
Exhibit 78: Expect FY15-18 EPS CAGR at 44% (INR)
106.9
18.7
5.1
FY14
Source: Company, MOSL
Source: Company, MOSL
10 December 2015
35

InterGlobe Aviation
Value IndiGo at INR1,478/share
IndiGo warrants a premium:
We believe that IndiGo warrants a premium
valuation compared with international LCC peers due to (a) it being positioned
at the forefront of Indian aviation market growth story and (b) consistently
comparable and higher EBITDAR margins even when present in a country that
has comparatively high ATF prices (fuel expenses are the biggest cost
component for an airline).
Further, it should command a premium over Indian peers due to (a) it being the
only airline to post profits consistently in the last seven years and (b) rapid fleet
expansion in the next 3-4 years.
Upside to payout assumptions:
Our dividend payout assumption of 60% has an
upside risk as the last three years average payout was 91%. Nevertheless, we
note that even on our reduced payout ratio assumption, the dividend yield is
attractive at >4%.
While the long-term earnings trajectory for IndiGo is very promising, we remain
cognizant of the volatility in oil prices—which could result in significant
fluctuations in earnings. Hence, despite our 44% earnings CAGR through FY18,
we assign lower FY17E P/E target multiple of 17x (10% premium to global LCC
player RyanAir).
We value IndiGo at 17x FY17E EPS to arrive at a fair value of INR1,478/sh (48%
upside. At our target price, implied FY17E EV/EBITDAR stands at 9.7x (v/s 9.6x
for RyanAir).
On FY17E, the stock currently trades at 11.5x EPS and adj. EV/EBITDAR of 7.4x
with an implied dividend yield of >4%. Initiate coverage with a Buy.
Exhibit 79: Global peers trade at 6x-16x FY17E earnings
M Cap
(USD B)
Asia Pacific - EM
AirAsia Bhd
Cebu Air Inc
Jet Airways India Ltd
North America
Southwest Airlines Co
JetBlue Airways Corp
WestJet Airlines Ltd
Spirit Airlines Inc
Allegiant Travel Co
Eurasia & ME
Air Arabia PJSC
easyJet PLC
Norwegian Air Shuttle ASA
Ryanair Holdings PLC
Wizz Air Holdings Plc
Indigo
1.5
10.1
1.2
21.0
1.3
5.4
11.8
14.1
LP
57.7
n.a.
55.5
12.5
12.4
n.a.
20.6
n.a.
27.8
9.4
12.3
17.4
17.8
1.3
13.9
8.0
11.3
9.8
15.8
14.9
11.5
9.4
8.7
40.0
17.0
5.9
5.0
7.8
7.5
9.9
12.4
4.6
6.8
7.0
8.0
9.6
4.4
8.6
3.6
0.0
0.0
0.0
29.0
8.1
1.8
2.9
2.9
56.6
28.4
13.6
12.0
65.0
21.0
22.7
13.6
24.5
16.0
12.6
13.3
6.5
10.1
13.8
11.0
11.4
6.9
10.6
13.1
8.6
9.7
3.8
6.9
13.3
5.8
5.8
3.4
5.6
7.0
5.3
5.1
3.3
5.5
6.6
3.0
0.0
0.9
0.7
0.9
1.1
1.0
179.9
196.4
LP
90.7
60.9
n.a.
7.8
7.1
13.9
5.8
6.7
8.2
9.7
8.8
13.4
8.1
5.7
7.2
7.9
n.a.
6.5
3.4
2.5
n.a.
EPS CAGR (%)
FY15-17E
FY15
PE (x)
FY16E
FY17E
Adj. EV/EBIDTAR (x)
FY15
FY16E
FY17E
Div Yield
FY17E
8.5
7.4
4.3
Source: Bloomberg, MOSL
10 December 2015
36

InterGlobe Aviation
Exhibit 80: Despite superior margins, Interglobe (Indigo) trading at discount to RyanAir
11.0
10.0
9.0
8.0
7.0
6.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
FY17 EBITDAR margins
35%
40%
45%
JetBlue
Norwegian
Jet Airways
easyJet
Air Arabia
Allegiant
Southwest
Spirit
RyanAir
AirAsia
InterGlobe
Wizz Air
WestJet
Source: Bloomberg, MOSL
Exhibit 81: IndiGo—Key assumptions
Y/E March
Fleet and capacity
Fleet size (No)
Fleet Size Chg (No)
YoY (%)
ASK per airplane (millions)
ASK (millions)
YoY (%)
Load Factor
RPK (millions)
YoY (%)
Revenue Calculation
Ticket Revenue (INRm)
Yield (INR/RPK)
Yield - INR/RPK (YoY %)
Ancillary revenues
Total Revenue (INR mn)
YoY (%)
Fuel Cost
Exchange rate (INR/USD)
Brent Price (USD/bbl)
ATF Prices (INR/ltr)
YoY (%)
Avg. aircraft utiliz. (block hours / day)
Block hours (number)
Fuel (m litres / block hour)
Fuel cost per block hour (INR)
Aircraft fuel expenses (INRm)
FY11
39
FY12
55
16
41%
383
18,006
44%
82%
14,826
39%
19.0
49,873
3.36
5%
5,774
55,647
45%
47.9
114.5
63.8
33%
10.4
179,252
2,513
160,310
28,736
FY13
FY14
FY15
94
17
22%
413
35,327
18%
80%
28,177
22%
15.7
122,939
4.36
2%
16,314
139,253
25%
61.2
85.5
68.4
-10%
11.4
354,276
2,373
162,260
57,485
FY16E
111
17
18%
414
42,435
20%
82%
34,797
23%
11.9
144,408
4.15
-5%
18,701
163,109
17%
60.0
50.0
49.5
-28%
11.4
418,874
2,351
116,382
48,749
FY17E
134
23
21%
416
50,955
20%
83%
42,293
22%
13.1
179,800
4.25
2%
23,284
203,085
25%
FY18E
154
20
15%
417
60,074
18%
84%
50,463
19%
13.7
216,392
4.29
1%
28,023
244,414
20%
320
12,491
85%
10,634
43%
15.0
33,910
3.19
2%
4,424
38,334
66
77
11
11
20%
17%
413
419
24,977
29,967
39%
20%
81%
77%
20,260
23,136
37%
14%
17.4
17.7
82,667
99,240
4.08
4.29
21%
5%
9,365
11,926
92,031 111,166
65%
21%
54.4
110.5
70.8
11%
11.1
246,140
2,475
175,210
43,126
60.5
107.6
75.7
7%
11.4
297,653
2,445
185,227
55,134
45.6
86.7
47.8
10.7
125,553
2,535
121,170
15,213
66.0
66.0
55.0
60.0
55.7
58.8
12%
6%
11.4
11.4
509,723
599,184
2,295
2,259
127,718
132,770
65,101
79,554
Source: Company, MOSL
10 December 2015
37

InterGlobe Aviation
Earnings Sensitivity
We have done sensitivity analysis for FY17 EPS with respect to ATF price and
passenger growth. Aviation fuel cost stands 30%-50% of revenues and has a direct
impact on ticket prices and in turn passenger growth.
Exhibit 82: Average ATF prices (INR/KL) across Delhi, Chennai, Kolkata and Mumbai
100,000
80,000
60,000
40,000
20,000
-
1-Jun-08
1-Jun-10
1-Jun-12
1-Jun-14
Source: Bloomberg, MOSL
Exhibit 83: IndiGo’s passenger volumes up 39.3% YTD
TruJet
Air Pegasus
Air Costa
Vistara
AirAsia
GoAir
SpiceJet
Air India
Jet Airways
Indigo
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.4
0.4
0.0
0.7
0.2
0.8
Apr-Oct 2014
Apr-Oct 2015
3.8
4.0
5.7
7.4
7.1
7.6
8.1
10.5
12.6
17.6
Source: DGCA, MOSL
For scenario analysis, we have assumed two scenarios:
Scenario 1:
50% pass-through of fuel price change,
Scenario 2:
75% pass-through of fuel price change.
And within these scenarios, our passenger traffic growth ranges between 10% and
25%.
10 December 2015
38

InterGlobe Aviation
Exhibit 84: FY17E EPS Sensitivity—Scenario 1: 50% pass-through of fuel price change
50% pass-through
113
98
83
109
94
79
106
91
75
Base Case (21%)
10% passenger growth
15% passenger growth
25% passenger growth
102
87
71
99
83
67
95
79
63
91
76
59
88
72
55
84
68
51
67
63
59
55
51
47
43
39
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
Brent Crude Price (USD/bbl)
70
75
80
Source: Bloomberg, MOSL
Exhibit 85: FY17E EPS Sensitivity—Scenario 2: 75% pass-through of fuel price change
75% pass-through
108
93
78
106
91
75
104
89
73
Base Case (21%)
10% passenger growth
102
87
71
15% passenger growth
25% passenger growth
100
85
68
98
83
66
96
81
64
94
78
61
93
76
59
63
60
58
55
53
50
48
45
42
40
45
50
55
60
65
Brent Crude Price (USD/bbl)
70
75
80
Source: Bloomberg, MOSL
10 December 2015
39

InterGlobe Aviation
Key risks
Economic risks:
Airline industry passenger growth is closely linked to GDP growth
rates. Any slowdown in domestic GDP growth, seasonality will impact overall
passenger growth.
Infrastructural constraints:
Many large airports in India have capacity constraints to
handle flights in the prime time slots. Any delay in debottlenecking the capacity will
limit the growth in those cities.
Increased competition:
Any move by competitors like high cash burn to gain market
share will impact market share during that period. We believe IndiGo management
will not sacrifice profitability for the sake of market share.
Sharp increase in oil prices:
Oil price is an airline’s biggest cost component (40-50%
of total costs). While LCCs are in a better position versus FSCs during a high oil price
scenario, high short-term volatility and inability to commensurately change ticket
price will impact margins.
Currency risk:
While almost all the revenue is in INR terms, ~70% of the expenses
are USD denominated. Inability to pass the forex impact could reduce margins.
Regulatory risks:
While the proposed aviation policy is intended to ease airlines, any
delay in policy implementation or any adverse rules could have implications for the
sector growth.
10 December 2015
40

InterGlobe Aviation
Company background
Incorporated in January 2004, InterGlobe Aviation Limited (IAL) operates
IndiGo—India’s largest passenger airline with 33.9% and 37.4% market share of
domestic passenger volume for FY15.
The company operates on a low-cost carrier (LCC) business model and focuses
on the domestic Indian air travel market. It caters to 33 airports in India and to 5
international airports, with a maximum of 603 domestic flights per day in the
week ending August 31, 2015.
It is continuously focused on maintaining the cost advantage and a high
frequency of flights while striving to fulfill the simple brand message of
providing “low fares, on-time flights and a hassle-free experience” to
passengers.
The company commenced operations in August 2006 with a single aircraft, and
has grown to a fleet of 97 aircraft (75 are on an operating lease while 22 are on
financial lease) as of August 31, 2015, all of which are Airbus A320.
InterGlobe has identified geography as its primary segment; it reports its
revenue in two segments: (a) Domestic and (b) international.
It primarily generates revenue through passenger ticket sales. Additional
revenue is generated through cargo services and typical activities associated
with air-travel like ticket modification and cancellation, in-flight sale of eatables,
special service requests etc.
Exhibit 86: Total FY15 revenue breakup
Ancillary
services
11.3%
Others 0.4%
Passenger
tickets 88.3%
Source: Company, MOSL
Exhibit 87: Total FY15 ancillary services breakup
In-flight 8% Advertising 1%
Tours 1%
Commission
0%
Cargo 42%
Passenger
services 48%
Source: Company, MOSL
10 December 2015
41

InterGlobe Aviation
Exhibit 88: Indigo primarily operates on domestic routes
Indigo ASK break-up (millions)
Domestic
International
3,910
4,207
3,714
1,345
16,661
FY12
21,263
25,760
31,417
FY13
FY14
FY15
Source: Company, MOSL
Exhibit 89: IndiGo’s ticket booking medium breakup
Booking medium
breakup (FY15)
Traditional agents
Aiport Desks
3%
16%
Website
Mobile Platform
1%
Call Centers
2%
52%
26%
Source: Company, MOSL
Exhibit 90: Key milestones
Year
January, 2004
June, 2005
July, 2006
August, 2006
April, 2007
April, 2009
June, 2011
September, 2011
September, 2011
October, 2011
December, 2012
February, 2013
April, 2014
November, 2014
March, 2015
August, 2015
Milestone
Incorporated
Placed a landmark order of 100 A320 aircraft with Airbus
Took delivery of the first aircraft
Launched its domestic operations
Crossed the one million passenger mark
Crossed the 10 million passenger mark
Placed another order of 180 A320neo aircraft with Airbus, which was
again one of the largest orders
Launched its international operations
Became the largest domestic carrier in India by market share
Took delivery of 50th aircraft.
Crossed the 50 million passenger mark
Took delivery of 75th aircraft
Crossed the 75 million passenger mark
Took delivery of 100th aircraft
Crossed the 100 million passenger mark
Placed an order of 250 A320neo aircraft with Airbus
Source: Company, MOSL
10 December 2015
42

InterGlobe Aviation
Exhibit 91: Promoters and key management
Mr. Rakesh Gangwal,
Promoter and Non-
executive Director
•
•
•
•
Mr. Rahul Bhatia,
Promoter and Non-
executive Director
•
•
•
Mr. Gangwal has more than 30 years of experience in the aviation industry.
He was the leader of driving hard bargains with Airbus and engine and spare
parts manufacturers, something learnt from the President and CEO of US
Airways Group.
Most recently (from June 2003 to August 2007), he was the Chairman,
President and CEO of Worldspan Technologies, Inc.
He holds a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering from IIT Kanpur and
an MBA from Wharton with a major in finance.
He holds a degree in electrical engineering from the University of Waterloo in
Ontario, Canada.
Mr. Bhatia was instrumental in the formation of InterGlobe Enterprises in
1989 with its flagship business of air transport management.
He has more than 25 years of experience in the travel industry.
Mr. Aditya Ghosh,
President and Whole-
time Director
•
•
•
•
•
Mr. Ghosh heads all operations and management of IndiGo. He became
Director in May 2007 and President in August 2008.
He also serves on the executive committee of InterGlobe Enterprises, which is
responsible for managing the company’s various businesses.
Mr. Ghosh holds a bachelor’s of law degree from Delhi University.
Prior to joining InterGlobe Aviation in 2008, Mr. Ghosh was the group general
counsel for InterGlobe Enterprises from 2004 to August 2008.
He also practiced law from 1998 to 2004 at J. Sagar Associates, Advocates &
Solicitors.
Exhibit 92: Indigo management organization structure
Source: Company, MOSL
10 December 2015
43

InterGlobe Aviation
Annexure 1: Aviation regulatory environment
Key features of the proposed aviation policy
India targeting 4-5x passenger growth by 2022:
The government is targeting
300m domestic tickets by 2022 (versus 70m now) and 500m by 2027. Similarly,
it is targeting increasing international ticketing to 200m by 2027.
Encouraging addition of new locations:
Under the regional connectivity scheme
(RCS), the government plans to provide subsidies to airlines for flying on certain
routes and limiting the flying cost to INR2,500 per flying hour. The government
will exempt ATF drawn from RCS airports from excise duty, apart from not
levying airport charges for 10 years and no service tax on tickets under RCS.
Reviving airports:
The government would also revive underutilized or unserved
airports and airlines at 400 locations at an estimated cost of around INR50cr to
support flights to these new locations. Requirement of project IRR of 12% will be
relaxed for airports under the Airport Authority of India (AAI).
Promoting new airports near congested airport locations:
Further, under the
current regulations, development of an airport within 150km radius of an
existing AAI airport is not permitted; the government will relax this requirement.
However, AAI may have the right of first refusal (to prohibit development of
such an airport) or can have equity participation of 49% in the new airport. We
believe that since major airports are near capacity, the relaxation will invigorate
airport infrastructure development in India.
Exhibit 93: Of the 476 airports and strips in India, only 75 are served fully
Source: AAI, MOSL
10 December 2015
44

InterGlobe Aviation
Incentives to shift aircraft maintenance to India:
Currently, Indian airlines incur
90% of their annual INR5,000cr maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO)
expenditure outside India. Overseas repairs increases the overall costs of
airlines, and a domestic well-functioning MRO industry is expected to reduce
these expenses. To develop the MRO sector, the government is considering
providing service tax waiver, apart from relaxing import of some spare parts.
Further, the state governments will be encouraged to waiver VAT charges.
Exhibit 94: India’s existing aviation policy comparison with that of developed countries
Policy/Regulation for the following
FDI in airlines
Licensing of ai line i terms of timelines
B l
teral
Regio a
connectivity
Airport econom ic
pol cy
Public-Private Partners hip i
airports
Sl
allocation
En ironme t
Safet
Security
Security/regulat ry r
quirements fo
aff
Car
and express
Aerospace
General aviation and business aviation
India
×
×
×
×
×
×
US
×
×
UK
×
×
×
Australia
×
Singapore
×
×
×
×
×
×
Germ
any
×
×
×
×
France
×
×
×
×
×
Hong
Kong
×
×
×
×
×
Dubai
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
Source: CAPA, MOSL
New proposed route dispersal guidelines
Indian government introduced route dispersal guidelines in 1994. The
underlying objective of the guidelines was to ensure air connectivity to J&K, NE,
island territories and Tier-2 and Tier-3 cities.
Category-II and Category-III routes under the earlier guidelines have seen more
than required capacity deployed, which points out that there is adequate
potential to expand Category-I.
We believe that addition of routes under Category-I will provide space to airlines
to rationalize their existing network.
Exhibit 95: Categorization of routes under the existing route dispersal guidelines
Category-I Routes
Mumbai - Bangalore
Kolkata - Delhi
Mumbai - Kolkata
Kolkata - Bangalore
Mumbai - Delhi
Kolkata - Chennai
Mumbai - Hyderabad
Delhi - Bangalore
Mumbai - Chennai
Delhi - Hyderabad
Mumbai - Trivandrum
Delhi - Chennai
Category-II Routes
Stations in:
North Eastern region,
Jammu & Kashmir
Andaman & Nicobar
Lakshadweep
Category-III Routes
Routes other than Category I and II
Source: Ministry of Civil Aviation , MOSL
10 December 2015
45

InterGlobe Aviation
Under the guidelines, any airline operating on one or more of the Category-I
routes is required to provide services on Category-II and Category-III routes as
defined in the flowing points.
On Category-II routes, an airline will have to deploy at least 10% of the capacity
it deploys on Category-I routes. Within the required capacity to be deployed, at
least 10% should be deployed on services operating exclusively within NE,
Jammu and Kashmir, Andaman & Nicobar, and Lakshadweep.
At least 50% of the capacity deployed on Category-I routes will be deployed on
Category-III routes.
On a route connecting destinations that fall under different categories, the
route will be broken into point-to-point sub-routes and these sub-routes will be
counted toward each category requirement.
For example, on a Delhi-Kolkata-Guwahati-Imphal route, the capacity on
Kolkata-Guwahati route will be counted under Category-II routes and that on
the Guwahati-Imphal route will be again counted under exclusive capacity
within Category-II routes.
Exhibit 96: Guidelines for defining new Category-I routes
Category-I Routes
The routes should have a flying distance of at least 700 km
The routes should have an average seat factor of 70% (timeline for computing average factor not
specified)
The routes should have an annual traffic of 50mn passengers
Source: Ministry of Civil Aviation , MOSL
10 December 2015
46

InterGlobe Aviation
Annexure 2: Fare structure for a standard air ticket in India
Some charges that appear on a common air ticket are not actually levied by the
airline, but by airport authorities and the government. These charges are hence
passed on to the relevant authorities and appear in expenses of an airlines income
statement.
Exhibit 97: Components of a standard air ticket
Name
Base Fee
Passenger Service Fees
User Development
Fees/Development Fees
CUTE Fee
Service Tax
Fuel Surcharge
Carrier Imposed Misc Fees
Agency/Airline
Charged by airlines
Charged by AAI airports and private airports.
Charged by AAI airports and private airports.
Charged by airlines
Charged by Central Board of Excise and
Customs, Central Government
Charged by airlines
Charged by airlines
Brief Description
Basic fare charged by airlines to passengers
To cover Security and Facilitation at all airports. This
part is passed through to airport authorities
Levied by airports to fund passenger facilitation. This
part of fare is passed through to airport authorities
Common Use Terminal Equipment fee - fee charged
for check-in process
Service Tax on transportation by air (journeys starting
in India).
Not passed through to others. Some airlines now club
this with base fees
Charged under various names
Source: Air India , MOSL
Exhibit 98: Fare structure of a standard IndiGo ticket
Exhibit 99: Fare structure of a standard SpiceJet ticket
Source: Company, MOSL
Source: Company, MOSL
10 December 2015
47

InterGlobe Aviation
Annexure 3: Indian aviation sector statistics
Exhibit 100: Total domestic passengers (m)
59.9
51.6
43.3
57.8
60.1
66.4
65.8
12.9
10.4
12.3
13.2
Exhibit 101: Total international passengers (m)
16.9
15.2
11.1
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
YTD15
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
YTD15
Source: DGCA, MOSL
Source: DGCA, MOSL
Exhibit 102: Distribution of passengers (m) by routes in FY15
16.2
Exhibit 103: Top 5 routes (Aug-Oct 2015) by passengers (m)
1.3
8.3
0.7
1.6
0.7
0.5
0.5
Top 10 Metro to
Metro routes
Top 10 Metro to Non- Top 10 Non-metro to
metro routes
Non-metro routes
Source: CAPA, Company, MOSL
Mumbai - Bangalore - Bangalore - Mumbai -
Delhi
Mumbai
Delhi
Goa
Mumbai -
Chennai
Source: DGCA, MOSL
Exhibit 104: Fleet distribution of major airlines
Boeing
1%
7%
57%
35%
16%
10%
74%
Airbus
38%
100%
62%
100%
100%
100%
ATR
Bombardier
Exhibit 105: Average fleet age of major airlines
8.9
5.9
4.1
3.9
3.9
2.7
3.2
Air India
Source: CAPA, DGCA, Company, MOSL
Jet SpiceJet Air
Airways
Costa
Go Air AirAsia IndiGo
India
Source: DGCA, Company, MOSL
10 December 2015
48

InterGlobe Aviation
Exhibit 106: Capacity market share (ASK) of major airlines
IndiGo
16
6
15
20
25
18
FY11
Jet Airways
13
6
17
19
24
21
FY12
Air India
2
7
20
20
23
28
FY13
SpiceJet
-
8
19
19
21
32
FY14
Go Air
Others
2
9
15
18
19
37
FY15
Exhibit 107: Passenger market share of major airlines
IndiGo
GoAir
-
20
6
14
16
26
18
FY11
Jet Airways
Kingfisher
Air India
Others
SpiceJet
2
-
9
15
17
22
34
FY15
-
16
6
15
16
27
20
FY12
-
2
8
19
17
26
27
FY13
-
9
19
18
24
30
FY14
Source: CAPA, DGCA, Company, MOSL
Source: DGCA, Company, MOSL
Exhibit 108: A few of India’s states are equal to some European countries in area, implying huge air travel opportunity with
increasing per capita income: Clockwise (1) Uttar Pradesh=~ UK, (2) Bihar ~ Hungary, (3) Haryana ~ Denmark (excl. Greenland)
and (4) Arunachal Pradesh ~ Austria
Source: Storypick, MOSL
10 December 2015
49

InterGlobe Aviation
Annexure 4: FSC v/s LCC business model
The LCC model:
Southwest Airlines, in the US, is usually cited as pioneering the
business model of low-cost carriers in 1970s with the sole objective of offering
cheap air-fares to the passengers. Naturally, the business model required a re-
look at each business area, from seating arrangements to other high cost areas
of the business. Fleets began to be standardized, and fare structure simplified
with some elimination of in-flight amenities.
Exhibit 109: Comparison of Low-Cost Carrier business model and traditional airlines
Full Service Carrier (FSC)
Fare structure
Distribution
Route structure
Seating
In flight
Frequent flyer
Aircraft
Trip Length
Airport
Staff
Low direct sales, high dependency on travel
agents.
High frequency Hub and Spoke route structure.
Multiple classes with mixed seating density
(Economy/Business/First). Pre assigned seating.
Hot meals and in-flight entertainment.
Frequent flyer program.
Multiple aircraft types and low utilization of
aircraft (9 hours/day)
Medium to long
Primary airport with major international
connections.
High wage but low productivity. No profit
sharing.
No hot meals. Snacks and light beverages only, no in-
flight-entertainment
No frequent flyer program
Limits many aircraft type, high utilization rate (12 hours
per day)
Short to medium.
Secondary/uncongested airports which facilitates fast
turnaround of aircraft.
Competitive wage, profit sharing plan and highly
productive employees
Source: Carleton University, MOSL
High frequency Point to Point route structure.
Single class high density seating, unreserved seating.
Low Cost Carrier (LCC)
High direct sales and low dependency on travel agents.
Multiple fare structures with various restrictions. Simplified fare structure.
Shift in market shares:
Due to lower fares, market share began shifting towards
LCC. This shift was more prevalent in developing economies where passengers
are more price-sensitive. Difference in market shares in developing South-East
Asian countries and the developed North-East Asian countries (Japan, Korea
etc.) highlights this trend.
Exhibit 110: LCCs’ average 2009-14 market shares in domestic air travel
Full service carriers
Low cost carriers
15%
85%
17%
83%
32%
68%
Europe
38%
62%
6%
94%
34%
66%
North
America
41%
59%
Oceania
Africa
Asia
Latin America Middle East
Source: Amadeus, MOSL
10 December 2015
50

InterGlobe Aviation
Exhibit 111: LCCs dominate developing economies…
Low cost carriers
Full service carriers
Exhibit 112: …FSCs dominate developed economies
Full service carriers
Low cost carriers
69%
69%
68%
48%
42%
40%
4%
6%
7%
10%
9%
10%
31%
2009
31%
2010
32%
2011
52%
2012
58%
2013
60%
2014
96%
94%
93%
91%
2012
91%
2013
90%
2014
2009
2010
2011
Source: CAPA, MOSL
Source: CAPA, MOSL
Exhibit 113: Similar to Southeast Asian countries, Indian aviation dominated by LCCs
Low cost carriers
Full service carriers
60%
54%
50%
39%
37%
38%
41%
FY10
46%
FY11
50%
FY12
61%
63%
62%
FY13
FY14
FY15
Source: DGCA, Company, MOSL
Hybridization:
With loss of market shares, legacy and full service carriers have
started adopting features of LCC model. This trend was furthered by the global
financial crisis and post-crisis developments. At the same time, some LCCs began
expanding their service offerings. According to KPMG, cost difference between
LCCs and traditional carriers have reduced to 2.5 US cents in 2012 from 3.6 US
cents per ASK. Further, some airlines have launched their own LCC services. For
example, Jet Airways operates as a FSC, while JetLite was operated as a LCC.
10 December 2015
51

InterGlobe Aviation
Annexure 5: Key terminologies for the airline industry
1. Available Seat Kilometer (ASK): The Basic Measure of Capacity
One seat (empty or filled) flying one kilometer is an ASK
A 180-seat A320 flying 100 kilometers creates 18,000 ASKs
2. Revenue Passenger Kilometer (RPK): The Basic Measure of Production
A paying passenger flying one kilometer creates an RPK
150 passengers flying 100 kilometers generate 15,000 RPKs
3. Load Factor: Production Compared to Capacity
To calculate the load factor, divide RPKs by ASKs
For an individual flight, 15,000 RPKs divided by 18,000 ASKs, or 83%
High load factor means high utilization, but how much each passenger pays is
also important
4. Yield: Revenue per Passenger Kilometer
To calculate the yield, divide passenger revenue by total RPKs
To calculate a customer's individual yield, divide ticket price by kilometers; if a
customer pays INR3,000 for the 500 kilometers, the yield would be INR6 per
kilometer
5. Revenue per Available Seat Kilometer (R/ASK): The Basic Measure of Revenue
It is a measure of how much revenue we generate per increment of capacity
To calculate unit revenue, divide total operating revenue by total ASKs
6. Cost per Available Seat Kilometer (C/ASK): The Basic Measure of Cost
Unit costs represent how much it costs to fly one seat (empty or filled) one mile
To calculate unit costs, divide total operating expenses by total ASKs
7. Code Sharing
Almost every airline in the world has a unique two letter code (some are one
letter and one number) assigned by the International Air Transport Association
(IATA) to identify its flights, tickets and other commercial documents. Many
airlines have now entered into agreements whereby they share these codes,
and usually coordinate their schedules as well. The result is that each airline can
offer its passengers more destinations, and a more convenient routing to those
destinations, than would be possible for either one of them alone. The motive,
of course, is to control that traffic by keeping it within the joint system and
avoid losing passengers who are going to points outside the route network of
one or the other of the partners.
8. Utilization
The word refers to the number of hours per day, usually Block, that an airplane
operates. Its importance lies in the fact that the only way an airline can carry
more passengers without adding new airplanes to the fleet is by increasing the
load factor or the daily utilization.
10 December 2015
52

InterGlobe Aviation
Financials and valuations
Standalone income statement
Y/E March
Total Income from Operations
YoY Chg (%)
Total Expenditure
EBITDAR
Margin (%)
Aircraft & Engine Lease Rentals
EBITDA
Margin (%)
Depreciation
EBIT
Int. and Finance Charges
Other Income
PBT
Current Tax
Deferred Tax
Tax Rate (%)
Reported PAT
Adjusted PAT
Change (%)
Margin (%)
FY12
55,647
45.2
47,151
8,496
15.3
8,007
489
0.9
665
-176
514
1,440
749
0
-657
-87.7
1,406
1,406
-75.7
2.5
FY13
92,031
65.4
69,533
22,498
24.4
13,561
8,936
9.7
856
8,080
578
2,371
9,873
837
1,202
20.7
7,834
7,834
457.2
8.5
FY14
111,166
20.8
89,396
21,769
19.6
16,703
5,066
4.6
2,260
2,806
1,226
3,155
4,736
0
-9
-0.2
4,744
4,744
-39.4
4.3
FY15
139,253
25.3
101,034
38,219
27.4
19,522
18,697
13.4
3,022
15,675
1,155
3,838
18,357
1,839
3,563
29.4
12,956
12,956
173.1
9.3
FY16E
163,109
17.1
100,930
62,178
38.1
24,154
38,024
23.3
3,710
34,315
1,057
3,774
37,032
11,110
0
30.0
25,922
25,922
100.1
15.9
FY17E
203,085
24.5
127,885
75,199
37.0
29,874
45,326
22.3
4,383
40,943
866
4,679
44,755
13,427
0
30.0
31,329
31,329
20.9
15.4
(INR Million)
FY18E
244,414
20.4
153,725
90,689
37.1
36,277
54,412
22.3
5,091
49,321
866
6,591
55,046
16,514
0
30.0
38,532
38,532
23.0
15.8
Standalone balance sheet
Y/E March
Equity Share Capital
Total Reserves
Net Worth
Deferred Tax Liabilities
Total Loans
Capital Employed
Gross Block
Less: Accum. Deprn.
Net Fixed Assets
Capital WIP
Total Investments
Curr. Assets, Loans&Adv.
Inventory
Account Receivables
Cash and Bank Balance
Loans and Advances
Curr. Liability & Prov.
Account Payables
Other Current Liabilities
Provisions
Net Current Assets
Deferred Tax assets
Appl. of Funds
E: MOSL Estimates
FY12
344
2,090
2,433
0
10,156
12,589
10,737
1,877
8,860
0
5,234
21,711
374
389
13,088
7,860
23,882
1,585
21,952
345
-2,170
665
12,589
FY13
344
3,547
3,890
537
18,004
22,432
20,362
2,718
17,645
69
11,383
29,428
523
685
13,406
14,814
36,093
2,648
32,906
539
-6,665
0
22,432
FY14
344
3,874
4,217
529
33,462
38,208
44,505
4,945
39,560
0
12,715
38,759
673
891
11,015
26,180
52,826
3,828
43,985
5,013
-14,067
0
38,208
FY15
344
3,918
4,262
4,091
39,262
47,615
56,727
7,967
48,760
5
5,168
53,805
1,306
1,046
19,994
31,460
60,123
4,755
53,316
2,051
-6,318
0
47,615
FY16E
3,604
17,604
21,208
4,091
27,262
52,561
67,531
11,677
55,854
1,201
5,168
65,403
1,304
1,225
26,025
36,849
75,066
4,750
60,423
9,893
-9,663
0
52,560
FY17E
3,604
30,201
33,805
4,091
27,262
65,158
79,292
16,060
63,232
1,440
5,168
87,829
1,653
1,525
38,771
45,881
92,511
6,018
77,127
9,366
-4,682
0
65,157
(INR Million)
FY18E
3,604
45,695
49,298
4,091
27,262
80,651
91,244
21,151
70,093
1,488
5,168
114,006
1,986
1,835
54,967
55,218
110,104
7,234
91,350
11,519
3,902
0
80,651
10 December 2015
53

InterGlobe Aviation
Financials and valuation
Ratios
Y/E March
Basic (INR)
EPS
Cash EPS
BV/Share
DPS
Payout (%)
Valuation (x)
P/E
Cash P/E
P/BV
EV/Sales
Adj. EV/EBITDAR
EV/EBITDA
Dividend Yield (%)
FCF Yield (%)
Return Ratios (%)
RoE
RoCE
Working Capital Ratios
Inventory (Days)
Debtor (Days)
Creditor (Days)
Working Cap. Turnover (Days)
Leverage Ratio (x)
Net Debt/Equity
FY12
3.9
5.7
10.6
0.0
0.0
FY13
21.7
24.1
14.8
15.2
81.4
FY14
13.2
19.4
11.3
10.5
93.1
75.8
51.4
85.3
0.5
8.0
11.2
1.0
FY15
36.0
44.3
11.8
30.0
99.7
27.8
22.5
84.4
0.4
5.0
2.9
3.0
3.8
FY16E
71.9
82.2
58.9
50.4
83.7
13.9
12.1
17.0
2.2
8.5
9.5
5.0
6.8
FY17E
86.9
99.1
93.8
43.5
59.8
11.5
10.1
10.6
1.7
7.4
7.7
4.4
7.7
FY18E
106.9
121.1
136.8
53.5
59.8
9.3
8.2
7.3
1.4
6.5
6.1
5.4
9.3
0.0
1.5
57.9
10.4
3
5
12
-91
-1.2
171.2
55.1
2
6
11
-74
1.2
100.9
18.7
2
6
13
-83
5.3
310.7
44.6
3
7
12
-69
4.5
203.6
76.0
3
9
11
-80
0.1
113.9
77.5
3
9
11
-78
-0.3
92.7
76.7
3
8
11
-76
-0.6
Standalone cash flow statement
Y/E March
OP/(Loss) before Tax
Depreciation
Interest & Finance Charges
Direct Taxes Paid
(Inc)/Dec in WC
CF from operations
Others
CF from operating including EO
(Inc)/Dec in FA
Free cash flow
(Pur)/Sale of Investments
Others
CF from investments
Issue of Shares
Inc/(Dec) in Debt
Interest Paid
Dividend Paid
Others
CF from financial activity
Inc/Dec of cash
Opening Balance
Closing balance
E: MOSL Estimates
FY12
639
665
457
-371
8,740
10,130
-1,169
8,961
-331
8,630
0
3,078
2,747
0
-219
-144
-4,904
-1,108
-6,376
5,332
7,757
13,089
FY13
9,932
856
543
-1,852
9,819
19,299
-1,892
17,407
-9,153
8,254
0
-8,298
-17,451
0
7,270
-169
-5,486
-1,253
361
317
13,089
13,405
FY14
4,778
2,260
1,019
-1,076
11,309
18,291
-2,341
15,950
-23,237
-7,287
0
-7,952
-31,189
0
13,638
-186
0
-603
12,848
-2,390
13,405
11,015
FY15
18,358
3,022
-1,667
-3,951
7,765
23,526
312
23,839
-10,170
13,669
8,583
-193
-1,779
0
3,817
-101
-13,575
-3,223
-13,081
8,979
11,015
19,994
FY16E
37,032
3,710
-2,717
-11,110
8,403
35,317
0
35,317
-11,026
24,291
0
3,774
-7,252
12,722
-12,000
-1,057
-21,699
0
-22,034
6,031
19,994
26,025
FY17E
44,755
4,383
-3,813
-13,427
1,339
33,238
0
33,238
-5,573
27,665
0
4,679
-894
0
0
-866
-18,732
0
-19,598
12,746
26,025
38,771
(INR Million)
FY18E
55,046
5,091
-5,725
-16,514
4,013
41,912
0
41,912
-8,402
33,510
0
6,591
-1,811
0
0
-866
-23,039
0
-23,905
16,196
38,771
54,967
10 December 2015
54

REPORT GALLERY
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